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“Once you do away with the idea of people as fixed, static entities, then you see that 
people can change, and there is hope.”  
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF RACE-BASED JUDGMENTS 
ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 
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Major Professor: Kathleen Corriveau, Associate Professor of Human Development 
ABSTRACT 
In my dissertation, I broadly investigate social essentialism across three studies. 
More specifically, I examined three particular types of essentialist beliefs: stability, strict 
boundary, and homogeneity beliefs. In the first two studies, I explored the mechanisms 
through which children and adults come to understand race as a stable construct. A third 
study built upon this work to inform the development of interventions designed to 
enhance cognitive flexibility and ultimately reduce intergroup conflict.  
In Study 1, I looked at children’s stability beliefs and how they differed based on 
a child’s age and racial background (monoracial Black versus biracial Black). This 
concept has been understudied among children of color in present day society, resulting 
in outdated and disjointed research. Results from Study 1 indicated that the development 
of race essentialism looked differently for monoracial Black and biracial Black children 
until age 7 at which point the two groups looked similar. Subsequently, I was interested 
in building upon Study 1 and examining stability beliefs at the other end of the lifespan to 
consider adults’ race essentialism. Existing research links essentialism with stereotyping 
and discrimination among adults, warranting a more nuanced understanding of its 
development and maintenance over time. More specifically, in Study 2, I investigated 
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how levels of race essentialism varied based upon demographic variables.  
 Lastly, in Study 3, I examined children’s sensitivity to information presented on a 
continuum as opposed to categorically and the impact such framing had on their 
similarity judgments and inferences about behavior. Children of color from low-income 
backgrounds who received the continuum framing were able to perceive greater 
variability within members of the same group and greater similarity between members of 
different groups, corroborating previous work with 4-year-old middle- to upper middle-
income children.  
Lastly, the final chapter of this dissertation addresses the implications of these 
findings for the field of education as well as clinical practice. Taken together, these 
results have the potential to inform classroom teachers, caregivers, and clinicians about 
the importance of encouraging the development of cognitive flexibility, especially in the 
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The belief that people can be categorized into discrete social categories, such as 
gender and race, is referred to as social essentialism (Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). 
Stemming from the superordinate idea of psychological essentialism, the fundamental 
idea is that particular categories are typified by an underlying essence or reality that 
cannot be observed or changed (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Locke, 1671/1959; 
Hirschfeld, 1995, 1996; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Prentice & Miller, 2007). Such an 
essence gives members of a category their perceived identity, and characterizes them as 
having shared, concealed, fixed qualities and even behaviors (Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld, 
1996; Medin & Ortony, 1989). For instance, children believe that legless lizards will act 
more similarly to a lizard than a snake, even though visually it is more similar to a snake 
(Gelman & Markman, 1986; Jaswal & Markman, 2002). When categorizing biological 
domains like animals, there is limited variability and the categories are the same across 
time and contexts. On the contrary, this clean structure does not exist when categorizing 
people (Atran, Estin, Coley, & Medin, 1997; Gelman & Rhodes, 2012). People are 
grouped by a wide range of characteristics that shift based on the context (Hirschfeld, 
1995). Furthermore, often the essence uniting category members cannot be readily 
explained. In other words, social essentialism is an intuitive theory, meaning that 
individuals do not necessarily have specific, or clear beliefs about the essence of a social 
category (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). It is simply a cognitive heuristic to categorize 
the world. However, such a strategy falls short and fails to accurately describe social 
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categories in particular (Prentice & Miller, 2007).  
Social categories are not marked by firm boundaries and are influenced by history 
and cultural norms (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Essentialist beliefs about social 
categories (hereinafter referred to as “social essentialism”), such as race, have malignant 
repercussions, including stereotyping and prejudice (Prentice & Miller, 2007). For 
instance, social essentialism invokes the belief that if one member of a racial group lashes 
out in anger, all members of that racial group must have an angry nature. In reasoning 
about race, people tend to believe that racial attributes are stable and do not change. 
Specifically in the case of race essentialism (i.e. essentialist beliefs about race), I studied 
stability beliefs in both children and adults. In Study 1, I investigate the developmental 
trajectory of stability beliefs within race essentialism for two understudied groups, 
monoracial Black children and biracial Black children (Chapter 2). In Study 2, I explore 
adults’ stability beliefs about race and how race essentialism might vary as a function of 
group differences. Additionally, people tend to see social categories as homogenous and 
having discrete boundaries. Therefore, in the case of social essentialism broadly, I studied 
the presence of it in children. In Study 3, I explored whether strict boundaries beliefs and 











Figure 1.1. The framework for this dissertation.  
 
In the following chapters, I integrate literature from various fields on social 
essentialism as the definition varies widely across the literature (Hamilton, 2007; 
Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam & Whelan, 2008).  I also argue that the cognitive bias of 
social essentialism influences young children and adults’ understanding of social 
identities, likely contributing to the development of prejudiced attitudes. 
Specifically, I investigate whether demographic variables, such as one’s own race, 
impacts one’s tendency to demonstrate social essentialism. Additionally, I explore a 
possible method to disrupt the development of these essentialist beliefs. In summary, this 
dissertation is guided by the three following overarching questions (see Figure 1.1): 
1) How do monoracial Black and biracial Black children’s beliefs about the 
stability of race change over development? (Study 1, Chapter 2) 
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2) Do beliefs about race as a stable attribute contribute to adults’ racial 
essentialist bias? Relatedly, how do adults conceptualize race broadly? 
(Study 2, Chapter 3) 
3) Does presenting information on a continuum, as opposed to categorically, 
influence how children reason about the category boundaries and 
homogeneity of social groups? (Study 3, Chapter 4) 
I will explore these questions pertaining to essentialist beliefs in greater detail below and 
situate them within the existing literature. 
Literature Review 
One of children’s primary tasks in early and middle childhood is to make sense of 
their social world (Erikson, 1963; Rhodes, 2013). Consequently, it is essential that we 
understand how children acquire their beliefs about the social world (Rhodes, 2013; 
Rhodes, Gelman, & Karuza, 2012). For instance, children may seek the answers to 
“questions such as: ‘What kinds of people are there in the world?,’ ‘What kind of person 
am I?,’ ‘What sorts of behaviors do people ‘like me’ do?,” and “What are we good at?’” 
(Rhodes & Bushara, 2015, p. 107). From a young age, children learn that placing 
information and people into categories (e.g., boys, teachers, adults) is necessary to 
organize the mass amount of new information they encounter on a daily basis (Allport, 
1954; Ellis & Oakes, 2006; Rhodes, 2013). Children begin to group social and non-social 
objects into categories as early as infancy (for a review, see Gelman & Myer, 2011). This 
ability to categorize allows for efficient retrieval of information, enhanced memory and 
language (Allport, 1954; Mareschal & French, 2000; Mareschal, Powell, & Volein, 
 
 5 
2003). Categorization about the social world allows for the prediction and explanation of 
human behavior based on past experience (Kinzler, Shutts, & Correll, 2010). 
Categorization is undoubtedly useful and a developmental achievement. However, social 
categorization quickly becomes problematic. Most notably, when a social object (e.g., a 
human) is viewed simply as a member of a superordinate group (e.g., race, ethnicity), 
differences between groups as well as similarities within groups are exaggerated, 
resulting in stereotypes about that group (Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Master, Markman, & 
Dweck, 2012). This strategy results in certain categories being essentialized, meaning 
membership in a category is determined and indicates concealed, fixed characteristics 
(Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989).  
Social essentialism is present around the world from young ages but there is 
significant cultural variation in age as well as the types of social categories in which 
social essentialism is evoked (Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004; Birnbaum, Deeb, Ben-
Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; Deeb, Segall, Bimbaum, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 
2011; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Hirschfeld, 1995; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Rhodes, 
Leslie, & Tworek, 2012; Sousa, Atran, & Medin, 2002; Taylor, Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; 
Waxman, 2010). For instance, Shutts and colleagues (2010) found that gender and age 
influence three-year-old children’s choices and preferences but race did not. Additionally, 
5-year-old White children only demonstrated essentialist beliefs around gender, not racial 
categories (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). In other words, although essential beliefs are 
present early, they are used with some selectivity and applied only to particular social 
categories (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). There is substantial cultural variation 
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and the type of information that children receive greatly impacts the development of 
these essentialist beliefs (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Research demonstrates though 
that because social categories are more complex, children require more evidence for the 
development of essentialist beliefs, which is encouraging (Diesendruck, 2003; 
Mandalaywala et al., 2018). A better understanding of the process by which children 
learn to make social judgments, engage in stereotyping, and are impacted in their 
everyday lives by others’ attitudes will help to inform the development, and the 
appropriate timing of interventions that may reduce stereotyping and discrimination. 
People often presume that members of a single category are joined by an 
underlying property but they do not postulate about the details of said property (Medin & 
Ortony, 1989). Therefore, it is extremely challenging to directly measure beliefs about 
the “essence” of a category in adults or children (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). 
Alternatively, researchers 
 
Figure 1.2. The five essentialist beliefs.   
typically focus on the cognitive implications of social essentialism, which result from five 
distinct yet interrelated beliefs: beliefs about natural kinds, causal attributes, stability of 
defining characteristics, strict category boundaries, and homogeneity (see Figure 1.2; for 
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a review, see Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Traditionally, researchers examined 
essentialist beliefs as a single construct without further exploring the individual beliefs. 
The different types of essentialist beliefs, however, are in fact discrete and indeed have 
their own unique consequences, making it difficult to generalize across them (Rhodes & 
Mandalaywala, 2017). In research moving forward, it is critical that the particular type of 
essentialist belief being investigated is clearly identified to accurately capture the 
development, observation, and impact of such beliefs.  
Additionally, the five types of beliefs described above are in fact distinct but are 
more easily separated in early childhood, making this an important time to study the 
development and presence of these different beliefs (Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007). 
This is a particularly important developmental period because children are beginning to 
develop their own self-concepts, which are highly impacted by the different types of 
essentialist beliefs (Collyer, Boseovski, & Marcovitch, 2018). For instance, preschool 
children see people as different “kinds” with innate characteristics, representing natural 
kinds beliefs (Gelman, 2003; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Organizing people into 
social categories is one method that children use to make sense of these different “kinds” 
and then assume that these categories inform how individuals will behave (Bigler & 
Liben, 2007; Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006). When considering how a person will behave 
in the future, the category a person is placed in is more explanatory than the individual’s 
past behaviors or preferences (Kalish & Lawson, 2008). The power associated with 
categories likely operates on the prescription of stable characteristics to certain groups 
(Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). In other words, children employ stereotypes and link 
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certain traits with certain social categories, such as race (Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 
2010).  
Through both experimental and survey methods, I focus exclusively on three of 
these essentialist beliefs. More specifically, I examine children and adults’ beliefs about 
how stable, as opposed to malleable, race is. Additionally, I explore how children reason 
about category boundaries and homogeneity within a social category. In order to position 
the objectives and possible contributions of these three studies, the remainder of this 
chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature. I begin by summarizing the 
existing research on the three specific essentialist beliefs (i.e. stability, strict boundaries, 
and homogeneity beliefs), the different factors associated with essentialist beliefs, before 
turning to the consequences of social essentialism.   
Stability Beliefs 
Stability beliefs, one of the five types of essentialist beliefs, posits that category 
membership is inherent and unchanging (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Children 
demonstrate stability beliefs as early as preschool (e.g., Gelman, 2003). As a result, 
children predict that category memberships are established prior to birth and will remain 
constant despite alterations. Once social essentialism has evolved during childhood, 
categories are perceived through an essentialist lens (i.e. racial group membership is 
immutable), which has been linked to out-group stereotyping (Pauker et al., 2010; Semaj, 
1980). Therefore, gaining a more nuanced understanding of when children develop social 
essentialism and how this differs across racial groups is critical.  
 
 9 
Several studies have examined stability beliefs about race by using skin color as a 
proxy and examining how it compares to other constructs that carry features of an 
inherited category. For example, Kinzler and Dautel (2012) contested race and language 
to see if one would trump the other. Interestingly, the researchers found differences 
across racial groups, such that 5- to 6-year-old Black children selected race as more 
stable over language while 5- to 6-year-old White children selected language as more 
stable over race. The differences observed between these racial groups of same-aged 
children suggest that children’s essentialist beliefs about race may vary widely across 
cultures. Similarly, Roberts and Gelman (2016) contested race and emotion by showing 
children a picture of a child and two adults and asked which adult the child would grow 
up to be more like – a person that matched on emotion or race. They found that 5- to 6-
year-old White children selected race and emotion pairs equally while racial minority 5- 
to 6-year-olds selected race over emotion. In these two studies, the differences are likely 
due to differences in racial socialization and knowledge and experiences of prejudice 
(Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001; Bigler, Averhart & Liben, 2003; Hughes et 
al., 2006; McKown & Weinstein, 2003; Pahlke, Bigler, & Suizzo, 2012; Rivas-Drake, 




Figure 1.3. Studies 1 and 2 explore stability beliefs as they relate to race at different 
points of development across the lifespan. 
 
Despite ample research on how social categories become essentialized (discussed 
in greater detail later on), there is significant variability and additional investigations are 
warranted to clarify the development of such beliefs for specific social categories within 
specific contexts. Although people globally demonstrate essentialist beliefs about several 
social categories such as gender, ethnicity, and class, essentialist beliefs about race are 
particularly frequent in the United States due to its history of categorizing people based 
on the color of their skin (Mandalaywala et al., 2018). How race is constructed and 
understood impacts the social, economic and legal landscapes, making it paramount to 
study how children and adults are thinking about race, especially given today’s cultural 
and political context. Therefore, I was especially interested in examining stability beliefs 
as they relate to race among children and adults. In Study 1, I aim to: 1) explore the 
development of stability beliefs specifically related to race during early childhood and 2) 
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explore variability in the development of these beliefs across two understudied groups: 
monoracial Black children and biracial Black children (see Figure 1.3).  
Race essentialism. 
Racial/ethnic identity development in early childhood. One of the ways in which 
race essentialism is explored is within the literature on racial identity development. Race 
essentialism undoubtedly plays a role in racial identity development and the importance 
of racial identity development, especially for children of Color, should not be undercut. 
How does racial/ethnicity identity develop? Children are not born with a racial self-
concept and must develop this identity as they grow older (Murray & Mandara, 2002). A 
child’s general developmental capacities dictate what elements of racial/ethnic identity 
development are relevant and growing during a certain period of development (Umaña-
Taylor et al., 2014). In spite of this, there is a lack of attention within the existing 
literature to the intersection of racial/ethnic identity development and normative 
developmental processes, such as cognitive development, emotion regulation, motivation, 
etc. (Umaña-Taylor et al., 2014; Williams, Tolan, Durkee, Francois, & Anderson, 2012). 
Additionally, further work is needed to situate racial and ethnic identity development as 
distinct yet contingent upon the development of other identities (e.g., gender; Phinney, 
2008).  Understanding dimensions within racial and ethnic identity development that are 
truly developmental in nature (i.e. stage-like progression over time) versus those that 
evolve as a result of growth in other developmental domains will enhance our clarity 
regarding the relationship between racial and ethnic identity and outcomes (Williams et 
al., 2012). Nonetheless, several researchers have sought to identify the salient 
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components within racial/ethnic identity development.  
 Perhaps one of the more well-known identity development models for African 
Americans is the nigrescence model made up of four stages (i.e. pre-encounter, 
encounter, immersion-emersion, and internalization; Cross & Vandiver, 2001). However, 
this model starts in adolescence and was not specifically designed to be developmental in 
nature (Williams et al., 2012; Worrell, 2008). Tatum (1997), however, applied the 
nigrescence model to encompass childhood and preadolescence. She argued that Black 
individuals do not need a dramatic identity transformation in adulthood but rather are 
being shaped by positive and negative influences throughout their lifespan. Thus, many 
have achieved a Black identity prior to being an adult. Tatum’s (1997) shift to include 
preadolescent years is appropriate but became somewhat complex because she utilized 
the same terms as the original Cross (1991) model, which was designed exclusively for 
adults. Thus, to ensure clarity of the different stages, Cross and Fhagen-Smith (2001) 
expanded the original nigrescence model to be comprised of six sectors that encompassed 
the lifespan. The researchers noted that sector one, infancy and childhood, are marked by 
sociological and ecological factors that impact the socialization of children, such as 
family, SES, schools, etc. Similarly, there are other general models for racial and ethnic 
identity development (e.g., Model of Ethnic Identity Development in Adolescence, 
Phinney, 1989; Racial and Cultural Identity Development Model, Atkinson, Morten, & 
Sue, 1998) as well as race specific models (e.g., Model of Latino Identity Development; 
Ferdman & Gallegos, 2001; Model of Multiracial Identity Development; Jacobs, 1992; 
Model of White Identity Development, Helms, 1995).  
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Although many theories have focused on adolescence and even preadolescence as 
the fundamental beginning of identity development (e.g., Phinney, 1989; Cross, 1991; 
Atkinson et al., 1998), more recent theories have highlighted that the process is taking 
shape earlier. Some theories (e.g., Alejandro-Wright, 1985; Cross & Fhagen-Smith, 2001; 
Tatum, 2017) have included childhood in their models yet still claim that developing 
racial identity patterns do not emerge before age 10. Given that the development of self-
concept, arguably the fledgling version of identity, begins quite early, it seems important 
to consider how racial and ethnic identity may be embedded within this process even at 
younger ages (Collyer et al., 2018). This may also serve as additional evidence that often 
racial and ethnic identity development is considered in isolation and not at the 
intersection of broader developmental processes. Additionally, these theories generally 
place a heavy emphasis on the external influences on identity development for children 
(e.g., parenting strategies). It is important to understand children’s engagement in the 
process as well as the content related to their racial and ethnic identity development.  
Umaña-Taylor and colleagues (2014) reserve the term, “ethnic/racial identity 
development” for the formative process that takes place during adolescence. Instead, the 
researchers use “ethnic-racial identification”  and the related processes include 
differentiation of the self and other and the application of general cognitive development 
to ethnicity and race. Despite acknowledging this important developmental period, 
Umaña-Taylor et al. (2014) focus on adolescence and do not elaborate sufficiently on 
these phenomena during childhood. However, drawing upon previous work on 
racial/ethnic identity (e.g., Aboud & Doyle, 1993; Alejandro-Wright, 1985; Bernal, 
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Knight, Garza, Ocampo, & Cota, 1990; Semaj, 1980), and social cognitive (Bandura & 
Bussey, 2004; Bussey & Bandura, 1999) and cognitive developmental work (e.g., Martin, 
Ruble, & Szkrybalo, 2002) on gender, Byrd (2012) suggested a framework for 
racial/ethnic identity made up of three main factors: awareness, identification, and 
attitudes (see Table A1 in Appendix A). Umaña-Taylor et al. (2014) and Byrd’s (2012) 
theories overlap but are structured slightly differently.  
Byrd’s (2012) concept of awareness, entails the ability to recognize members of 
different races. Although adults can use physiognomic, cultural, and social markers to 
categorize by race/ethnicity, children often only attend to skin color (Dunham, 
Stepanova, Dotsch, & Todorov, 2015; Ramsey & Myers, 1990). Additionally, Umaña-
Taylor and colleagues (2014) see constancy, or the idea that their race is unchanging, as 
indicative of the ability to meaningfully identify as opposed to simply being able to apply 
a label to the self or a group. 
While the awareness stage focuses on the identification of others’ races, Byrd’s 
(2012) idea of identification, which signifies a child’s ability to accurately detect their 
own race/ethnicity and is different from identity (i.e., a set of beliefs/attitudes pertaining 
to one’s identification), parallels Umaña-Taylor & colleagues’ (2012) construct, labeling; 
however, labeling within Umaña-Taylor et al.’s (2014) theory encompasses both the 
identification of not only the self but also others. Lastly, Byrd’s (2012) concept of 
attitudes refers to beliefs about various racial groups. When exploring racial/ethnic 
identity among adolescents and adults, the concept is typically only referring to attitudes 
since the assumption is made that they can correctly categorize themselves and others 
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according to race/ethnicity. However, younger children are still developing awareness 
and identification capacities, hence the need for researchers to advance the grasp on racial 
constancy (Byrd, 2012). Phinney and Rotheram (1987) included a fourth factor, beliefs, 
which appear to be captured within attitudes in Byrd’s (2012) model. Taken together, 
these developing abilities prepare children for later identity development in adolescence.   
Socio-cognitive developmental model for children’s understanding of race. The 
idea that children actively create their social experience is a guiding principle within the 
cognitive developmental model of racial/ethnic identity development (Aboud & Doyle, 
1993). As previously mentioned, identity development begins with awareness, which 
refers to a child’s capacity to differentiate individuals of different races (Byrd, 2012). 
This ability likely arises as soon as a child “becomes perceptually aware of physical 
differences in people” (Semaj, 1980, p. 60). Research demonstrates that infants can 
visually differentiate as well as perceptually categorize faces by race by three months and 
six months of age, respectively (Anzures, Quinn, Pascalis, Slater, Tanaka, & Lee, 2013; 
Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy, & Hodes, 2006; Kelly, Quinn, Slater, Lee, Ge, & Pascalis, 2007; 
Sangrigoli & De Schoen, 2004). More specifically, infants living in racially homogenous 
communities look longer at same race faces (Bar-Haim et al., 2006). However, to fully 
appreciate this research, it is important to consider the fact that infants’ tendency to look 
at same race individuals for longer periods of time develops and is not present at birth 
(Kelly, Quinn, Slater, Lee, Gibson, Smith, & Pascalis, 2005). In other words, exposure to 
faces of different races can slow or even block the development of this effect; increased 
looking time at same race individuals, which may be a precursor to later in-group bias, is 
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not observed among infants growing up in heterogeneous communities who have been 
regularly exposed to racially diverse faces (Bar-Haim et al., 2006).  
Similarly, upon viewing African American faces, activity in the amygdala (i.e. the 
brain structure responsible for emotion and believed to play a role in unconscious 
responses to race) was positively correlated with age among 4- to 14-year-old White and 
Black children, such that the amygdala response heightens as children age (Telzer, 
Humphreys, Shapiro, & Tottenham, 2013). Yet, akin to the work on infants, a lessened 
response was observed among those who have greater racial diversity among their peers 
(Telzer et al., 2013). Other research has demonstrated that 3-year-old children do not 
reliably use race to inform their preferences while 4- to 5-year-old children do (Kircher & 
Furby 1971; Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2010). In conjunction with the research on infants, 
it is evident that the socialization of children largely impacts their perceptions of race 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2006; Telzer et al., 2013) Thus, the significance of race is variable 
during early childhood but it is clear that race can become a salient construct at an 
incredibly young age. Research demonstrates that children’s understanding of race 
parallels the developmental trajectory associated with children’s understanding of gender; 
however, young children’s understanding of gender, at least historically as a binary 
construct, is often more advanced because race is not identified or discussed as frequently 
and directly as gender is (Katz, 2003; Shutts et al., 2010).  
In order to understand the process by which children learn about the concept of 
race, Alejandro-Wright (1985) aimed to create a socio-cognitive developmental model 
that consisted of four stages (0-III; see Table A2 in Appendix A). Despite serving as a 
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seminal piece, it is important to note that while her sample was made up of Chinese, 
Black, and White children, the sample was small (n = 32) and her work took place more 
than 30 years ago. Nonetheless, the model helps to lay the foundation of children’s 
conception of race.    
Alejandro-Wright (1985) described Stage 0 as consisting of idiosyncratic 
information about color categories (black or white) with no attention to physical 
characteristics (e.g., hair); all of the 3- and 4-year-olds responded at this level. Byrd 
(2012) suggests that children ages 3 to 4 years old are becoming aware that physical 
differences exist and are in the beginning stages of identity development, but categorize 
people based on their own individualized methods.   
Recall that children at young ages do not think in abstract terms and so, skin 
color, an observable, concrete trait, is something on which they depend (Alejandro-
Wright, 1985). Eye color and hair type may also play a role but skin color is the main 
feature by which children are categorizing individuals by race (Alejandro-Wright, 1985; 
Dunham et al., 2015). By 4 to 6 years of age, children use race to categorize, evaluate, 
and think about others across different contexts (Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 2006; 
Levy & Killen, 2008; Quintana & McKown, 2008). Alejandro-Wright (1985) deemed 
this Stage I, the subliminal stage of awareness, as their awareness is solidly founded on 
physical characteristics and their categorization strategies are more predictable (Byrd, 
2012; Dunham et al., 2015). However, there is a dearth of research on younger children’s 
race-based judgments and reasoning (Shutts et al., 2010). Additionally, during these early 
years, children see race as something fleeting and unfixed (e.g., by tanning in the sun; 
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Ramsey, 1987).  
Nonetheless, children at Stage I more spontaneously grouped individuals together 
based on physical appearance than children at Stage 0. However, these categories were 
broad skin color groups (e.g., black and white). Thus, they incorrectly grouped Blacks 
with lighter complexions and Chinese as Whites (Alejandro-Wright, 1985). Once given 
“Chinese” as a label though, children at Stage I and not at Stage 0, were able to correctly 
categorize the individuals but could not explain the logic behind their choice. As children 
continue to develop, their awareness hardens while they also acquire their faculty to 
reliably self-identify (Byrd, 2012). Recall that at ages 4 to 5, children are merely able to 
sort people according to a schema and are not necessarily accurately labeling race. 
Although there is some inconsistency within the research, children seem to become able 
to correctly identify their own race and that of others by the age of 5 to 6 years of age 
(Aboud, 1988; Byrd, 2012). Bernal, Knight, Garza, Ocampo, and Cota (1990) also noted 
a shift from preschool (4- to 5-year-olds) to school-aged (6-10 year-olds) observing the 
ability to use an “empty” label for themselves (simply based on mimicry) to a label 
carrying greater weight (see Table A3 in Appendix A).  
Subsequently, children move on to Stage II, the preconceptual level, in which 
they are able to appreciate finer distinctions related to racial groups. Additionally, 
children have an emerging awareness that physical and biological features, in addition to 
skin color, play a role when categorizing individuals by race (Alejandro-Wright, 1985; 
Byrd, 2012). This stage typically is achieved by 7 to 8 years of age.  
Children then progress to the fourth and final stage, Stage III, which is the 
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conceptual stage. At this stage, children are able to fully appreciate that racial/ethnic 
differences are hereditary and due to biological qualities in addition to the physical 
features. Moreover, children are just beginning to understand the influence that social 
features have in racial classification (Alejandro-Wright, 1985; Byrd, 2012). This stage 
normally occurs between ages 8 to 10 years of age (Alejandro-Wright, 1985).  
Although Alejandro-Wright’s (1985) model does not go past the age of 10, Byrd 
(2012) expanded the framework to include 10 to 12 years of age because it is not until 
this point that the full awareness of physical, biological, and social characteristics can be 
appreciated (Alejandro-Wright, 1985; Quintana, 1998). Children at this age are also able 
to comprehend the need to categorize more flexibly (e.g., a person that is biracial). 
Additionally, Byrd (2012) also suggests that racial constancy, or the idea that race does 
not change, does not develop until ages 10 to 12 (Byrd, 2012).  
Racial constancy. One particular idea within racial identity development is 
constancy and much of the foundational work centered on the terms “racial constancy” or 
“ethnic constancy” (e.g., Aboud & Skerry, 1983; Aboud & Doyle, 1993; Semaj, 1980). 
Much of the research on racial/ethnic identity assumes that observations of children’s 
early preferences, biases, and attitudes are consequential because children have attained 
racial constancy. However, this premise is misleading because racial constancy has been 
largely untested and the literature is inconsistent and limited to studies on White children 
(Roberts & Gelman, 2016). Racial constancy specifically is “the knowledge that race is 
stable and will not change with superficial alterations” (Byrd, 2012, p. 6). In other words, 
it is the recognition that an individual’s racial group membership does not change over 
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the course of time or across circumstances (Aboud, 1983).  
Gender constancy, the dated understanding that gender is permanent, is the most 
widely investigated example of this ability (Marcus & Overton, 1978; Martin et al., 
2002). Derived from Kohlberg’s (1966) work on gender constancy, children’s 
understanding of race parallels the developmental trajectory associated with children’s 
understanding of gender being that both are inherited and cannot easily be changed 
(Aboud, 1983); however, young children’s understanding of gender, at least historically 
as a binary construct, is often more advanced because race is not identified or discussed 
as frequently and directly as gender is (Katz, 2003; Shutts et al., 2010). Therefore, 
research suggests that racial constancy takes a longer time to develop despite the fact that 
awareness of race develops very early (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2006; Martin et al., 2002; 
Umaña-Taylor et al., 2014). On the contrary, Akiba and García Coll (2003) found that 
children of color from immigrant backgrounds demonstrate the opposite pattern in which 
the salience of their ethnicity is greater than gender and thus, develops more quickly.  
Through research, Slaby and Frey (1975) conceptualized constancy by exploring 
three stages through which children move: identification (the ability to identify one’s own 
category membership and differentiate racial groups), stability (recognizing that category 
memberships do not change over time) and consistency (understanding that category 
memberships do not change over different contexts and superficial physical changes; 
Ruble, Alvarez, Bachman, Cameron, Fuligni, Garcia Coll, & Rhee, 2004; Martin et al., 
2002). Drawing upon previous research (e.g., Bernal et al., 1990; Knight, Bernal, Garza, 
Cota, & Ocampo,1993; Ruble et al., 2004, 2007), Serrano-Villar and Calzada (2016) 
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deemed asking forced choice questions related to identification, stability, and consistency 
the “gold standard” (p. 28), albeit very few studies have assessed all three components. 
However, recall that the literature is disjointed though and it is difficult to generalize 
because so few studies examined all three components of racial constancy, which 
contributes to the confusing, divergent results. Nonetheless, I will give an overview of the 
research framed as racial constancy so one can fully appreciate how similar the different 
conceptualizations in fact are.  
Identification. To examine the first component of racial constancy, identification, 
or children’s ability to categorize, Aboud and Doyle (1993) used a label recognition test, 
in which children had to recognize whether they were the same race as the picture shown 
and related label given (e.g., “This person is Black. Are you Black?”). They found that 
children in kindergarten did well on the label recognition test, indicating no differences 
between Black and White children. Subsequently, the children were asked to group the 
photos of the children along with a card denoting the child’s name into “groups of 
children who belong together” (p. 50). More than 80% of White participants were correct 
and showed minimal improvement with age. On the other hand, Black children were less 
frequently correct in kindergarten but were all correct by third grade. Yet, these results 
for the Black children are akin to Clark and Clark’s (1947) doll study in which clear 
developmental progress is observed; the large majority of 7-year-old Black children 
(87%) selected the Black doll as most similar to themselves whereas only 48% and 68% 
of 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds, respectively, did.    
Exactly when self-identification takes place varies with some studies 
 
 22 
demonstrating that it is more limited in preschool and does not exceed chance in 
kindergarten through first grade (Annis & Corenblum, 1986; Bernal et al., 1990; Branch 
& Newcombe, 1986; Semaj, 1980). Other more recent research illustrates that 56% and 
76% of 3- and 5-year-olds respectively are able to accurately self-identify with pictures, 
suggesting that children are able to self-identify at younger ages (Guerrero, Enesco, & 
Lam, 2011). Nonetheless, the variation is likely related to children’s exposure to people 
of other races because awareness of racial groups, identification of one’s own group, and 
intergroup attitudes develop more rapidly in diverse communities when compared to 
more racially homogenous communities (Cramer & Anderson, 2003; Kowalski & Lo, 
2001).  
Stability. To assess the second component of racial constancy, stability, or the 
idea that a child was always and will always be the same race, Hirschfeld (1993, 1995) 
asked children to look at a drawing of an adult and determine which picture of a child the 
adult was most alike. The drawings varied based on race, body build, and occupation. A 
sample of predominantly White 4-year-olds viewed race as more stable than occupation; 
however, they did not judge race as more stable than stature (e.g., body build) 
(Hirschfeld, 1995). However, since there were no pre-test control trials, it may be that 
children did not consider occupation, as opposed to their choice being a reflection of their 
appreciation for the stability of race. Nonetheless, by 7 years of age, children viewed race 
as more stable than stature or occupation (Hirschfeld, 1995). This suggests that stability 
within racial constancy is not present at age 4 but can be appreciated by age 7.  
Hirschfeld (1997) summarized his findings (1988, 1993, 1995, 1996) by noting 
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that children’s understanding of race by the age of merely 3 years of age is “adult-like” 
and more sophisticated than previous work noted (Hirschfeld, 2012). The young age at 
which children demonstrate a mature understanding of race can likely be explained by the 
fact that Hirschfeld focused exclusively on identification and stability. Hirschfeld (1997) 
emphasized the importance of heritability by asking children what happens when young 
children are switched at birth and raised by adoptive parents of a different race. They 
noted that the children grew up and showed them pictures of elementary aged children. 
Hirschfeld (1997) argued that if children thought race was socially determined, they 
would select the adoptive parents. Instead, the majority of the 3-year-olds and almost all 
of the 4-year-olds chose the birth parents. This conclusion likely needs tempering as there 
are various alternative explanations that could account for the findings (e.g., children may 
simply be matching based on color). To say that children have an “adult-like” 
understanding of race seems radical and misleading. The tasks also did not assess 
consistency, which is a critical and arguably the most high-level component of racial 
constancy (Hughes, 1997). An additional major caveat is that Hirschfeld used a sample of 
primarily White children as well as line drawings for the pictures, which did not allow for 
clear distinctions between races (Roberts & Gelman, 2016). In summary, Hirschfeld’s 
(1993, 1995) work in which he offered occupation as a comparison factor that was less 
salient may have resulted in an overestimate of children’s grasp of race (Roberts & 
Gelman, 2016).  
Similarly, Rutland et al. (2005) investigated both identification and stability 
among a sample of 3- to 5-year-old White, British children. The participants had the 
 
 24 
possibility of earning a score of 3 on the racial constancy task, which required the 
children to look at pictures of four children and asked which they were most like 
presently and when they got a suntan. Lastly, the children viewed four pictures of adults 
and asked which they would be most similar to when they were older. Twenty-one 
percent scored 0, 38% scored 1, 34% scored 2, and 7% scored 3, suggesting that 
children’s understanding of race is immature in preschool. 
 Despite a heavy emphasis on White populations, in a rare exception, Kinzler and 
Dautel (2012) examined White and Black children to determine whether they privileged 
race or language. They found that the Black 5- to 6-year-old children along with the 
White and Black 9- to 10-year-olds selected the adult that matched on race while White 
5- to 6-year-old children selected the adult that matched on language. These 
discrepancies in the findings between White and Black children of the same age suggests 
that racial stability may be acquired at different rates across the two groups.  
Most recently, Roberts and Gelman (2016) used emotional expression as an 
example of a contrasting feature that was not stable but still salient. Aligned with Pauker 
et al.’s (2010) procedure, participants saw one child and two adults (e.g., one who 
matched in emotion but not race and one who matched in race but not emotion). All 
possible combinations of emotion and race were given. Results indicated that White 5- to 
6-year-olds were significantly less likely than White 9- to 10-year-olds and adults to 
make same-race matches. The 9- to 10-year-olds’ responses did not differ significantly 
from the adults’ responses. Additionally, the same-race matches by the White 5- to 6-
year-olds were at chance levels (e.g., approximately 58% made more same-emotion 
 
 25 
matches, 35% made more same-race matches, and 7% made same-emotion and same-
race matches equally).  A second sample of racial minority children (75% Black) were 
then compared to the White sample. Racial minority 5- to 6-year-olds were more likely to 
make same-race matches than their White counterparts.  In short, the findings are 
consistent with Kinzler and Dautel’s (2012) and suggest that Black children view race as 
more stable than language and emotion and appreciate the stability of race at a younger 
age than White children (Roberts & Gelman, 2016). However, White 9- to 10-year-olds 
and adults deemed race more stable than emotion, demonstrating a developmental 
progression.  
Consistency. Although Byrd’s (2012) model indicates that racial constancy is not 
achieved until well after the age of six, studies examining the third component of racial 
constancy, consistency, have shown that his may begin to occur earlier. For example, in a 
sample of 80 Black children ages 4-11 (M = 8.9 years, SD = 2.4 years), Semaj (1980) 
found that 20% of 4-5 year olds, 60% of 6-7 year olds, and 80% of both 8-9 year olds and 
10-11 year olds demonstrated awareness that a Black person could not become White 
when they were asked whether race could change due to desire or superficial 
transformations. However, only 15% of 6- to 7-year-olds and 8- to 9-year-olds, and less 
than half (40%) of the 10-11 year olds, maintained constancy when hair and skin color 
were altered, indicating that constancy may not fully develop until pre-adolescence or 
early adolescence. These findings suggest nuanced changes over time, such that it is not 
an “all or nothing” process.  
Aboud (2001) also assessed consistency among a sample of White, middle class 
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children ages 5-9 years old and did not observe consistent development of racial 
constancy until children were 8 years old. Aboud (2001) suggests that social factors 
related specifically to ethnicity impact the development of racial constancy after 
accounting for general cognitive abilities. Aboud (2001) conceptualized these social 
factors as awareness of the permanent nature of race, preference, and conservation. 
Between kindergarten and first grade, Aboud (2001) noted that permanence arose quickly 
and was observed in children prior to the achievement of constancy, suggesting that it 
develops independently and precedes constancy.  
 Serrano-Villar and Calzada (2016) also examined constancy but specifically 
looked at ethnicity and differentiated this from racial constancy. More specifically, they 
suggested that racial and ethnic identity development for non-White Latinos may be 
mutually supporting processes that are both are in progress by the age of 4. Using the 
Early Childhood Ethnic Identity Interview (ECEII) with 674 Mexican and Dominican 
American 4- to 5-year-old children, results indicated that 74.6% could self-identify and 
56.6% demonstrated ethnic constancy (65.4% in Kindergarten and 46.8% in Pre-K). 
However, what the authors are calling constancy embeds the idea that children are aware 
their ethnicity does not change but does not necessarily mean that they can explain why 
or how, which is considered an integral factor in other work (e.g., Pauker et al., 2010). 
Therefore, it is important to consider what these authors deem “ethnic knowledge” which 
examines children’s meaning of ethnicity. This likely more adequately parallels Byrd’s 
operationalization of racial constancy (i.e. only 21.8% of the whole sample and 12.7% of 
Pre-K participants demonstrated ethnic knowledge) and more closely aligns with existing 
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research among children of color (e.g., Semaj, 1980).  
The significant differences between the scores of children in pre-k and 
kindergarten align with existing research and support a developmental process (Bernal et 
al., 1990; Knight et al., 1993). However, in the only other study to date examining Latino 
children in pre-k, Bernal and colleagues (1993) found that self-identification and 
constancy were not present broadly until elementary school (ages 6-10 years). Thus, the 
process may be evolving earlier in development or the social context of the samples may 
account for the varying results (Berry, 2004). An additional finding of interest is that 
significantly more Mexican American children showed understanding of constancy when 
compared to Dominican American children (63.4% and 52.7% respectively). Again, the 
social context may help to explain these subtle differences, such that the Dominican 
American children in the sample had mothers who were more likely to speak English, 
had higher levels of education, worked outside the home, and of higher SES and in turn, 
demonstrated higher levels of acculturation.  
Although there is a dearth of studies that assess all three components of racial 
constancy (i.e. identification, stability, and consistency), Pauker and colleagues (2010) 
examined racial constancy by asking children to identify their race presently, as a baby, 
and as an adult and whether they could change their race if they wanted. The children 
were asked questions regarding stability and consistency for others through the use of 
pictures of real people. Pauker et al. (2010) found that none of the 3- to 5-year-old 
children had achieved racial constancy of the self and less than 5% had achieved it for 
others. One-third of 5- to 6-year-olds achieved racial constancy for self and 19.4% 
 
 28 
achieved it for others. Among the 6- to 7-year-olds 56.3% and 68.8% had achieved racial 
constancy for self and others, respectively. Finally, 60% of 7- to 10-year-olds achieved 
racial constancy for both self and others. Interestingly, racial constancy for others is 
highest for 6- to 7-year-olds.  
Using the same protocol, Pauker et al. (2016) created a racial constancy score 
(max = 3), where higher scores demonstrated a greater understanding of the unchanging 
nature of race. Note that they referred to this score as race essentialism, defining race 
essentialism as the belief that one’s racial group membership is unchanging. The added 
component to race essentialism is that a category or in this case, racial group, has a 
fundamental essence shared by members of the particular group (Gelman, 2004). Pauker 
and colleagues (2010) argued that children perceive categories through an essentialist 
framework when they achieve racial constancy.  
However, Pauker et al.’s (2016) operationalization of race essentialism is the same as 
racial constancy.   
Among the largely White sample (89.7%) of children 4- to 11-years old, their 
racial constancy scores increased with age and the large majority of the older children 
achieved a max score. However, older children (7-11) from a more diverse sample in 
Hawaii utilized other context specific reasoning such as culture and language instead of 
essentialist reasoning and only 36.0% of 7- to 11-year-olds achieved a maximum score. 
These findings clearly highlight not only the differences between racial groups but also 
the importance of the geographical and social context. Despite being salient, social 
contexts that are marked by integration and intergroup contact may result in less of an 
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essentialist view of race and consequently, less negative bias towards outgroups (Deeb et 
al., 2011; Pauker et al., 2016). 
 Through reviewing the various literature, I am suggesting that understanding 
these three components as ‘racial constancy’ should not be the focus; instead, there is 
considerable research demonstrating the correlation between race essentialism and social 
essentialism broadly and prejudice, stereotyping, and more. By honing in on essentialism, 
the findings are more likely to be transferrable to other concepts and ways of thinking 
altogether. It is more meaningful given essentialism’s broad implications and in turn, the 
findings can still be considered within and inform identity development. Moreover, now 
that gender constancy has been re-considered to adapt to modern times in which gender is 
no longer seen as binary and there is the possibility of changing, it is also worth moving 
away from this literature given that the idea of racial constancy stemmed from the 
concept of gender constancy. Finally, essentialist beliefs are amenable to change and 
individuals with fewer essentialist beliefs tend to be associated with more positive 
outcomes including enhanced memory for racially ambiguous faces (Gaither, Schultz, 
Pauker, Sommers, Maddox, & Ambady, 2014; Pauker et al., 2016; Young, Sanchez, & 
Wilton, 2013) as well as better flexibility and creativity generally, not just for this 
particular social domain (Gaither, Chen et al., 2014; Tadmor, Chao, Hong, & Polzer, 
2013).   
 Through reviewing the literature, it is evident that there is significant overlap 
among the different frameworks being used to operationalize children’s understanding of 
race, leading to confusion and ambiguity. I argue that because race essentialism is a 
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subordinate dimension of social essentialism and has grave consequences, it is most 
useful to unite the literature using essentialism as a framework (See Chapter 2 for more 
details). There is significant opportunity for intervention to minimize essentialism both as 
it pertains to race as well as other social categories, which can in turn positively impact 
the development of various identities, not exclusively racial identity.  
In summary, the results from Study 1 will shed light on the development of 
children’s essentialist beliefs about race. Existing research suggests that children 
increasingly view race as a fixed characteristic (demonstrate essentialist beliefs about 
race) as they get older (Aboud & Doyle, 1995; Bales & Sera, 1995; Pauker et al., 2010, 
2016; Rutland et al., 2005; Semaj, 1980). This view then remains static throughout 
adulthood (Haslam, Rothschild & Ernst, 2004). Thus, in the third chapter of this 
dissertation (Study 2), I explore adults’ stability beliefs about race and how this might 
vary as a function of group differences. In Chapter 3, I used survey methodology to 
explore adults’ levels of race essentialism. I used the same essentialist belief paradigm 
with the adults as I did with the children to determine how adults’ essentialist beliefs 
were impacted by demographic variables such as age, race, gender, where they grew up, 
and whether a person identified as a minority or majority within their primary 
community. By using the same framework for essentialism put forth by Rhodes and 
Mandalaywala (2017) for Studies 1 and 2 (with children and adults, respectively), I aim 
to create consistency and a more reliable overview of what stability beliefs look like 
across the lifespan. Taken together, these findings will help to shed light on the 
development and maintenance of stability beliefs about race and within social 
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essentialism broadly (Gelman, 2003; Mandalaywala et al., 2018; Prentice & Miller, 
2007). Additionally, I investigate the ways in which adults define ‘race’ in contrast with 
‘ethnicity’ and will briefly review the literature on these terms.  
Defining Race 
One of the most prominent social categories is race. Historically in research and 
society, the term “race” was operationalized as a scientific explanation to account for 
biological differences and validate racial inequalities (Eberhardt, 2005; Richeson & 
Sommers, 2016; Smedley & Smedley, 2005). Genetic analyses, however, have revealed 
that humans do not physically have biological races (Graves, 2005, 2010, 2015; Smedley 
& Smedley, 2005). Race is now generally accepted to be fundamentally a socially 
constructed category, as genetic studies demonstrate that there is more variation within 
groups than between groups (Fujimura et al., 2014; Quintana & McKown, 2008; 
Richeson & Sommers, 2016). However, biological races are often taken to be tantamount, 
if not superior, to socially constructed races (Friedman & Lee, 2013; Graves, 2010, 
2015). The issue is that many within the general population, researchers included, are 
engrained within the historical foundations of “race” and the obsolete notion of natural, 
biological races (Omi & Winant, 1994; Prentice & Miller, 2007). In turn, it is wrongly 
assumed that the variations in skin color, as well as other physical features that are 
associated with different races, are indicative of more inherent differences (Diesendruck, 
2013; Fujimura et al., 2014; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Richeson & Sommers, 2016; 
Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). Yet, despite being socially constructed, racial categories 
continue to take on significant meaning with serious implications. Thus, although we 
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recognize the arbitrary notion of social categories such as race and gender, we still binned 
our participants by these different categories since these categories still carry significant 
meaning. The hope is that one day social categories will be less defined and more fluid 
but in present day, we believe it is important to show the effects associated with being a 
category member and thus treat these demographic variables as distinct in our three 
studies.   
Differentiating race and ethnicity. 
 Similarly, subscribing to the belief that race is socially constructed, it is difficult 
to differentiate the concept from ethnicity. Typically, ethnicity is associated with one’s 
national origin and related cultural characteristics, such as the language spoken (Guerrero 
et al., 2011; Quintana & McKown, 2008). However, ethnicity varies in its definition and 
is often socially constructed as well (Markus, 2008). A commonly debated example 
surrounds the term “Hispanic” vs. “Latino.” According to the U.S. Census (2010), 
Hispanic or Latino indicates an ethnic group but can be made up of members of various 
races yet two-thirds of Hispanics noted that they consider being Latino to be part of their 
racial background (Pew Research Center, 2015a). Despite acknowledging the diversity 
within the Hispanic population, researchers often group all individuals of Spanish origin 
together due to the linguistic similarity even though the members may not have other 
shared characteristics (Vaquera & Kao, 2006). Moreover, it is important to acknowledge 
that a person may have varying experiences based on their race and ethnicity. For 
instance, a Hispanic woman who identifies as Black versus a Hispanic woman who 
identifies as White likely will experience the world differently. In the United States, race 
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arguably undermines ethnicity because often a person’s racial category is defined by 
others whereas ethnicity is defined by the self and those within the ingroup (Markus, 
2008). In short, there is significant debate in the literature regarding the differences 
between race and ethnicity, particularly as they relate to identity (e.g., Cokley, 2007). 
Therefore, in addition to exploring stability beliefs among adults in Study 2, I was also 
interested in surveying adults to get a sense of how they think about race and ethnicity 
generally.  
Strict Boundaries Beliefs 
The studies related to questions 1 and 2 focus on one particular essentialist belief 
(i.e. stability beliefs). More specifically, the two studies investigate stability beliefs about 
race as a way to examine race essentialism across the lifespan. In Study 3, I explore two 
additional types of essentialist beliefs: strict boundaries and homogeneity beliefs (see 






Figure 1.4. Study 3 explores children’s strict boundaries and homogeneity beliefs.  
 
Category boundaries are necessary to create categories in which individuals can 
be placed but often the differences between categories are exaggerated and the conceptual 
distance is increased by virtue of psychological essentialism (Roberts, Ho, Rhodes, & 
Gelman, 2017). For instance, when ethnicity was described in a way that promoted 
essentialism, Israeli Jewish 6-year-olds drew a Jewish and Arab person farther apart from 
one another (Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015). The enlarged distance shows that when 
there are strict boundaries, differences between groups are amplified and a failure to see 
how members from one group are similar to members of another can be observed.  
Within social essentialism, boundaries are seen as binary and fixed, instead of 
flexible and continuous (Gelman, 2003). Seeing social categories through this lens is 
remiss and inconsistent because we know that social categories inherently have 
ambiguous boundaries, instead of strict boundaries, due to the influence of the cultural 
and historical contexts (Hirschfeld, 1996). Additionally, individuals are members of 
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various social categories and which identities are endorsed should be an individual’s 
choice that may vary depending on the situation and time (Deaux, 2018; Liebler, Rastogi, 
Fernandez, Noon, & Ennis, 2017). However, unfortunately with social categories, even 
though people may belong to multiple groups, the category to which they are “assigned” 
is often imposed by others. For example, Biracial adults are generally categorized as 
mainly Black instead of equally Black and White (Ho, Kteily, & Chen, 2017; Ho, 
Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011). Similarly, young children tend to categorize multiracial 
children as Black (Roberts & Gelman, 2015, 2017a). These findings suggest that seeing 
social categories as absolute and binary emerges early in development. The importance of 
encouraging children to think more flexibly and not simply in terms of discrete 
categories, is of growing importance in today’s society, which is increasingly marked by 
diversity and individuals that do not fit neatly in boxes (Dunham & Olson, 2016). More 
specifically, the second goal of this dissertation is to explore whether children’s 
tendencies to use strict boundaries and homogeneity varies when information is presented 
on a continuum instead of using discrete categories.  
Master, Markman, and Dweck (2012) explored the use of a continuum framework 
with children in preschool. Over six studies, Master and colleagues (2012) found that 
framing social dimensions on a continuum inhibited the classic pattern of categorization 
for similarity judgments, deductions about behavior and deservingness, personal liking, 
play preferences, and stable and internal attributions for behavior. Although Master and 
colleagues’ (2012) findings offered an excellent starting point in this area, the narrow 
demographics of their sample warrant additional investigation. Specifically, it is likely 
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that the child’s own race might impact how a continuum framework is absorbed. For 
example, despite showing positive self-concept, minority children in preschool 
demonstrated pro-White attitudes and preferences (e.g., Spencer, 1984). Younger 
children are in the process of determining how to structure their own social world and so 
it appears to be an optimal time to influence their development (Cameron, Alvarez, 
Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001; Hilliard & Liben, 2010). Research suggests ages five- to six-
years marks when children become receptive to minimal groups (e.g., creation of groups 
using arbitrary criterion that does not give a child a reason to favor their ingroup; 
Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Dunham & Emory, 2014). Thus, education in 
decategorization may overpower the effects of others’ emphasis on racial categories and 
differences (Aboud, 1988; Aboud & Fenwick, 1999; Banks, 1995; Graves, 1999; 
Rutland, 1999).  
 Children are taught to classify people into groups based on race (Black-Gutman 
& Hickson, 1996). For example, the use of black and white for colors as well as race 
labels fostered unprompted categorization of individuals by race. However, category 
boundaries must be more flexible for racial attitudes to be pliable (Miller & Brewer, 
1986). Altering the perception of in-group and out-group categories could ultimately 
mitigate tension and stereotypes (Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997; 
Brown, 1996, 1999). Some research highlights the role of de-categorizing or re-
categorizing to inhibit biases and prejudice (Jones & Foley, 2003). Gaertner and 
colleagues (1989) found that re-categorizing in-groups and out-groups into a single entity 
lessened intergroup bias and did so more effectively than individualizing group members. 
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Similarly, Jones and Foley (2003) found that decreasing the salience of boundaries 
between groups by means of teaching a unit to increase the perception of similarities 
when viewing self and others was very successful. In other words, children who were 
taught to de-categorize were significantly less likely to categorize other individuals. The 
findings suggest that although categorization is a fundamental developmental process, 
fourth graders can be taught (even in a very brief, ten-minute lesson) to observe 
similarities rather than differences between themselves and others. Such results may have 
tremendous implications because categorization has been illustrated to be a predictor of 
the development of racially biased categories albeit decategorization in this study was 
shown to be a predictor of the non-prejudiced categories.   
Imposing a continuum framework emphasizes differences based on degree, rather 
than type, which allows more fastidious discrepancies to be conserved (Master et al., 
2012). A continuum framework may facilitate recognizing individual differences and 
prevent grouping people together as “the same” (Katz & Zalk, 1978; Wilder, 1978). In 
other words, individuals will be marked by their differentiated characteristics, allowing 
the child to consider each person as an individual instead of relying on stereotypes. Not to 
mention, studies suggest that a subtle, more implicit continuum still may help to 
minimize the consequences of categorization (Ensari & Miller, 2001; Gelman & 
Heyman, 1999; Gonzalez, Zosuls, & Ruble, 2010).  
As children mature, their thinking within particular contexts does become more 
flexible (e.g. categorizing a car based on not a single dimension but on various). Ellis and 
Oakes (2006) were able to extend these results to infants and found that infants too can 
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engage in flexible cognitive processing. This finding is innovative because historically 
infants are considered to greatly perseverate (Piaget, 1954). Thus, flexibility in thinking 
does not mark a particularly point in development since all ages have demonstrated both 
flexibility and inflexibility in thinking (Ellis & Oakes, 2006). Instead, individuals 
demonstrate flexible thinking in their approaches to some problems and inflexible 
thinking in their approaches to others. Such flexible thinking can be encouraged by the 
type of task and the instructions given (Ellis & Oakes, 2006; Gershkoff-Stowe, 2005; 
Ionescu, 2006).  
The concept of flexible thinking and ultimately imposing a continuum framework 
is particularly relevant in present times because our nation becomes more and more 
diverse every day, demanding more flexible categorizations (U.S. Census, 2012). With an 
increasing number of biracial children, eliminating this Black-White dichotomy is 
certainly more inclusive and may help to facilitate their racial identity development 
(Wilson, 1984). Our hope is that continuum framing will prevent young children from 
forming these stereotypes altogether, which may positively influence their trajectory 
across social domains in the years to come.  
Taking these findings together, in Study 3, I aim to discern whether children of 
Color in early elementary school are responsive to a continuum framework to the degree 
that their similarity judgments are affected. I focus on such thinking in monoracial Black 
and biracial children, as previous research with biracial children suggests that they can 
categorize themselves more flexibly (Gaither, Chen, et al., 2014). Additionally, based on 
the findings from Study 1, I am interested in whether the judgements of children between 
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the ages of 5 to 8 years of age are impacted as this is the time when children’s race 
essentialism (i.e. essentialist beliefs about race) is developing. In turn, conceptual 
framing along a continuum may be an important intervention to interrupt stereotypical 
thinking, that results from thinking about social groups with distinct group boundaries 
(Allport, 1954; Haslam et al., 2002; Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001).  
Homogeneity Beliefs 
A third component of essentialist beliefs that I will focus on in my dissertation is 
homogeneity, the idea that groups are marked by uniformity. In effort to unite the 
literature, it is important to note that other researchers have captured this idea of 
homogeneity by using the term, entitativity (e.g., Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam et al., 
2004; McGarty et al., 1995; Yzberbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001). The term entitativity 
grew out of Gestalt psychology and is defined as the degree to which a social aggregate is 
seen as coherent, unified, and meaningful (Campbell, 1958). It was not until 1995 though 
that McGarty and colleagues considered entitativity in relation to essentialism and found 
that it was positively correlated with perceived homogeneity and distinctiveness. 
Therefore, entitativity is a broader term than homogeneity as it encompasses both 
homogeneity and strict boundaries. As such, the term homogeneity will be used. 
The main consequence of homogeneity is that children assume that members of a 
particular group will share unapparent properties, even if they demonstrate many other 
dissimilarities (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). For instance, children as young as 4 
years of age predict that an individual who is labeled as a girl, but is more similar visually 
to traditional depictions of boys, will share unapparent properties with girls (Diesendruck 
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& HaLevi, 2006; Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1986; Waxman, 2012). In other words, 
an individual is determined by the category they are placed in, not based on the apparent 
properties that they exhibit. Therefore, early in childhood, children tend to overlook 
differences across members of the same category in order to highlight similarities and 
maintain homogeneity (Gelman & Rhodes, 2012; Shtulman & Calabi, 2012).  
Some studies assume that the early presence of essentialist bias, specifically 
homogeneity beliefs in this case, makes children immune to the concept of variation 
(Rhodes & Brickman, 2010; Rhodes et al., 2010). However, these findings beg the 
question as whether this assumption is correct - are we wrong to assume that children are 
unable to make room for variation within species? There is limited evidence examining 
children’s expectations about variation within species but Emmons and Kelemen (2015) 
sought to explore this idea with novel animals and found that 5- to 8-year-olds are less 
resistant to the idea of variation within species as previously understood (Shtulman & 
Schultz, 2008). These findings were consistent for behavioral as well as physical 
properties. Although these findings are about animals, they are important to consider 
since children’s abilities to engage in categorization with non-social items creates the 
foundation for their abilities to engage in social categorization.  
Given that previous research demonstrates the troubling consequences associated 
with essentialist beliefs, I am interested in the development of interventions that 
minimize essentialist beliefs and encourage more flexible thinking. In Study 3, I focus on 
a possible method to curtail children’s tendency to employ essentialist beliefs. More 
specifically, I present information either on a continuum or categorically before asking 
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children to make social judgments that reflect the strict boundaries and homogeneity 
beliefs. These findings are important for highlighting the potential that this presentation 
of information might have for minimizing the development of essentialist beliefs.  
Factors Associated with Social Essentialism 
Despite the fact that essentialist beliefs about social categories can be observed 
around the world across the lifespan, there still remains significant variation as to whether 
they are displayed (Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; 
Hirschfeld, 1995; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012; 
Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017; Waxman, 2010). Why would children vary in their 
adoption of essentialist beliefs (for a review, see Rhodes & Mandalywala, 2017)? Some 
research suggests that children only employ essentialist beliefs for familiar social 
categories (Rhodes et al., 2012). For instance, 5-year-old White children only 
demonstrated these beliefs around gender, not racial, categories (Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009). Yet, various other studies suggest that 4- to 5-year-olds attend to race across 
assorted tasks and contexts (Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 2006; Levy & Killen, 2008; 
Quintana & McKown, 2008; Shutts et al., 2010; Shutts et al., 2013). Moreover, 5-year-
olds do not consider the category membership to be inherited, stable, or important 
inferentially when a person is categorized based on their shirt color or a new label 
(Rhodes & Brickman, 2011). Children will only make these assumptions when they are 
given significantly more input regarding those categories (Rhodes et al., 2012). In other 
words, although essentialist beliefs are present early, they are used with some selectivity 
and applied only to particular social categories (Haslam et al., 2000). Young children are 
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quite conscious of social category membership but in order for social essentialism to be 
evoked, they must consider “category memberships as fundamental to identity—that is as 
a stable, objectively accurate way of classifying people that marks patterns of 
fundamental similarities and differences” (Rhodes, 2013, p. 13). In this section, I will 
explore several factors that impact the expression of essentialist beliefs including cultural 
context, racial background, use of generic language, and age. 
Cultural Context 
One possible explanation for differences in the development and endorsement of 
essentialist beliefs is related to cultural context (Gelman, 2003; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 
2017). Children’s variability in the adoption of essentialist beliefs is related to how 
prevalent such a category is in their culture. For example, Kinzler and colleagues (2009) 
demonstrated that 5-year-old White children preferred to be friends with children of their 
own race; however, when given the choice to befriend a child of their own race with a 
foreign accent or a Black child with a native accent, children preferred the Black 
children. This finding suggests that accent trumps race and children’s social preferences 
can transcend information that is only visual in nature. Relatedly, in Israel, essentialist 
beliefs about gender, race, and ethnicity are observed more among children in religious 
communities than those in secular communities (Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).  
In general, the diversity within a community impacts whether and how essentialist 
beliefs are displayed. For instance, 10- and 17-year-old children in a more conservative, 
racially homogenous town were more likely to demonstrate essentialist beliefs about race 
than those living in a more liberal, racially diverse town (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). 
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Pauker and colleagues (2016) also found that children in the U.S. who grew up in more 
racially diverse communities demonstrate weaker essentialist beliefs about race than 
those who grow up in more homogenous areas. An alternative way to interpret these 
findings is that the families of children who live in a more racially diverse, liberal 
communities may be less likely to impart essentialist beliefs about race to their children 
than families who choose to live in more homogeneous, conservative communities. In 
summary, it is likely that both the makeup of the community as well as the socialization 
practices in the home are impacting the development of essentialist beliefs in children.    
Studies centered on religion have found parallel findings and the pattern around 
exposure to diversity extends beyond race and is observed with other social categories 
too. For instance, Smyth and colleagues (2017) found that children in segregated schools 
in Northern Ireland developed stronger essentialist beliefs about religion compared to 
those in more homogenous schools, which corroborated Diesendruck et al.’s (2013) 
findings in Israel. However, the exact development and patterns differed from Israel, such 
that essentialist beliefs developed later around age 8 in Northern Ireland compared to age 
5 in Israel. These discrepancies further emphasize the importance of the cultural context. 
Evidently, the makeup of the community of which one is a part informs the likelihood of 
essentialist beliefs with more diverse schools eliciting less essentialist beliefs. Moreover, 
the community also determines what social categories are most relevant. In other 
countries such as Israel, the belief that categorizing people by race is significant is absent 
and religious-ethnic group have greater implications instead (Diesendruck et al., 2013). 
More specifically, studies have shown that the salience of race can even vary based on 
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the demographics of the students within a school (Douglass, Mirpuri, & Yip, 2017; 
Juang, Nguyen, & Lin, 2006; Umaña-Taylor, 2004). 
Therefore, cultural information in conjunction with developing cognitive biases 
likely contributes to the emergence of category-specific social essentialism (Gelman et 
al., 2010; Rhodes et al., 2012). Moreover, this logic lends itself to what is often a long 
trajectory for social essentialist beliefs because acquiring adequate cultural input is 
gradual (Rhodes et al., 2012). Although there has been limited research exploring how 
children develop essentialist beliefs, investigations have demonstrated that generic 
language as a cultural variable plays a role (Rhodes et al., 2012).  
Generic Language 
Generic language refers to broad statements about a category overall, as opposed 
to a particular group member. For instance, a generic statement might be “girls like 
dolls,” which implies that all girls like dolls. By contrast, a non-generic sentence would 
be “these girls like dolls.” Some studies have connected hearing generic language and the 
development of essentialist beliefs albeit others have illustrated that essentialist beliefs 
still quickly evolve without generic language (Diesendruck, 2003; Gelman, Ware, & 
Kleinberg, 2010). Generic language overall may only partially influence the development 
of social essentialism but is indeed influential (Rhodes et al., 2012).  
When information is presented using generic language, children make the 
assumption that there is a causal reason as to why the members have the particular 
property. For instance, children explained that “butterflies need the dust so they can fly” 
after hearing that “butterflies have dust on their wings” (Cimpian & Markman, 2009). On 
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the flip side, when non-generic language is used (e.g,. “this butterfly has dust on her 
wings,” children make the assumption that the reason is supplementary (e.g., “she flew 
through a dusty room”). This difference in interpretation shows that when presented with 
new qualities for familiar categories in generic as opposed to non-generic language, there 
is a greater likelihood that children will explain the quality as causes instead of effects. 
Yet, these results are not claiming that essentialism is singularly created by the use of 
generic language (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). As mentioned, the interaction 
between cognitive biases and cultural input seem to account more for the development of 
social essentialism (Rhodes et al., 2012). Put simply, children demonstrate cognitive 
biases that cause them to think that certain social categories indicate essential types. 
Furthermore, generic language impacts the development of essentialist beliefs about 
novel categories among adults as well (Rhodes et al., 2012). Therefore, to which 
categories children and adults should extend essentialist beliefs is shaped in part by 
generic language.  
Conversely, the cultural variation and slow, selective nature of the development 
of social essentialism may be reflective of cultural input as a significant influence. 
Cultural factors beyond the use of generic language (e.g., a category’s salience as serving 
as the basis of discrimination) likely also affect the development of social essentialism 
(Deeb, Segall, Birnbaum, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2011). Because eliciting 
essentialism may be related to adverse social attitudes, better understanding the processes 
responsible for the development of essentialism is pivotal (Dweck, 2009; Levy & Dweck, 
1999; Haslam et al., 2002). For example, children typically demonstrate essentialist 
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beliefs about gender (by age 4) earlier than race (Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1989; 
Taylor et al., 2009). Children may be given cultural information for gender categories 
earlier than racial categories (Rhodes, 2013). This transmission of information is likely 
influenced by language broadly and generic language in particular (Rhodes et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, experiences with people of different races as well as knowledge around 
intergroup conflict may play a role in strengthening the beliefs that the categories are 
demonstrative of distinctive types of people (Rhodes & Brickman, 2011; Kinzler & 
Dautel, 2012). 
The main takeaway is that language can effectively change the likelihood that 
social essentialism is evoked. Even incredibly subtle shifts in language can have 
formidable effects on a person’s perception and understanding of social categories. 
Although I do not use generic language specifically, in Study 3 (Chapter 4), I alter the 
language used to present information about categories and hypothesized that this too 
would impact the demonstration of essentialist beliefs, specifically strict boundaries and 
homogeneity beliefs. Moreover, it is clear that the diversity of a community impacts the 
development and maintenance of essentialist beliefs. Thus, it is necessary to consider an 
individual’s racial background and its interaction with the racial composition of the 
context to fully appreciate the impact on essentialist beliefs (Umaña-Taylor, 2018). 
Racial Group Membership 
 Because essentialism also facilitates children’s understanding of their own 
category memberships, children’s beliefs about their own self-concepts, including their 
racial identity, as well as their interests and abilities, are also impacted by this way of 
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thinking (Dweck, 2006; Phinney, 1989; Umaña-Taylor et al., 2014). Research 
demonstrates that individuals from different racial backgrounds may demonstrate 
essentialist beliefs at different points in development.  
A common procedure to assess children’s essentialist beliefs is to ask participants 
to look at a picture of a child and select a picture of an adult that depicts who the child 
will be when they grow up. Recall that 5- to 6-year-old Black children selected an adult 
that racially matched the target child while their White counterparts selected an adult that 
matched either the language or emotion of the target child (Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; 
Roberts & Gelman, 2016). These clear differences between racial groups highlight the 
fact that race may be more salient for racial minority groups and thus encourage them to 
start reasoning about race as a stable attribute earlier in development. Additionally, 
previous research posits that young children see skin color as an inherited trait 
(Hirschfeld, 1995). While this is likely a necessary foundation for the development of 
essentialist beliefs, recognizing a trait as inherited does not definitively mean that 
children see skin color as a meaningful indicator of category membership and have 
essentialist beliefs about race. Further work has shown that instead essentialist beliefs 
about race among predominantly White children do not develop until later (7 to 10 years 
of age).  
 Based on this research, one of my predictions is that adults and children’s 
essentialist beliefs vary based on their racial backgrounds. Much of the work on race 
among young children is either outdated or focuses on White children. Therefore, in 
Study 1, the goal is to systematically explore essentialist beliefs, stability beliefs in 
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particular, about race among 5- to 8-year-old children of Color. More specifically, I 
predict that monoracial Black children will demonstrate essentialist reasoning at younger 
ages than their biracial Black counterparts within this study.  
Age 
Recall that essentialist beliefs about social categories arise in all cultural contexts 
studied thus far by ages 3 to 5 and are observed across the lifespan (see Rhodes & 
Mandalaywala, 2017 for a review). However, despite this early emergence, the trajectory 
that essentialist beliefs follow is due to an interaction of various factors. For example, 3-
year-olds reliably use age and gender for preferences but not race (Shutts, Banaji, & 
Spelke, 2010). In turn, essentialist beliefs about gender decrease with age and older 
children and adults tend to attribute differences to the environment instead of birth 
(Berndt & Heller, 1986; Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2009). A few studies indicate that 
adults may be able to more thoughtfully integrate information to make judgments as 
opposed to children who are simply making category-based decisions (Eidson & Coley, 
2014; Gelman et al., 2007). On the other hand, in Rhodes and Gelman’s (2009) study in 
which they compared children in a more liberal town versus those living in a more 
conservative and racially homogenous town, children’s essentialist beliefs about gender 
only decreased with age in the more liberal community. Additionally, recall that 10- and 
17-year-olds in the more conservative community were more likely to demonstrate 
essentialist beliefs about race. Although the discrepancies between children from these 
two communities could be due to a variety of factors, the important piece to note is the 
significant role that cultural context plays in the presence and degree of essentialist 
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beliefs. (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017).   
However, children ages 5 and 7 in the two towns did not differ on their 
essentialist beliefs about race (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Moreover, expanding upon 
Kinzler and colleagues’ (2009) study, Kinzler and Dautel (2012) found that 5- to 6-year-
old White participants selected an adult that would match the same language as the child 
target, instead of the same race, irrespective of whether they lived in an urban, racially 
diverse area or a rural, racially homogenous area. Age then played a significant role 
though because 9- to 10-year-old White children accurately selected the adult that 
matched the race of the target child, not the language. Relatedly, when examining the 
stability of race versus emotion, White 9- to 10-year-olds and adults selected the adult 
who matched the target child on race, not emotion while White 5-to 6-year-olds selected 
the adult who matched the child target’s emotion as often as race (Roberts & Gelman, 
2016). Recall again that in both of these studies, Black 5- to 6-year-olds paralleled the 
findings of the older White children and adults, indicating that Black children may 
develop essentialist beliefs prior to White children (Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Roberts & 
Gelman, 2015)  
In summary, social essentialism highlights the fact that categorization is complex 
and takes place through focusing on both external and underlying features (Gelman, 
2003). Within social essentialism, categories are treated to have sharp, fixed boundaries 
and include innate potential, promoting inductive inferences (Gelman, 2003). 
Additionally, contextual factors (i.e. culture, exposure to generic language, and diversity 
of a community) and a person’s unique demographic variables (i.e. age and racial 
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background) impact the induction of social essentialism. The invocation of social 
essentialism also produces the propensity to consider categories as immutable and 
explanatory, which may greatly impact individuals’ belief systems, particularly in terms 
of social relations (Gelman & Meyer, 2011; Pauker et al., 2010). 
Consequences of Social Essentialism 
Creating and maintaining social connections is an innate human drive and is 
imperative to our survival (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Through these connections, 
groups are formed and research shows that essentialist beliefs have powerful implications 
for intergroup relations. In general, when essentialist beliefs are present, both Whites and 
people of color are less inclined to engage in activities with outgroup members (Lee et 
al., 2014). In one study by Lee and colleagues (2014), essentialism was incited by asking 
participants to check one (instead of many) ethnic identities and in turn decreased both 
minority participants’ interest in participating in diversity activities and negatively 
impacted White participants’ outlook on engaging with people of color. In simple terms, 
essentialist beliefs about various social categories including race, gender, ethnicity, and 
religion are associated with stereotyping and more negative attitudes toward outgroups 
(Allport, 1954; Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Levy, 2006; Hodson & Skorska, 
2015; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998; Leyens et al., 2001; Zagefka, Nigbur,  
Gonazlez, & Tip, 2013).  
Stereotypes. Social essentialism broadly creates a lush foundation that 
encourages the development of stereotypes (Prentice & Miller, 2007). A stereotype is “a 
generalization about a group or its members on the basis of their categorization’’ (Mio, 
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Barker-Hackett, & Tumambing, 2006, p. 147). Stereotypes result from categorizations 
created by inflated differences between groups as well as overstated similarities within 
groups (Master et al., 2012). For example, when meeting someone for the first time, 
expectations are automatically formed about the individual and stereotypes are relied 
upon when information is limited (Jones, 2002). Often the expectation of the 
stereotypical behavior encourages those behaviors from the individual, eliciting self-
fulfilling prophecy, only serving to reaffirm the stereotype (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). 
When considering how stereotypes relate to essentialism, essentialism posits that 
categories are homogeneous. In turn, with stronger essentialist beliefs, it is likely easier to 
assume that individuals of a social group will all have the same qualities (Rhodes & 
Mandalaywala, 2017). As suggested, research shows both among children and adults that 
essentialist beliefs are positively correlated with outgroup stereotyping (Bastian & 
Haslam, 2006; Gaither, Schultz et al., 2014; Pauker et al., 2010) 
When considering members of other groups, it has been well documented that an 
outgroup homogeneity effect emerges and is observed in both children and adults, in 
which outgroups are not ascribed the same variability that ingroups are (Aboud, 2003; 
Bigler & Liben, 2007; Brewer & Brown, 1998;  Judd & Park, 1988; Pauker et al., 2010; 
Simon & Brown, 1987). Even by the age of 5, children attribute outgroups to be more 
homogenous in terms of biological properties when compared to their ingroups (Shilo, 
Weinsdorfer, Rakoczy, & Diesendruck, 2018). However, this finding did not hold for 
psychological properties, suggesting that even at young ages, children are sensitive to 
diverse samples and recognize that people differ in their psychological behaviors and 
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qualities. Nonetheless, viewing an outgroup as homogeneous strengthens stereotypes and 
is linked to negative racial attitudes among children (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Doyle & 
Aboud, 1995). As homogeneity posits, groups share underlying, unobservable properties 
that makes them the same despite obvious differences between group members.  
Children in particular may just assume that similarity is positive and difference is 
negative (Aboud, 2003). Thus, stereotypes affect one’s perceptions of others and 
subsequent interactions. Interestingly, children ages 4 to 7 years old who saw more 
variability in their ingroup, demonstrated greater ingroup favoritism (Aboud, 2003), 
which is similar to what is observed with older children with outgroups (Katz et al., 
1975). Older children who saw more variability in their outgroup demonstrated a more 
favorable attitude toward the outgroup (Katz et al., 1975). In summary, appreciating 
variability, in both ingroups or outgroups, appears to be linked to more positive 
evaluation of that group, emphasizing its important role in social categorization and 
intergroup attitudes and bias.  
Additionally, as touched upon above, much of children’s ingroup and outgroup 
attitudes and perspectives are shaped by the diversity of their communities. When 
children, especially those of majority backgrounds, attend more diverse schools, they are 
less likely to demonstrate essentialist beliefs because they have more specific information 
about outgroup members and do not rely on the category as a placeholder that is marked 
by homogeneity (Deeb et al., 2011). Further, White children in less diverse schools 
emphasized variability for their ingroup and homogeneity beliefs for the outgroup while 
minority children emphasized shared characteristics across racial groups (McGlothlin & 
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Killen, 2006). In parallel with findings on adults, the minority children in this study were 
less likely to ascribe homogeneity to the White groups compared to their White peers. 
Guinote, Mouro, Pereira, and Monteiro (2007)  also found that Black 7- to 9-year-olds 
ascribed more variability to the outgroup compared to same-aged White children. 
Therefore, these findings suggest that the perceptions of ingroups and outgroups, 
specifically outgroup homogeneity, varies by a child’s racial group. Better understanding 
this tendency is important as stereotypes evolve from this type of thinking. More 
specifically, the literature on stereotypes suggests that broader beliefs around 
homogeneity and discrete boundaries may inform how ingroups and outgroups are 
viewed, impacting inclusion and exclusion at a young age (Haslam et al., 2000; Mulvey, 
Hitti, & Killen, 2010). 
The irony of the homogeneity outgroup bias is that the variability within a single 
racial group is equal if not greater than the variability between different racial groups 
(Slaughter-Defoe, 2012). Nonetheless, it is important to note that stereotypes by nature 
are cognitive categorizations and not necessarily the result of overt prejudice that humans 
consciously or unconsciously apply to individuals (Agars, 2004; Mulvey et al., 2010). At 
young ages, children do not differentiate between actions that are inherently based on 
justice (e.g., sharing) and those that benefit the group’s wellbeing and social interactions 
(for a review, see Killen, Sinno, & Margie, 2007). Yet, prejudice is seemingly an 
inevitable consequence of these ordinary categorization processes and even at a young 
age become solidified and difficult to change (Allport, 1954; see Raabe & Beelmann, 
2011 for a meta-analysis).  
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It is evident that an emphasis on categories heightens stereotypical thinking and 
makes it more difficult to identify possible similarities across members of different 
categories, which would help to combat homogeneity beliefs (Dunham & Olson, 2016). 
Children and adults are inclined to believe that categories indicate the way things should 
be (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Roberts, 
Gelman, & Ho, 2016; Tworek & Cimpian, 2016). However, there are nuances. When 
children are taught to categorize stimuli into multiple categories, they demonstrate lower 
in-group favoritism, more egalitarian attitudes, and have an enhanced memory about 
information that counters the stereotype compared to those who have a more difficult 
time using multiple categories (Aboud, 2003; Bigler & Liben, 1992, 1993). At the same 
time, stereotypes may impact memory yet the methods that children use to remember are 
often based on schemas, which then tend to bring about stereotypes (Memon, Holliday, & 
Hill, 2006; Mulvey et al., 2010). 
 Despite the promise of encouraging multiple categorization, it is apparent that 
stereotyping is observed regularly in adulthood and there must be additional factors at 
play during childhood but the research on stereotypes around real social groups remains 
limited with children (Levy et al., 1998; Levy et al., 2001; Nesdale, 2002). One body of 
work demonstrated that 11- to 13-year-old children who believe that a person’s traits are 
fixed exhibited higher levels of stereotyping than those who thought of a person’s traits 
as malleable (Levy & Dweck, 1999; Levy et al., 1998). This tendency to see traits as 
fixed and assume that members of a group share unobservable attributes is an example of 
essentialism in action and may be part of what is impacting the development and use of 
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stereotypes (Arthur, Bigler, Liben, Gelman, & Ruble, 2008; Gelman, 2003). 
Fundamentally essentialist beliefs comprise generalizing attributes of an entire group to a 
single member of the group and of course these broad generalizations are the source of 
stereotypes (Arthur et al., 2008).  
Examining essentialist beliefs is necessary to better understand how to disrupt the 
formation of stereotypes. Thus, considering methods that allow for enhanced awareness 
and appreciation of continuous distinctions and decreased use of dichotomous category 
labels is warranted not only for categorization but to protect against the resulting 
stereotypes and discrimination. More detail will be provided in Study 3 (Chapter 4) about 
different possible methods to interrupt the development of essentialist beliefs.  
Intergroup relations and prejudice. Essentialist beliefs not only impact 
stereotypical thinking but behavior is also impacted, which affects intergroup relations. 
Research demonstrates that considering race to be an informative category is associated 
with racial prejudice with both White and Black adults (Jayaratne, Ybarra, Sheldon, 
Brown, Feldbaum, Pfeffer et al., 2006; Mandalaywala et al., 2018; Williams & Eberhardt, 
2008). Although there is still much to learn about children’s essentialist beliefs, the 
consequences for adults are quite clear in that essentialist beliefs are associated with 
prejudice (Allport, 1954; Haslam et al., 2002; Keller, 2005; Leyens et al., 2003, 
Mandalaywala, Amodio, & Rhodes, 2017; Yzerbyt et al., 2001), less of a desire to engage 
with members of other racial groups (Williams & Eberhardt, 2008), and an increased 
likelihood of attributing the behavior of outgroup members to inherent, personal flaws as 
opposed to external, environmental causes (Prentice & Miller, 2007; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & 
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Fiske, 1998). More resources are given to ingroup members, help is offered more 
quickly, and they are seen more as individuals (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Levine, Cassidy, 
Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). On the contrary, 
outgroup members are not remembered with the same accuracy, are avoided more, and 
considered less trustworthy than ingroup members (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 
2007; Shah, Brazy & Higgins, 2004; Voci, 2006).  
 Social essentialism likely impacts intergroup relations and prejudice through strict 
boundaries. Drawing stark lines between groups creates a true divide that not only 
prevents people from engaging with one another but also diminishes any interest in 
interacting (Bernstein et al., 2010; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008; Zagefka et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, such fixed rifts cause even more problems for those who are not 
prototypical group members and exist more on the periphery, closer to the boundaries 
(Maddox & Gray, 2002; Pauker & Ambady, 2009). These individuals are not as likely to 
be remembered and are often overlooked by both children and adults (Gaither, Schultz et 
al., 2014; Pauker & Ambady, 2009). In short, the exaggeration and intensification of 
boundaries can have negative implications for the ways individuals act towards those 
outside, or even on the edge, of their own social group.  
As touched upon, social essentialism has also been linked to people’s social 
perceptions meaning that it impacted the way in which they recalled and categorized 
racially ambiguous individuals as well as their justifications of social ranks and 
hierarchies (Gaither, Schultz et al., 2014; Ho, Roberts, & Gelman, 2015; Morton, 
Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009; Yzerbyt et al., 2001). Further, while Chao and 
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colleagues (2007) found that essentialism is associated with greater difficulty making 
cognitive shifts, the literature continues to find that multiracial individuals, who typically 
exhibit lower levels of essentialism, demonstrate more flexible thinking (Gaither, 2018; 
Pauker et al., 2018; Shih, Bonam, Sanchez, & Peck, 2007). Being able to engage in 
flexible thinking is an important cognitive strength and inherently contrasts with 
essentialist thinking. Capturing both children and adults’ essentialist beliefs will help to 
inform the development of interventions that seek to minimize essentialist beliefs and 
promote cognitive flexibility. Seeing social categories, as well as marginalization 
broadly, as more flexible and dynamic will make change easier and prevent further 
marginalization of vulnerable populations that occurs when groups are seen to have 
discrete, essential discrepancies (Causadias & Umaña-Taylor, 2018).  
Conclusion 
This dissertation suggests that there might be differences in the development and 
demonstration of social essentialism, specifically beliefs around stability, strict 
boundaries, and homogeneity, by individuals based on their racial backgrounds. The 
literature to date tends to oversimplify the various types of essentialist beliefs, lumping 
them together as a single superordinate category. This is problematic since each of the 
beliefs carry different consequences (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Furthermore, the 
development and presence of essentialist beliefs cannot be generalized across different 
racial groups since it is evident that they vary by cultural context. Therefore, across three 
studies, I hone in on three specific types of essentialist beliefs. In Studies 1 and 2 
(Chapters 2 and 3), I examine age-based differences of stability beliefs specifically about 
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race. I investigate children of varying ages from understudied populations as well as 
adults. Given that the findings from Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that children and adults 
endorse stability beliefs and utilize essentialist reasoning about race, in Study 3 (Chapter 
4) I explore children’s endorsement of strict boundaries beliefs and homogeneity beliefs 
for social essentialism broadly. In particular, I examine whether these beliefs can be 
modulated in a task. In future work, I intend to look more closely at mechanisms that may 




CHAPTER 2: STUDY 1 
Stability Beliefs about Race in Monoracial and Biracial Black Children  
Introduction 
Social essentialism is present at very young ages but varies based on cultural 
input (e.g., Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Hirschfeld, 1995; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). 
However, it is also evident that the terminology and methods have varied considerably in 
order to capture the phenomenon of social essentialism, particularly as it relates to race. 
In the current study, I adopt a social essentialism framework with an emphasis on race 
essentialism (i.e. essentialist beliefs about race). The current manuscript has three main 
aims: 1) to explore the development of children’s race essentialism by examining self-
labeling and stability beliefs, one of the five types of essentialist beliefs, during early 
childhood (for a review of the five essentialist beliefs, see Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 
2017), 2) to explore variability in race essentialism across two understudied groups: 
monoracial Black children and biracial Black children, and 3) attempt to unify some of 
the literature in this area in hopes of enhancing the cohesiveness of this body of work. 
Race Essentialism 
Race essentialism (i.e. essentialist beliefs about race), posits that sorting people 
into racial groups is meaningful and allows for conclusions to be drawn about 
unobservable qualities, such as abilities and traits (Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong, 2007; 
Gelman, 2003; Pauker et al., 2016). In other words, racial categories are viewed as 
unchanging with causal essences that define their characteristics (Gelman, 2003; 
Hirschfeld, 1995; Pauker et al., 2010; Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Essentialist 
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beliefs about race help to justify group differences that are in reality arbitrary and 
nonexistent (Diesendruck, 2013). Despite the recognition that children develop racial 
biases and attitudes at a very young age, the exact ontogeny of race essentialism—the 
understanding of race as a fixed, biological concept—is unknown (Hirschfeld, 1996; 
Roberts & Gelman, 2016; Semaj, 1980). 
To date, the majority of research on race essentialism focuses primarily on White 
children, and is largely disjointed (Roberts & Gelman, 2016). One of the primary reasons 
that it is challenging to integrate the literature is because researchers use discrete 
terminology to refer to interrelated, if not the same, constructs. For instance, ‘racial 
constancy’, or the understanding that a person cannot change their race, is frequently 
described as synonymous with race essentialism, the belief that racial groups share an 
underlying essence that does not change  (Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001; 
Woods, 2017). Yet, in other work ‘racial constancy’ is framed as simply as “children’s 
understanding of race” (Quintana, 2008, p. 6), “a mature understanding of race” that 
develops between the ages of 8 to 11 (Hughes, 1997, p. 119), or a sophisticated capacity 
that encompasses physical, biological, social, and cultural characteristics that does not 
develop until the age of 12 (Byrd, 2012). Moreover, some researchers describe racial 
constancy as a component of race essentialism, whereas other researchers see racial 
constancy as part of racial identity development, and still other researchers treat it as its 
own entity capturing identity and essentialism (Pauker et al., 2010, 2016; Woods, 2017). 
Therefore, this manuscript aims to synthesize the literature across the different spheres of 
research including racial identity development and racial constancy to get a clearer 
 
 61 
picture of the constructs of interest using social essentialism as the framework.  
Synthesis of the Literature as Race Essentialism 
Due to the varying methods and approaches to better examine children’s 
understanding of race, the developmental trajectory of race essentialism remains slightly 
indefinite and so narrowing this timeline is one of the main goals of this study. 
Regardless of the timing of the development of essentialist beliefs about race, research 
suggests that as early as five years of age, children have begun to think about themselves 
in the context of social categories and relationships (Bigler & Liben, 2007; Cvenceck, 
Greenwald, & Meltzoff, 2016; Sani & Bennett, 2009). Children’s ability to recognize 
themselves as part of social groups indicates that they also then attribute certain 
assumptions about these groups to themselves, which influences their sense of self 
(Greenwald et al., 2002). One particular aspect of children’s developing self-concepts is 
the importance of gaining an understanding of their racial and ethnic identity. For racial 
and ethnic minority youth, this is an essential developmental task (Derlan, Umaña-
Taylor, Updegraff, & Jahromi, 2017).  
The term ethnic-racial identity (ERI) is reserved for adolescents and refers to the 
complex, psychological construct that captures not only the beliefs and perceptions of 
their ethnic-racial membership but also the processes through which these beliefs develop 
during adolescence (Umaña-Taylor et al., 2014). Research demonstrates that a strong ERI 
is correlated with positive psychosocial, academic, and health outcomes for both 
monoracial and biracial adolescents (for a review, see Rivas-Drake et al., 2014). 
Although ERI development is limited to adolescence, Umaña-Taylor and colleagues 
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(2014) have emphasized its importance for healthy development and thus, the need to 
have a clear understanding of the precursors that evolve during childhood. However, 
much less is known about these childhood tasks, collectively known as ethnic-racial 
identification  (Derlan et al., 2017).  
Ethnic-racial identification includes self-labeling (i.e. the ability to identify one’s 
own category membership and differentiate racial groups), constancy (i.e. recognizing 
that category memberships do not change over time and contexts), use of ethnic role 
behaviors (i.e. engaging in behaviors related to an individual’s culture), knowledge (i.e. 
information of behaviors, customs, and values associated with an individual’s culture), 
and preferences (i.e. feelings about one’s group membership; Bernal, Knight, Garza, 
Ocampo, & Cota, 1990). Although these five components are interrelated, behaviors, 
knowledge, and preferences are outside the scope of this manuscript. Due to my focus on 
social categories, I will focus exclusively on self-labeling and constancy. However, recall 
that one of the reasons that much of the literature is disorganized is due to the different 
terminology being used. For example, the idea of self-labeling is synonymous in the 
literature with self-identification (Aboud, 2003) and very similar to identification as one 
of the three components within ‘racial constancy’ although identification includes others 
as well (Pauker et al., 2010; 2016). Instead of using the terms ‘constancy’ (e.g., Bernal et 
al., 1990), or ‘immutability’ (Pauker et al., 2010; 2016), I aim to unite previous work by 
examining the concept of fixed category membership through a psychological 




Previous research exploring stability as a component of racial constancy has 
indicated age-related changes. However, I argue that stability is better examined through 
the lens of essentialism. In particular, several researchers were interested in how 
children’s stability beliefs, as part of racial constancy, relate to essentialist beliefs. 
Therefore, after assessing stability, researchers then asked a question to investigate 
children’s reasoning. Inquiring about a child’s reasoning taps into essentialism, which is 
where some of the overlap and conflation arises in the literature between racial constancy 
and race essentialism.  Instead of seeing these as separate entities, I will examine stability 
beliefs and their justification collectively through an essentialist frame. The remainder of 
this section will explore the ways that essentialism was explored within existing studies 
on racial constancy.  
For example, to better understand how children were thinking about racial 
constancy with particular regards to essentialist beliefs, Aboud and Doyle (1993) and 
Pauker and colleagues (2010) explored children’s explanations for why or why not a 
person can change their race. Results indicated that children’s explanations for constancy 
shifted significantly from being primarily affective or perceptual by age five to perceptual 
or cognitive by age seven to eight (Aboud & Doyle, 1993). Using a slightly different 
coding scheme, Pauker et al. (2010) found that the majority of three- to five-year-olds did 
not offer a reason for why a person could or could not change their race (65.0%) whereas 
almost half (46.7%) of five- to six-year-old children used essentialist reasoning to explain 
their response. In the two older groups (six- to seven-year-olds and seven- to ten-year-
olds), more than 75% of children in both groups employed essentialist reasoning. 
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Essentialist reasoning in children is associated with out-group stereotyping even after 
controlling for gender, race, age, and social context (Pauker et al., 2016). Note that most 
of the children (94.4%) in Pauker et al.’s (2010) study were European American or 
Asian, and thus limited research has explored how such stability judgments emerge in 
children who are not members of the racial majority.  
Some research indicates that children growing up as members of the minority race 
or as members of multiple racial and ethnic groups are more flexible in their learning and 
socialization preferences (e.g., Gaither, Chen et al., 2014) as well as in their use of 
essentialist reasoning (e.g., Pauker, Xu, Williams, & Biddle, 2016). Other research by 
Roberts and Gelman (2016) found that Black children view race as more stable than 
language and emotion and appreciate the stability of race at a younger age when 
compared to White children. Thus, majority or minority racial status might impact the 
development of racial stability. In the current study, I explore whether such flexibility in 
learning and socialization preferences extend to variability in the developmental 
trajectory of stability beliefs within race essentialism.   
Taken together, the results of these studies demonstrate that preschool children 
understand that people are classified into racial categories (Pauker, Williams, & Steele, 
2015; Roberts & Gelman, 2015, 2016, 2017a), and draw on race to make social 
judgments (Baron & Banaji, 2006; Pauker et al., 2015; Shutts, Roben, & Spelke, 2013). 
Despite this ability to classify individuals based on race, children’s understanding of the 
denotation of race and its fixed nature is likely to develop with age and be cultivated 
through experience (Roberts & Gelman, 2016). Consequently, unlike other essentialist 
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beliefs that are present at very young ages (e.g., natural kinds; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), 
essentialism with regards to race is likely to develop later and not observed until after 6 
years of age (Gaither, Schultz et al., 2014; Pauker et al., 2010; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). 
For example, despite making judgments consistent with an understanding of race 
essentialism, more recent studies demonstrate that young White children have neither a 
sense of the structure of racial categories nor do these categories influence the way they 
perceive a person’s development across time (e.g., Roberts & Gelman, 2016; Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009). 
Children’s tendencies to think about race and ethnicity using essentialist beliefs 
generally increases with age and is observed across cultures (Diesendruck & HaLevi, 
2006; Gelman, 2003). Yet, there is some research suggesting that essentialist beliefs 
about race are influenced by cultural input (Gelman, 2009; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; 
Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). Rhodes and Gelman (2009) found that older children 
from a rural community were significantly more likely to demonstrate race essentialism 
than those growing up in an urban area. These findings suggest that the development of 
race essentialism might be influenced by both the geographical context and demographic 
makeup of the surrounding community, as well as through variability in the socialization 
practices in families who choose to live in an urban versus rural area.  
In addition, results from several studies highlight that the onset of the 
development of race essentialism varies based on the type of task and the type of 
essentialist belief that is assessed (Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, 
Rhodes, Gaither, Schultz et al., 2014; Gelman, & Neumark, 2013; Gimenez & Harris, 
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2002; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Pauker et al., 2016; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Regardless 
of the timing of onset, when both children and adults demonstrate race essentialism, they 
are more likely to stereotype out-groups and see race as relating to inherent differences 
(Levy & Dweck, 1999; Pauker et al., 2010; Prentice & Miller, 2007).  
Methods Used to Study Race Essentialism 
Previous research has also employed a variety of measures to assess children’s 
understanding of race and race essentialism (Roberts & Gelman, 2016). One method to 
measure race essentialism is the switched-at-birth paradigm (Gelman & Wellman, 1991) 
where preschool-aged children recognize that a child will be a member of the same racial 
group as their birth parents as opposed to their adoptive parents (Gimenez & Harris, 
2002, Hirschfeld, 1995; Rhodes, Brickman, & Gelman, 2008). Participants consistently 
selected the child with skin color that matched the adult’s skin color. Nonetheless, these 
switched-at-birth tasks have been critiqued for not capturing race essentialism since they 
only attend to what a person will look like, not what they will be like or how they will act 
(Mandalaywala et al., 2018). If race essentialism in its truest sense was present by age 4, 
then cultural input would not play a significant role and the development of race 
essentialism would take place early and should not vary across groups (Hirschfeld, 1996). 
However, the results from previous research indicate that the developmental trajectory 
indeed varies based on culture (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009). 
Mandalywala and colleagues (2018) suggest that these switched-at-birth tasks are 
measuring the heritability of skin color as opposed to essentialist beliefs about race 
(Mandalaywala et al., 2018; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). Children in elementary school 
 
 67 
primarily use skin color to categorize individuals by race and preschool-aged children 
depend entirely on skin color (Dunham, Stepanova, Dotsch, & Todorov, 2015; Williams 
et al., 1975). These results suggest that children’s idea of race is different from that of 
adults, which includes physiognomic features in addition to skin color. Consequently, 
using skin color as a proxy to study race is likely appropriate with children under the age 
of 9. 
 Previous studies about the heritability of skin color may have overestimated the 
degree to which children view race through an essentialist lens, as simply asking about 
how individuals are similar based on appearance does not provide information around 
causal properties (Mandalaywala et al., 2018). Research have sought to reconcile this 
apparent ambiguity by asking children to describe their justification for why skin color 
does not change (Gaither, Schultz et al., 2014; Pauker et al., 2010; Pauker et al., 2016). 
When asked to justify their responses, younger children generally do not use essentialist 
reasoning to justify their answers, suggesting that essentialist beliefs about race may not 
be present as early as expected. Moreover, Mandalaywala and colleagues (2018) explored 
both elements of White and Black children’s beliefs – the heritability of skin color and 
essentialist beliefs about race – using the switched-at-birth task. Consistent with previous 
research, stability beliefs about race appeared to emerge earlier in Black children 
compared to White children, as Black children attributed behavioral properties to birth 
parents more than White children (Mandalaywala et al., 2018).  
Current Study  
Taken together, results are mixed as to the onset and development of race 
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essentialism, especially when considering children from different racial backgrounds. 
Therefore, it is critical to gain an enhanced understanding of race essentialism because 
the stronger a child’s adherence is to the idea of fixed group memberships, the more 
likely they will demonstrate prejudice against those group members and in turn 
stereotype the group members (Haslam et al., 2006; Pauker et al., 2010). Moreover, a 
child’s understanding of race is an important component of racial-ethnic identification 
and later racial-ethnic identity development, which becomes more significant to children 
as they get older and is positively correlated with self-esteem among children of Color 
(Phinney, 1989, 1992). The study presented here aims to explore differences in the 
development of stability beliefs within race essentialism by age and race. Following 
Waxman’s call (2013), which emphasizes the importance of examining the development 
of social categorization in the context of essentialist reasoning with diverse groups, I 
focus specifically on the development in monoracial Black children and biracial Black 
children. Previous research focused strictly on White children’s understanding of race, 
yet some research indicates that minority individuals may appreciate the stability of race 
earlier due to the salience of their skin color in more integrated settings (Dutton, Singer, 
& Devlin, 1998; Tatum, 2017). Even if minority children are living in all Black 
communities, the media is heavily White, which may give children implicit messages 
about the color of their skin and in turn racial identity (Tatum, 2017). As a result, Black 
caregivers are significantly more likely to discuss race openly and explicitly with their 
children (Hughes et al., 2006). It is also suggested that individuals of multiracial 
backgrounds may appreciate the stability of race earlier due to their exposure to multiple 
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races (Roberts & Gelman, 2016; Waxman, 2012, 2013). Given that approximately one of 
every ten children born in the United States today is multiracial (Pew Research Center, 
2015a), a more nuanced understanding of the development of race essentialism is 
necessary.  
Within ethnic/racial identity identification (not to be confused with identification 
within racial constancy but rather the stage that is the precursor to ethnic/racial identity 
development in adolescence), self-labeling is a key starting point. Labeling oneself is the 
beginning of establishing a social identity, a racial identity in particular, that allows a 
child to see themselves as part of a broader group (Quintana, 1994; Rogers et al., 2012; 
Ruble et al., 2004). Identifying one’s own race as a person of color serves as a protective 
factor as it can foster a sense of belonging that in turn can help to serve as a buffer 
against stereotype threat (Steele, 2010; Tatum, 2017).  
In addition to self-labeling, we are interested in examining children’s stability 
beliefs about race as a component of race essentialism. Using Pauker’s (2010, 2016) 
methods as a framework, we will explore the children’s understanding of the heritability 
of race and whether they use essentialist explanations to justify their answers. My 
prediction is that children’s stability beliefs and race essentialism will vary based on age 
and their racial backgrounds. These findings have important implications for classroom 
teachers, families, and clinicians for how they can support children’s cognitive 






One hundred thirteen children, ages five to seven years old (M age = 6.25, SDage = 
.701), were recruited from schools and afterschool programs serving low-income 
families. Parent, child, and school/program consent were obtained and all students 
provided verbal assent. Participants included 68 males (60.2%) and 45 females (39.8%). 
One hundred percent of participants received free or reduced lunch. 
         Ninety-five children identified as monoracial Black (39 female, Mage = 6.27 years, 
SDage = .706 years, age range = 5-7 years). An additional four monoracial Black children 
were tested but excluded for failing to correctly self-identify themselves. Eighteen 
children identified as Biracial (100% Black/Latinx; 6 female, Mage = 6.11 years, SDage = 
.676 years, age range = 5-7 years). The mean age of the two groups were not significantly 
different, t(111) = .901, p = .369. 
Materials 
Eight color pictures of adult faces were drawn from the Chicago Face Database 
(Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015) and eight faces of children were drawn from the 
Child Affective Facial Expression (CAFE) set (LoBue, 2014). 
Procedure 
Based on previous methods used to examine children’s race essentialism, 
specifically their beliefs about the stability of a category (Gaither, Schultz et al., 2014; 
Hirschfeld, 1995; Pauker et al., 2010, 2016; Ruble et al., 2007; Semaj, 1980), children’s 
race essentialism was assessed using both children’s judgments of the self and others. To 
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begin, ethnic-racial identification was examined through self-labeling (i.e. the ability to 
identify one’s own category membership and differentiate racial groups). Children’s 
ability to self-label (referred to as identification by Pauker et al., 2010, 2016) is a 
dimension within racial-ethnic identification (e.g., Bernal et al., 1990) and was examined 
to determine whether children should be included in analyses. Recall that a failure to 
accurately self-label excluded them from further analyses. Children were then asked to 
make judgments about their race essentialism about race for both themselves as well as 
others. The self-labeling measure, as well as race essentialism judgments of self and 
others are described in more detail below. 
Self-labeling. To assess children’s ability to self-label and correctly identify their 
own category membership, the experimenter turned to the child and asked, “What color is 
your skin?” (identification question)[1]. Using the children’s response (e.g., “light 
brown”), children were then asked, “Are you a light brown boy/girl?” Although the 
children’s responses to identification were assessed for accuracy, they were not included 
in their overall scores and used for exclusion. Children were excluded if they failed to 
correctly answer the two identification questions for gender and/or race. Four children 
were excluded from further analyses. Children’s responses were used simply for the 
purpose of the questions and their racial category membership was pre-determined by 
information from the school and families.   
Race Essentialism. Next, using the labels identified by the child from the self-




Judgments of Self. Children were asked three questions designed to assess race 
essentialism judgments of self. To assess whether children view race as stable over time, 
they were asked, 1) “when you were a baby, were you a light brown baby?” and 2) “when 
you grow up to be a man/woman, will you be a light brown man/woman?” Responses 
were limited to yes or no and coded as 1 or 0, respectively. Furthermore, to assess 
whether children view race as stable over settings and context, they were asked, 3A) “if 
you really wanted to change your skin color to be White, could you do that?” To assess 
whether children were attending merely to the heritability of skin color or holding in 
mind an essentialist frame, we examined children’s justification of their stability beliefs. 
In response to the previous question around whether they could/n’t change their race, 
they were asked, 3B) “how would you do that?” or “why not?” For this final two-part 
item, children’s responses were coded as essentialist (1) only if they correctly answered 
question 3A (a “no” to the question around whether change is possible) and employed 
essentialist reasoning when answering the justification question by describing 
immutability (e.g., “you gotta stay how you are”, inheritability (e.g., “because he was 
born like that”), or naturalness (“because that wouldn’t be possible”; see Gaither, Schultz 
et al., 2014 and Pauker et al., 2010, 2016 for similar coding schemas). If children 
incorrectly answered question 3A, they were automatically given a score of 0. 
Additionally if children provided a reason that did not fall into one of the aforementioned 
categories for 3B (e.g., “because I don’t want to”), children were coded as non-
essentialist and given a score of 0. A maximum score (3) indicated higher levels of race 
essentialism of self.  
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Judgments of others. Similar to the procedure for the judgments of the self, 
participants’ judgments of others 
were assessed by using pictures 
that corresponded to the child’s 
gender. To assess stability, 
children saw a picture of a Black 
child above a Black adult and a 
White adult. They were then 
asked, 4) “When this child grows 
up, will they look more like this adult or that adult?” (see Figure 2.1). Subsequently, they 
were shown a picture of an adult of their own race above a child of their race and a White 
child. They were then asked, 5) “when this adult was little, did they look more like this 
child or this child?” Finally, children were shown a picture of a Black child and were 
asked, 6A) “If this child really wanted to be White and change his/her skin color, could 
he/she do that?” To understand their logic to the previous question, children were asked 
6B) “how would he/she change? Or “why can’t he/she change?” Parallel to the procedure 
for judgments of self, children were invited to explain their reasoning for the final 
question for judgments of others. If children incorrectly responded “yes” to question 6A, 
they were given a 0. Children were given a 1 if they correctly answered “no” to 6A and 
provided and essentialist response to 6B. We coded children’s response as essentialist 
(e.g., “because he was born like a brown boy so he stays like a brown boy”) or non-
essentialist (e.g., “because she will turn White”; see also Pauker et al., 2010, 2016). 
Figure 2.1. Example of the stimuli. 
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Scores for race essentialism judgments of others ranged from 0-3. 
In summary, recall that children that did not score a 2 (N = 4) on the self-labeling 
questions were excluded from subsequent analyses. The remaining children had two 
scores ranging from 0-3 for their race essentialism pertaining to self and others; when 
combined, scores ranged from 0-6. 
Open ended questions. Finally, to determine if the previous tasks served as a 
prime for race, we examined whether race was used in salient ways when describing 
others and themselves. Children were asked three open-ended questions as follows: a) 
“How do you choose your friends? What do you like about your friends?”, b) “What do 
you like about yourself?”, and c) “How would you describe yourself? Tell me about 
yourself.” Responses were coded based on whether or not the children spontaneously 






Table 2.1 Mean Scores and Standard Deviation of Children’s Race Essentialism Scores 
by Age, Task, and Racial Group.  
Task 
Racial 








Self (max = 3) 
 
Monoracial  2.07 (.823) 2.15 (.793) 2.15 (.770) 
n 14 41 40 
Biracial 2.00 (.00) 2.50 (.527) 2.20 (1.10) 
 n 3 10 5 
Other (max = 3) Monoracial 2.36 (.745) 2.39 (.703) 2.50 (.506) 
 n 14 41 40 
 Biracial 1.00 (1.00) 2.00 (.817) 2.80 (.447) 
 n 3 10 5 
Total (max = 6) Monoracial  4.43 (1.16) 4.54 (1.21) 4.65 (1.00) 
 n 14 41 40 
 Biracial 3.00 (1.00) 4.50 (1.27) 5.00 (1.41) 
 n 3 10 5 
 
Table 2.1 displays children’s mean race essentialism scores for both self and 
others by age and racial group. To determine if there were differences between race 
essentialism for self and race essentialism for others, a paired sample t-test was run 
indicating that scores for self were significantly lower than scores for others, t(112) = -
2.38, p = .019. These findings held within the monoracial Black sample, t(94) = -3.24, p 
= .009, but were not significant within the biracial sample, likely due to the small sample 
size. Furthermore, to determine if there were effects of age and racial group membership 
on a child’s race essentialism about themselves, an ANOVA was run but the model was 
not significant, p =0.58, likely due to reduced power.  
To explore age and racial group-level differences for race essentialism about 
others, we conducted a 2 X 3 between-subjects ANOVA with race essentialism score for 
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others (max = 3) as the dependent variable and racial group (monoracial, biracial) and 
age (5, 6, 7) as independent variables. The overall model was significant, F (5, 107) = 
4.03, p = .002, and there was a statistically significant interaction between the effects of 
racial group and age on race essentialism score for others, F(2, 107) = 5.14, p = .007. 
There were also significant main effects of Age, F(2, 107) = 7.21, p = .001, and Racial 
Group, F(1, 107) = 6.49, p = .012.  
Figure 2.2 displays children’s mean race essentialism scores about others by child 
age and racial group. 
Inspection of Figure 2.2 
indicates that monoracial 
Black children’s race 
essentialism scores about 
others remain relatively 
stable across 5 to 7 years 
of age. On the other hand, 
there is a clearer 
developmental trajectory 
taking place for the biracial children, suggesting that biracial children are taking more 
time to make sense of the race of others. Nonetheless, by the age of 7, both groups look 
similar in terms of their scores.  
To confirm these findings, we conducted simple effects tests separately by age 
group. Monoracial 5-year-olds had significantly higher scores compared to biracial 5-
Figure 2.2. Mean race essentialism scores for others by 


































year-olds (p = .001). There were no significant differences between monoracial and 
biracial children at 6 years of age (p = 0.094) and 7 years of age (p = 0.334). We also 
conducted simple effects tests separately by racial group. Biracial 5-year-olds had 
significantly lower scores, as compared to biracial 6-year-olds (p = .022) and biracial 7-
year-olds (p < .001). Biracial 7-year-olds also had significantly higher scores than biracial 
6-year-olds (p = .028). No age-level differences were found within the monoracial group. 
Comparison with existing data 
We were 
interested in making 
visual comparisons to 
Pauker and 
colleagues’ data from 
the (2010, 2016) 
study with a 
Massachusetts 
population (89.7% 
White). Figure 2.3 displays data from the White population from Pauker et al. (2010, 
2016), as compared to the data collected in this dissertation (monoracial Black, biracial). 
Although we were unable to obtain raw data from the Pauker study, leaving us unable to 
run analyses, it appears through visual inspection of Figure 2.3, that White and biracial 
children’s scores increase as they get older whereas Black children’s scores remain stable 
from 5 to 7 years of age.  
Figure 2.3. Mean race essentialism scores for others by age 





































 Recall that we asked three open-ended questions at the end of the testing session 
to explore whether children spontaneously referred to race when making social group 
judgments. Responses were coded as 0, indicating that there was no mention of race 
across responses to the three questions or 1, indicating that race was mentioned at least 
once across responses to the three questions. Despite having previously answered several 
questions pertaining to race during the task, only 9 (8%) of the 113 participants 
mentioned race, suggesting there was no priming effect.   
Discussion 
We investigated the impact of race and age on race essentialism among two racial 
groups that are relatively understudied: monoracial and biracial Black children from low-
income backgrounds. The results support two main conclusions. First, children’s levels of 
race essentialism vary when making judgments about themselves in contrast with making 
judgments about others, such that children’s race essentialism for others is higher than 
their race essentialism for themselves. Second, the developmental trajectory of race 
essentialism varies when comparing monoracial and biracial Black children. However, by 
7 years of age, children from monoracial and biracial Black racial groups, look very 
similar in terms of their levels of race essentialism when making judgments about their 
own identity as well as when making judgments about others. Below, we discuss each of 
those findings in more detail before turning to more broad implications of the findings.  
 Children were asked to identify their own racial identity and then make judgments 
about the stability of their own race as well as that of others. Previous research used a 
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variety of methods to assess race essentialism while also using various terms to capture 
race essentialism (e.g., ‘racial constancy’), leading to inconsistencies in the reported 
developmental trajectory of race essentialism. The majority of research exploring race 
essentialism only measures one or two components of the construct (e.g., only examines 
race essentialism for others) and is often conducted with White children from middle to 
upper class backgrounds. The results from this study indicated clear differences between 
the predictors of the judgments of self and those of others. In other words, the sample as a 
whole looked differently when considering race essentialism about themselves versus 
looking at images of other people. This finding suggests that exploring the stability of 
others’ racial identity is a distinct process from that of one’s own racial identity and 
appears to take place earlier in development. Indeed, some research has indicated that 
race essentialism for self was associated with decreased out-group stereotyping and race 
essentialism for others was associated with increased out-group stereotyping, highlighting 
the importance of considering judgments of the self differently from judgments of others 
(Bigler et al., 2001; Pauker et al., 2010).  
The finding that children’s understanding of other’s race develops earlier than 
their understanding of their own race is somewhat surprising, given developmental 
research highlighting young children’s egocentric capacities (Piaget, 1954). Because race 
is a complex social construct, one possible explanation is that the racial group that one 
self-identifies does not always match how a person is perceived by others (Vargas & 
Kingsbury, 2016). Particularly because children think concretely and tend to focus almost 
exclusively on skin color and not physiognomic features, they may be offering implicit or 
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explicit judgments about other children’s racial group memberships that may or may not 
align with the child’s understanding of their racial group membership. This misalignment 
may be especially true for biracial children, whose identities can be more ambiguous in 
terms of appearance, and may receive messages about their own identities that are 
complex and confusing or questions such as “what are you?” (Pauker et al., 2018 Tran, 
Miyake, Martinez‐Morales, & Csizmadia, 2016). For example, regardless of how 
White/Black biracial individuals self-identify, young children perceive White/Black 
biracial individuals as more Black than White (Roberts & Gelman, 2015).  
The possibility that children may identify others in ways that do not align with the 
others’ self-identifications stands in contrast with our findings that indicated that children 
demonstrate higher levels of race essentialism for others. Note, however, that in our study 
we used pictures that lacked racial ambiguity. Future investigations should include more 
variability in the pictures used and include pictures of multiracial individuals. There is 
very limited research examining how children categorize multiracial individuals, in 
particular how multiracial individuals categorize other multiracial individuals (Roberts & 
Gelman, 2017a). Some research indicates that 4- to 9-year-old White children 
remembered White faces significantly better than they remembered ambiguous and Black 
faces, and this difference in memory was especially true for children who did not 
demonstrate essentialism (Gaither, Schultz et al., 2014). Future research should explore 
the relative predictors of understanding one’s own racial identity in relation to their 
understanding of the identity of others.  
We also explored the predictors of race essentialism in both monoracial Black 
 
 81 
children and biracial Black children. When examining judgments of self, the model was 
not significant. By contrast, when examining judgments of others, we found associations 
between age, racial group, and race essentialism. Scores for 7-year-old biracial children’s 
race essentialism scores for judgments of others were significantly higher than those of 5- 
and 6-year-old biracial children’s scores, indicating a clear increase in score with age for 
biracial children. There were little age-related changes in race essentialism associated 
with monoracial Black status.  
Because the existing research is largely restricted to monoracial White children, 
there is limited evidence to inform our hypotheses about the trajectory of the 
development of race essentialism within our sample. However, by nature of the fact that 
race is often more salient to racial and ethnic minorities (Phinney, 1992; Tatum, 2017), 
we anticipated that children in our sample would demonstrate race essentialism earlier 
than their White counterparts (Loyd & Gaither, 2018; Roberts & Gelman, 2016, 2017). 
Indeed, our results demonstrate that the developmental trajectory of race essentialism 
differs when comparing monoracial Black children and Biracial children. Furthermore, 
when compared to previous research, these developmental trajectories also differ from 
their White counterparts (Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Pauker et al., 2016). Whereas we 
found that Black children’s level of race essentialism is relatively stable across the ages 
of 5 to 7, race essentialism appears to develop later in biracial children and in monoracial 
White children. The lack of age-related changes in our sample of monoracial Black 
children raises an interesting question around the age at which the development of race 
essentialism takes place for monoracial Black children. Future research should explore 
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these concepts with children in preschool to determine the age at which race essentialism 
emerges in monoracial Black children. Previous research suggests that self-identification 
(i.e. our exclusion criteria) is inconsistent in preschool (Annis & Corenblum, 1986; 
Bernal et al., 1990). However, today’s racial landscape is significantly more diverse than 
it was 30 years ago, which could result in earlier self-identification amongst certain racial 
groups.   
By age 7, both racial groups look similar and appear to have high levels of race 
essentialism. One possible explanation for the convergence of scores at age 7 for the two 
racial groups is the increased socialization that takes place with peers at this time. During 
this period of development, friendship becomes critical to establishing a self-concept and 
a way in which a child figures out who they are based on perceived similarities and 
differences as well as their perception of what others think of them (Witt, 2000). 
Additionally, theory of mind, or the ability to recognize that others may have mental 
states different from one’s own, has been shown to be linked to friendship or 
friendlessness with less advanced theory of mind at age 5 predicting friendlessness at age 
7 (Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, & de Rosnay, 2014).   
Theory of mind typically emerges with consistent success by 5 years of age 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004). However, newer research has suggested that 6- to 8-year-old 
children are not competent in all theory of mind tasks and age continues to be positively 
associated with proficiency (Calero, Salles, Semelman, & Sigman, 2013). Future research 
should explore the role of theory of mind abilities as a mechanism for developing race 
essentialism – especially among White and biracial children.  More developed theory of 
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mind in conjunction with increased peer socialization may encourage children to more 
readily consider social groups and their boundaries.  
Why might biracial children take longer to develop race essentialism, as 
compared to monoracial Black and White children? One reason might be that to fully 
understand their identity, biracial children must appreciate that objects (and people) can 
belong to multiple categories simultaneously (Morrison & Bordere, 2001). The process is 
arguably more complex since biracial children need to first make sense of why their 
parents’ races each differ but then how the child themselves fits into this dynamic. 
Monoracial Black children can self-categorize and put themselves in in a single racial 
category whereas self-categorization for biracial children may require the integration of 
societal messaging or viewing it as an opportunity to take pride in one’s biracial group 
membership (Hitlin, Brown, & Elder, 2006). Although monoracial White children are 
ahead of biracial children at age 5, they still lag behind monoracial Black children. This 
difference between the two monoracial groups may be attributed to the boost that 
monoracial Black children receive being from a lower-status racial group and the 
unearned privilege that accompanies the skin color of monoracial White children. 
Monoracial Black children are compelled to confront race, making them more advanced 
at younger ages when making judgments about race. On the other hand, the monoracial 
White children struggle due to the face that they have a choice, one typically not afforded 
to monoracial Black children, to consider race in order to navigate their social world. By 
contrast, biracial children struggle for an entirely different reason: they need to grapple 
with multiple identities. In other words, for biracial children, the process of 
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understanding race may require more thoughtfulness and be more of a developmentally 
significant achievement. Consistent with previous research, multiracial children reason 
differently about race than their monoracial counterparts (Gaither, 2015; Roberts & 
Gelman, 2017a). Roberts and Gelman (2016) suggest that children may view themselves 
as able to grow up to be like one or both of their parents and understand race as more 
fluid.   
Additionally, an alternative interpretation of the differences in the developmental 
trajectory of race essentialism between monoracial Black children and biracial children 
comes from research on racial/ethnic socialization (Rollins & Hunter, 2013). Research 
has focused more heavily on the racial/ethnic socialization of monoracial children and 
further investigation of the socialization of biracial children is needed (Csizmadia, 
Rollins, & Kaneakua, 2014). Part of the reason for the need for racial/ethnic socialization 
is due to the pervasive racism that continues to exist in the United States (Parker, 2016; 
Tesler, 2016). Race is made salient to Black children because it behooves Black families 
to engage in racial socialization practices in order to prepare their children to cope with 
and counter discrimination to, in turn, promote a sense of empowerment (for a review, 
see Hughes et al., 2006; Rollins & Hunter, 2013). By contrast, White parents rarely 
engage in racial socialization practices, are more likely to encourage a color-blind 
approach, and discourage any consideration of race (Hughes et al., 2006, Pahlke, Bigler, 
& Suizzo, 2012). Therefore, one would expect White children to develop a mature 
understanding of race at a slower rate than Black children (Roberts & Gelman, 2016). 
Our results support this hypothesis: whereas 41.2% of 5-year-olds in our sample achieved 
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the maximum score for race essentialism, only 10.7% of 4- to 6-year olds demonstrated 
race essentialism in a largely White sample (Pauker et al., 2016).  
The developmental trajectory for biracial children mirrors the trajectory seen in 
monoracial White children, suggesting that the racial socialization practices might be 
similar for White and biracial families (e.g, Csizmadia, Rollins, & Kaneauka, 2014; 
Rollins & Hunter, 2013). Future work should explicitly explore the relation between 
racial socialization practices and race essentialism in early childhood, especially among 
biracial and multiracial families. Specifically, research exploring parent-child 
conversations could shed light on variability in the amount of explicit discussion about 
race and, for multiracial families, discussion about racial similarities and differences. 
Some research seems to indicate variability in racial socialization. Brown and colleagues 
(2007) found that racial/ethnic socialization practices were observed more in biracial 
families of high SES backgrounds. Additionally, within the same family, White parents 
of biracial children are more likely to address race in response to their child’s experiences 
and questions while Black parents are more likely to preemptively teach their children 
strategies to navigate racism (Samuels, 2009).  
By gathering more information about families’ socialization practices, the 
mechanisms of transmission of race essentialism within a family may become clearer. 
Furthermore, previous research demonstrates that environmental factors, such as living in 
more diverse communities are associated with weaker essentialist beliefs (Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009; Pauker et al., 2016). While it is possible that sheer exposure to diversity 
reduces the strength of essentialist beliefs, it is also plausible that the families have made 
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conscious and deliberate choices to live in communities marked by heterogeneity. 
Moreover, there may be different levels of threat or risk associated with any given 
environment that also may impact a child’s essentialist beliefs. Future studies that collect 
information not only about families’ socialization practices but also about how they came 
to live in their communities, whether homogenous or heterogenous, would help to 
untangle the effect of a community’s diversity on the development of race essentialism.   
Recall that only 8% of the participants mentioned race or skin color in response to 
the several open-ended questions that explored children’s friendships as well as their own 
identity. The fact that only a small percentage of children mentioned race is not 
surprising for several reasons. First, although awareness of race is present and some 
children demonstrated race essentialism, it may be more cognitive in nature (i.e. 
categorization capacities) based on concrete observations and not meaningfully related to 
the abstract idea of identity (Tatum, 2016). Note that the large majority of children did 
not mention their skin color or race despite having been asked explicit questions about 
skin color. Another plausible explanation is that the large majority of these students are in 
communities where the student body is racially homogenous. Therefore, race may be less 
salient when their peers largely look similar to themselves. It is also plausible that the 
children did not feel comfortable spontaneously discussing race with a White 
experimenter. Moreover, race is not commonly discussed in the learning environment and 
most of data collection took place in schools during the school day (Husband, 2010; 
Derman-Sparks & Ramsey, 2006). 
Note that based on Pauker et al.’s (2016) findings showing differences in 
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essentialist reasoning by racial group, we had anticipated differences between our 
monoracial Black and our biracial participants. The only effect we observed was that 5-
year-old biracial children demonstrated significantly lower race essentialism scores for 
judgments of others than 5-year-old Black children. No other effects were observed 
between racial groups. A possible explanation for the limited racial group effect is that 
our sample size was so small for the biracial group. Increasing the number of biracial 
participants may result in more variation. However, should the effect be maintained after 
increasing the sample size, the difference between the racial groups may be related to the 
development of theory of mind. As previously mentioned, theory of mind tends to 
emerge at age 5 and so the differences observed in our study between 5-year-olds may be 
related to differences in theory of mind proficiencies. There is no work to our knowledge 
that has looked at the development of theory of mind specifically among monoracial 
Black and biracial Black children. However, there is research that biracial children have 
increased cognitive flexibility, a task within executive functioning, which is associated 
with theory of mind (Austin, Groppe, & Elsner, 2014; Gaither, Chen et al., 2014). In turn, 
this finding provides further support for future research centered on the intersection of 
race essentialism and theory of mind among children of monoracial and biracial 
backgrounds.    
Additionally, both of our racial groups had minority status and attended racially 
segregated schools. In Pauker et al.’s (2016) work, they compared high-status White 
participants in Massachusetts with Hawaiian participants where multiracial, Asian, and 
White racial groups all share the high-status title. In other words, status level in the 
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surrounding community could be playing a role. Given that our participants were all of 
minority status, regardless of the specific racial group, racial minority individuals may be 
forced to confront race by age 6 due to the salience of race and related oppressive forces. 
One might argue that this might not hold for biracial participants. However, given that 
racially ambiguous individuals are more often deemed a minority instead of White (e.g., 
Roberts & Gelman, 2015), this pattern is logical particularly in our study since our 
participants were half Black and half Latinx.  
Although not significant likely due to the limited number of participants, it is 
interesting to note that biracial participants’ race essentialism scores for judgments of self 
are highest among the 6-year-olds. The increase in scores from age 5 to 6 followed by a 
decrease in scores at age 7 may be a reflection of u-shaped development which is seen 
broadly in the development of cognitive skills (Karmiloff-Smith, 1997). In this case, race 
essentialism starts out weaker, spikes at age 6, only to lessen again at age 7. Should 
biracial children’s scores for judgments of self truly follow a u-shaped curve, we may be 
able to gain insight into the underlying processes that are impacting development related 
to race essentialism but also how it intersects with general cognitive development (Pauls, 
Macha, & Petermann, 2013).   
Finally, research traditionally examined social essentialism as a single entity 
when in fact there are five different types of essentialist reasoning, including natural 
kinds, strict boundaries, homogeneity, stability, and causal (Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 
2017). Our study exclusively examined stability (i.e. the idea that category membership is 
both stable and intrinsic) and past research most often examines social essentialism as a 
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whole and combination of the different types of essentialist beliefs. Future research 
should treat the components of essentialism as discrete and explore the role of racial 
social group status as well as socioeconomic status in the development of race 
essentialism.  
Taken together, findings from Study 1 highlight an important developmental 
window for interventions. There is tremendous growth taking place from the ages of 5 to 
7 in social, emotional, and cognitive domains and it is likely that advancement in these 
different domains impact the way in which a child views themselves and others as 
racialized beings. To take advantage of this flourishing time period, it would be 
advantageous to structure interventions that help to dissect whether there are domain 
specific developmental shifts or if shifts in racial identity are a result of domain general 
developments.  
In summary, the findings suggest that we need to reframe how we think about and 
study race essentialism. Our data indicate that there are differences between judgments of 
self and other. Thus, it may be more informative to consider these constructs 
independently and collectively. We also observed a difference in the developmental 
trajectory of children’s race essentialism by racial group. Whereas Black children 
demonstrate high levels of race essentialism for others across the ages of 5 to 7, biracial 
children’s race essentialism increases with age. These results highlight the important and 
unique differences in how children learn about themselves and others with regard to 
racial identity. Future research should consider these three main findings when designing 
studies, as the study of the development of race essentialism is a timely issue with 
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significant real-world importance. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
It is important to note that this study had several limitations. Our study explored 
the development of race essentialism among Black children and biracial children. One of 
the main limitations of this study is the small sample size of biracial participants. 
Although we had 113 participants, a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 indicated that a 
sample of 111 participants total (56 participants in each racial group) are needed in order 
to achieve 80% power with an alpha of .05 to detect small effect sizes (Cohen, 1992). 
Thus, additional data collection is warranted to be able to draw more definitive 
conclusions around results based on racial group membership. Moreover, research 
historically has treated ethnic minorities as a single, unified group that simply contrasts 
with the majority group (Howarth, 2009). With the recognition that this is poor practice 
and inadequate, our sampling intentionally only included individuals of African descent. 
There are certainly still nuances within these monoracial and biracial groups; however, it 
is important to be clear that these results cannot nor should they be generalized more 
broadly to other groups.  
Similarly, it is important to note the controversy around using Latinx as a racial 
group. Some argue that Latinx is an ethnic group while others argue that it is a racial 
group (De Genova & Ramos-Zayas, 2003). We chose to treat it as a racial group for this 
study for several reasons. First, when given the opportunity to choose a Latino label and 
racial label, most chose Latino only and did not select a race (Campbell & Rogalin, 
2006). Additionally, one study showed that Latinx youth feel as though they lack racial 
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categories and may be a manifestation of their ongoing racial exclusion (Flores-González, 
Aranda, & Vaquera, 2014). Flores-González and colleagues (2014) also highlight the 
incongruity between institutional assessments of race, such as the U.S. census, and the 
racial identities of Latinx individuals. The researchers suggest that failing to consider 
Latinx as a racial group limits the Latinx individuals from feeling a sense of belonging in 
a nation where being part of a racial group carries significant weight. Nonetheless, we 
acknowledge that it will be important to conduct further research that explores Latinx 
populations in greater detail given the complex history in the United States with the 
limiting and changing U.S. Census categories.  
Second, a possible limitation is that we are more narrowly capturing the 
heritability of race and skin color through our examination of stability beliefs as opposed 
to causal essentialist beliefs about race. As highlighted in our study, when children 
explained why skin color would remain stable over time, more children (54%) provided 
reasoning that was not essentialist in nature to support their judgments, which aligns with 
previous research, suggesting that race essentialism takes significant time and input to 
develop (Gaither, Schultz et al., 2014; Pauker et al., 2010, 2016). A critical study that set 
to directly examine how the heritability of skin color relates to causal essentialist beliefs 
about race demonstrated the importance of asking not only what the child will look like 
when they grow up but also what the child would be like (Mandalaywala et al., 2018). 
Mandalaywala and colleagues’ (2018) findings indicated that 5- to 7-year-old children 
hold the view that skin color is inherited but did not believe that behavioral and 
psychological qualities are attributed exclusively to an innate racial essence. Therefore, it 
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will be important that future research continue to use similar methods in which 
researchers move beyond the heritability of skin color and race and examine these beliefs 
in conjunction with the belief that race is indicative of an intrinsic essence.   
Additionally, further research is warranted to examine the role of the race of the 
experimenter. In our study, the experimenters’ race (all White) was different from the 
race of the participants. Children of color’s answers may vary if the experimenter is also 
a person of color and so it would be beneficial to conduct the same study with 
experimenters of color. This is especially relevant for students of color since the teacher 
workforce is predominantly White (Segall & Garrett, 2013). 
Finally, research demonstrates that internalized racism is observed in very young 
children. Therefore, when answering the question about whether a child can change their 
race or not, there arguably could be a sophisticated desire to want to be White due to an 
awareness of the privilege and power that comes with being part of the majority group. 
Therefore, future research could look at children’s beliefs across race. For instance, we 
could explore children of color’s beliefs about whether a White child could change to be 
Black and White children’s beliefs about whether a Black child could change to be 
White. The procedure could also be paired with tasks that ask about the child’s feelings 
towards their own race to tease this apart.  
Despite these limitations, these findings make important contributions to our 
understanding of race essentialism. As mentioned, the literature remains ambiguous 
regarding children’s development of race essentialism. The results from this study help to 
illuminate the age at which race essentialism is revealed. However, a small percentage of 
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participants in the sample demonstrated perfect scores on the race essentialism measures. 
Therefore, the development of race essentialism remains an interesting question for future 
research. If it is in fact the case that race essentialism is developing later, then 
interventions to promote more flexible thinking may be possible over a longer period of 
development than initially anticipated. To identify an even narrower timeframe during 






CHAPTER 3: STUDY 2 
An Examination of the Predictors of Race Essentialism among Adults 
Introduction 
Despite a lack of agreement on the definition of race within research and the 
argument that race is “a conceptually meaningless concept”, race continues to serve as 
grounds for the unequal distribution of resources and power (Helms, Jernigan, & 
Mascher, 2005, p. 27; Parker, 2016; Slaughter-Defoe, 2012). Race vacillates between 
being seen as an essence, or a fixed and objective characteristic, and as simply an 
illusion, or a socially constructed ideology (Omi & Winant, 1994). Over 20 years ago, 
Omi and Winant (1994) made the charge to reject the polarization of these two 
viewpoints and see race as an unstable construct that is routinely changed by political 
struggle. However, despite the argument that the concept of race is imprecise, Omi and 
Winant (1994) acknowledged that expelling the notion of race would not be a simple 
task. Needless to say, race today remains a prevalent construct and is intricately tied to 
individuals’ identities and understanding of the world. Thus, before we can fully 
understand how children come to understand race and engage in race-based judgments, 
we need to investigate adults’ present-day conceptualizations of race, which are marked 
by divergent category definitions and labels (Helms, 2007). Furthermore, Sanders-
Thompson and Akbar (2003) suggest that “the literature currently lacks significant 
discussion of individual definitions of the racial category that is required for the 
establishment of a group identity based on race” (p. 81). Race is often seen as a socially 
constructed construct having consequences for people of color (Helms, 1992). However, 
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we need to discern how a person defines and makes sense of the basis for the group with 
which they choose to identify (Sanders-Thompson & Akbar, 2003).  
Race vs. Ethnicity 
 An important place to start is to consider the terminology that we commonly use 
interchangeably: race and ethnicity. Researchers remain divided as to whether race and 
ethnicity should be treated as the same, overlapping, or distinct constructs. Phinney 
(1996) argued that due to the ambiguity of the word race, particularly within psychology, 
ethnicity could instead include both race and culture. More recently in the developmental 
literature, researchers have suggested using ethnic-racial identification and ethnic-racial 
identity, given that the two terms are difficult to separate and the development of an 
identity tends to encompass experiences based on both ethnicity and race (Umaña-Taylor 
et al., 2014). However, others argue that especially in the United States, ethnicity often 
serves as a stand-in for racial categorization or immigrant status and race is less 
ambiguous in comparison (Helms & Talleyrand, 1997). Unclear language is used to 
capture both racial and race-related (e.g., ethnicity and culture) constructs (Helms, 1996).  
Furthermore, in a superficial review of psychology abstracts that included measures 
involving race, ethnicity, or both, race emerged as the more discrete paradigm. Despite 
the recognition that race is a social construct, the phenotypic qualities associated with 
race inform how a person is treated, regardless of the culture of which they are a part 
(Helms & Talleyrand, 1997). In essence, the role race plays is obvious while the role 
culture plays is much more inconspicuous. Therefore, others propose treating the two as 
distinct such that race is a social construction, putting individuals together based on 
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phenotypic characteristics such as skin color and hair texture, and ethnicity is the cultural 
heritage, including language and customs, that is transmitted across generations  (Derlan 
et al., 2017). In summary, there is considerable variation around how race and ethnicity 
are operationalized and so we were interested in getting a snapshot of adults’ 
conceptualizations of the two constructs, especially given the increasing diversity of the 
nation.  
Race Essentialism 
Despite haziness around the boundaries of race in the context of ethnicity, there is 
a large body of evidence indicating that the idea of biologically distinct races is mythical 
and race is exclusively a social construction (Smedley & Smedley, 2005; Williams & 
Eberhardt, 2008). However, biological races are often taken to be tantamount, if not 
superior, to socially constructed races (Friedman & Lee, 2013; Graves, 2010, 2015). The 
issue is that many within the general population, researchers included, are engrained 
within the historical foundations of “race” and the obsolete notion of natural, biological 
races (Omi & Winant, 1994; Prentice & Miller, 2007). In turn, it is wrongly assumed that 
the variations in skin color, as well as other physical features that are associated with 
different races, are indicative of more inherent differences (Diesendruck, 2013; Fujimura 
et al., 2014; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Richeson & Sommers, 2016; Roberts, 2011; 
Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). Race essentialism, or the tendency to view groups as 
biologically distinct with an underlying essence that informs the attributes that group 
members will possess, is associated with various negative outcomes including prejudice, 
stereotyping, and discrimination (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Gaither et al., 2014; Jayartne 
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et al., 2006; Mandalaywala, Amodio, & Rhodes, 2018; Medin, 1989; Tawa, 2017; Tawa 
& Kim, 2011; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). However, inconsistencies remain as others 
failed to capture the same relationship between essentialism and prejudice (Bastian & 
Haslam, 2006; Bastian, Loughnan, & Koval, 2011; Haslam et al., 2002). Therefore, 
Mandalaywala and Rhodes (2016) call for more precise investigations of essentialist 
beliefs, particularly as they relate to race, to better understand this relationship.  
Current Study 
 In the current study, we were interested in answering three main questions:  
1) Do beliefs about race as a stable attribute contribute to adults’ race 
essentialist bias?   
2) How does race essentialism differ based on demographic variables (e.g., 
gender, age, race)?  




Participants were 1377 adults who completed a survey on a voluntary basis. 
Eighty-three percent of participants completed the survey in entirety. Participants who 
were under the age of 18 or completed less than a third of the survey (n = 154) were 
excluded in further analyses. Additionally, due to the limited responses from individuals 
who identify outside of the cisgender binary categories of male and female (n = 10), these 
participants were also excluded from further analyses. We also excluded participants who 
had less than a high school degree as the number of participants was too small to observe 
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meaningful results (n = 4). Finally, we excluded participants who indicated “other” for 
their status as a majority or minority within their community whose responses were 
unable to be coded into majority or minority resulting in a sample of 1151. Participants’ 
ages ranged from 18 to 86 years of age (Mean age= 35.46, SD = 14.56; Median = 29.0). 
The final sample of 1151 adults largely identified as female (73.2%). The participants 
were able to identify their own race. Race was coded based on participants’ responses 
and the sample was largely White (84.1%) and with a roughly equal distribution among 
Black (3.3%), Latinx (3.8%), Asian (5.1%), Biracial (3.2%), and Other (0.4%).  
Procedure 
 Responses were collected by means of an anonymous online survey using 
Qualtrics. The survey was shared via faculty members at Boston University, social 
media, and e-mail. The survey consisted of questions similar to those posed to children in 
Study 1 (see Appendix B). None of the survey questions required responses. As depicted 
in Appendix B, additional questions were included in the survey but for the purposes of 
this dissertation, they were not included in the present study. Future work will consider 
them further.  
First, participants were asked to identify their age, gender, race, and skin color. 
For gender, participants could choose from male, female, and other with the option to 
write in their own gender. For race and skin color, participants could write in their own 
responses. Additionally, participants answered questions about the zip code where they 
grew up, highest level of education, the nature of their K–12 schooling (e.g, private, 
public, or other), and whether they identified as a majority or minority within their 
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primary community,  
Based on Pauker et al.’s (2010, 2016) methods, the adults answered various 
questions to assess their levels of race essentialism. Using their previous responses (e.g., 
“Caucasian; female”), adults were then asked, “Are you a Caucasian female?” to assess 
self-labeling. Adults were asked three questions designed to assess race essentialism 
judgments of self. To assess whether adults view race as stable over time, they were 
asked, 1) “when you were a baby, were you a Caucasian baby?” as well as 2) “when you 
grow older, will you be a Caucasian adult?” Responses were limited to yes or no and 
coded as 1 or 0, respectively. Additionally, in order to understand whether adults view 
race as consistent across settings and context, the participants were asked, 3A) “Can you 
become another race?” and responses were coded as no (1) or yes (0). To assess whether 
adults were attending merely to the heritability of skin color or holding in mind an 
essentialist frame, we examined their justification of their stability beliefs. In turn, if a 
participant answered 3A) as no, you can’t become another race, the question was 
followed by, “Why can’t you become another race?” Their response to this question was 
open-ended. If the participant answered 3A) as yes, you can become another race, the 
question was followed by, “How would you become another race?” Their response to this 
question was open-ended. For this final two-part item, adults’ responses were coded as 
essentialist (1) or non-essentialist. To be coded as essentialist, participants correctly 
answered question 3A (a “no” to the question around whether change is possible) and 
employed essentialist reasoning when answering the justification question by describing 
immutability (e.g., “I am what I am”, inheritability (e.g., “because I was born 
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Caucasian”), or naturalness (“race is your natural physical characteristics”; see Gaither et 
al., 2014 and Pauker et al., 2010, 2016 for similar coding schemas). If adults incorrectly 
answered question 3A, they were automatically given a score of 0 (i.e. non-essentialist). 
Additionally, if adults provided a reason that did not fall into one of the aforementioned 
categories (e.g., “I don’t want to”), adults were also coded as non-essentialist and given a 
score of 0. Because a response was not required, those who did not submit an answer 
were excluded from analyses. A maximum score (3) indicated higher levels of race 
essentialism of self. Finally, participants were asked “Do you think race and ethnicity 
have the same meaning?” and responses were coded as 1 (no) or 0 (yes).  
Results 
 First, we were interested in examining whether beliefs about race as a stable 
attribute contributed to adults’ race essentialism. Therefore, we added the two scores 
together from the two questions centered on whether race changes over time (e.g., when 
you were a baby and when you are older) and called this Stability Score (0-2). 
Additionally, the range in age of the participants was wide and the data was bimodal. In 
turn, we binned the ages by generations as defined by the Pew Research Center (2019) 
resulting in five cohorts: the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, Generation X, 
Millennials, and Generation Z (see Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 Number of Participants by Generation 




n 189 593 170 190 9 




A binary logistic regression was performed to test the effects of Generation (Gen Z, 
Millennials, Gen X, Boomers, Silent), Gender (female, male), Education (high school 
graduate, postsecondary degree (i.e. associate or bachelor’s), graduate degree), Race 
(White, Non-White), Majority Status (Majority, Minority) and Stability Score on the 
likelihood of giving an essentialist explanation around whether race could be changed 
(see Table 3.2). The model was significant, χ2 (10, N = 1151) = 59.62, p < .001. Stability 
Score was indeed a predictor of giving an essentialist explanation (OR = 3.00, p < .001). 
More specifically, those who received scores of 2 on the stability questions indicating 
that their race was the same as a baby and will continue to be the same as they get older 
were 3.0 times more likely to provide an essentialist explanation than those who indicated 
that their race was able to change across time. There was also a significant effect of 
Gender (OR = 1.51, p = .003) such that females were 1.51 times more likely to provide 
an essentialist explanation than males. Additionally, those with graduate degrees were 
about half as likely to offer an essentialist explanation compared to those who had a high 
school degree (OR = 0.55, p = .012). Finally, members of the Baby Boomer generation 
were 1.68 times more likely to offer an essentialist explanation compared to members of 
Generation Z (OR = 1.68, p = .034). However, it is important to note that these predictors 




Table 3.2 Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Predictors of an Essentialist 
Explanation (n =1151) 
Predictors  (SE) Wald OR [95% CI] 
Constant -1.73(0.54)  10.27** 0.18 
Gender (0 = male) 0.41(0.14)  8.62** 1.51 [1.15, 1.98] 
Race (0 = White) -0.42(0.24) 3.10 0.66 [0.41, 1.05] 
Majority status -0.7(0.25) 0.08 0.93 [0.57, 1.52] 
Education (0 = high school)  8.17*  
Education (1 = postsecondary degree)  -0.29(0.22) 1.70 0.75 [0.48, 1.16] 
Education (2 = graduate degree)  -0.61(0.24) 6.33* 0.55 [0.34, 0.87] 
Stability score  1.10(0.25) 19.31*** 3.00 [1.84, 4.91] 
Generation (0 = Gen Z)  6.34  
Generation (1 = Millennials) 0.21(0.20) 1.02 1.23 {0.82, 1.83] 
Generation (2 = Gen X) 0.45(0.25) 3.34 1.58 [0.97, 2.56] 
Generation (3 = Boomers) 0.52(0.25) 4.48* 1.68 [1.04, 2.72] 
Generation (4 = Silent) 0.43(0.74) 0.34 1.54 [0.36, 6.62] 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Nagelkerke R2 = 0.07 
 
Demographic Predictors of Race Essentialism 
Second, we were interested in how race essentialism scores may differ based on 
demographic variables. We used multiple linear regression with bias-corrected 
bootstrapping to test the effect of Gender (male, female), Education level (High School, 
Post-secondary, Graduate), Generation (Gen Z, Millennials, Gen X, Boomers, Silent), 
Race (White, Non-White), and Majority Status (Majority, Minority) on Race 
Essentialism Score (max score of 4). Using 5,000 resamples, these analyses revealed a 
significant model, F(9, 1139) = 6.43, p < .001. Bias-corrected bootstrap estimates and 





Table 3.3 The Summary Statistics of Regression Coefficients for Bootstrap Regression 
for Race Essentialism based on the Observations (n =1030, B = 5000)  
B 
estimate 
SE  Bias p 95% BCa 
CI 
Constant 3.53 0.06 0.001 <0.001 [3.41, 3.66] 
Gender 0.15 0.04 -0.001 <0.001 [0.07, 0.23] 
Majority status -0.34 0.21 -0.006 0.101 [-0.82, 0.05] 
Race -0.14 0.11 -0.002 0.174 [-0.35, 0.06] 
Education level -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.167 [-0.10, 0.02] 
Generation 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.756 [-.04, 0.05] 
Generation x Race -0.18 0.09 0.00 0.039 [-0.35, 0.02] 
Generation x Majority 
status 
0.20 0.10 0.004 0.047 [0.00, 0.41] 
Education x Majority status -0.20 0.12 -0.005 0.095 [-0.44, 0.02] 
Race x Majority status 0.54 0.26 0.013 0.030 [0.07, 1.06] 
R2= .048. Note: confidence intervals in bold are significant. 
As shown in Table 3.3, there was a little bias in the bootstrap coefficients, and the 
tests of significance showed that the effects of Gender, Generation x Race, Generation x 
Race, and Generation x Majority 
Status were significant. However, the 
confidence intervals (CI) are more 
informative and take into account the 
non-symmetry in the distribution of 
the estimate (Hayes, 2013). The CI is 
deemed significant when it does not 
include 0. Therefore, Gender and Race 
x Majority Status remain significant.  
Inspection of Figure 3.1 indicates that 
although Gender is significant, the difference is marginal between Males (M = 3.45, SD = 
































depicts the interaction between Race and Majority Status. With equal variances not 
assumed (equal variances assumed was significant, p = .042), White individuals who 
identified as the majority had significantly higher scores than non-White individuals who 
identified as the majority, t(61.29) = 2.94, p = .005. Additionally, Levene’s Test for 
Equality of Variances was also significant (p < .001) when examining White Majority 
versus White Minority. Thus, we examined the results when equal variances was not 
assumed but the effect did not hold and was not significant (p = 0.125).   
In summary, White 
participants who identified as the 
Majority had the highest race 
essentialism mean score (n =932, M 
= 3.60, SD = 0.58) while White 
participants who identified as the 
Minority had the lowest mean score 
(n = 33, M = 3.33, SD = 1.18) of the 
four groups. The scores of the non-
White participants who identified as 
the Majority (n = 57, M = 3.33, SD = 
0.66) and the Minority (n = 127, M = 3.41, SD = 0.63) fell in between the White 






























Figure 3.2. Mean essentialism score by 
race and majority status. 
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Analyses by Zip Code 
In addition, we collected information about the zip codes where individuals grew 
up. To explore the influence that a person’s zip code growing up had on their responses, 
we obtained information about the median income level per capita for the zip code as 
well as the racial demographics. Subsequently, we coded the median per capita income as 
low income (0), middle income (1), or high income (2) in line with standards that middle 
class equates to income levels between $40,500 and $122,000 (Pew Research Center, 
2015b). Our sample indicated that it was largely middle income (78.2%) with 6.3% low 
income and 15.4% high income with the income levels ranging from $21, 172 to $226, 
386. Additionally, we coded the zip code as predominantly White (0) for communities 
with more than 50% White individuals and predominantly Non-White (1) for 
communities with more than 50% individuals of color. 
We used multiple linear regression with bias-corrected bootstrapping to test the 
effect of Gender (male, female), Education level (High School, Post-secondary, 
Graduate), Generation (Gen Z, Millennials, Gen X, Boomers, Silent), Race (White, Non-
White), Majority Status (Majority, Minority), Income Level (Low, Middle, High), and 
Predominant Race in Zip Code (White, Non-White) on Race Essentialism Score (max 
score of 4). Using 5,000 resamples, these analyses revealed a significant model, F(8, 
1021) = 5.75, p < .001. Bias-corrected bootstrap estimates and 95% confidence intervals 




Table 3.4 The Summary Statistics of Regression Coefficients for Bootstrap Regression 
for Zip Code based on the Observations (n=1151, B = 5000)  
B 
estimate 
SE  Bias p 95% BCa CI 
Constant 3.60 0.11 0.003 <.001 [3.37, 3.83] 
Gender 0.15 0.05 0.000 .001 [0.06, 0.24] 
Majority status -0.13 0.12 -0.002 0.286 [-0.39, 0.10] 
Race -0.09 0.12 0.002 0.423 [-0.32, 0.14] 
Education level -0.20 0.07 -0.002 0.004 [-0.34, -0.07] 
Generation -0.002 0.02 0.000 0.922 [-0.05, 0.04] 
Predominant Race for Zip 
Code 
0.12 0.06 0.000 0.06 [-0.01, 0.24] 
Income Level -0.04 0.08 -0.003 0.592 [-0.20, 0.11] 
Education x Income Level 0.14 0.06 0.002 0.021 [0.02, 0.267] 
R2= .043. Note: confidence intervals in bold are significant. 
As displayed in Table 3.4, results indicated a significant interaction between 
Education x Income Level as 
well as main effects of 
Education and Gender. Recall 
females had slightly higher 
scores than males (refer back 
to Figure 3.1). Additionally, 
when exploring the 
interaction between Education 
and Income Level, the effects 
were driven by those with 
Graduate Degrees. More specifically, those with Graduate Degrees from low income 
backgrounds had significantly lower scores (n = 59, M = 3.20, SD = 0.85) than those 




























High School Postsecondary Graduate
Figure 3.3. Mean Essentialism Score by Education 
and Income Level. 
 
 107 
income (n = 43, M = 3.67, SD = 0.47; t(100) = -3.29, p = .001. These results suggest that 
the race essentialism scores of those with graduate degrees are moderated by the mean 
household income level of where they grew up (see discussion and limitations below for 
more details).     
Race and Ethnicity 
Table 3.5 Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Predictors of Viewing Race and 
Ethnicity as the Same 
Predictors  (SE) Wald OR [95% CI] 
Constant -3.64(0.72) 25.24*** 0.03 
Generation  1.46  
  Millennials 0.20(0.28) 0.51 1.22[0.71, 2.12] 
  Gen X 0.27(0.34) 0.62 1.31[0.67, 2.53] 
  Baby Boomers 0.06(0.34) 0.62 1.06[0.55, 2.04] 
  Silent 0.75(0.86) 0.77 2.12[0.40, 11.44] 
Gender  -0.04(0.20) 0.04 0.96[0.65, 1.43] 
Race  0.02(0.35) 0.003 1.02[0.52, 2.01] 
Majority Status 0.28(0.35) 0.63 1.32[0.66, 2.64] 
Education  7.22*  
  Postsecondary degree -0.11(0.28) 0.16 0.89[0.51, 1.55] 
   Graduate degree -0.64(0.32) 3.98* 0.53[0.28, 0.99] 
Race Essentialism 0.54(0.18) 9.23** 1.72[1.21, 2.43] 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Finally, with regards to how individuals think about race and ethnicity, 85.6% 
noted that race and ethnicity do not have the same meaning, which suggests that adults 
think about these two constructs differently. We were interested in whether participants’ 
background variables as well as their Race Essentialism score predicted their likelihood 
of answering yes, race and ethnicity do have the same meaning. Thus, we conducted a 
binary logistic regression with Generation (gen Z = 0), Gender (male = 0), Majority 
Status (majority = 0), Education Level (high school graduate = 0), and Race Essentialism 
as predictors of the likelihood of indicating race and ethnicity as synonymous. The 
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overall model was significant, χ2 (10, N = 1054) = 21.26, p = .019 with significant main 
effects of Education Level for those with Graduate Degrees and Race Essentialism score  
(see Table 3.5). Compared with individuals with high school degrees, those with graduate 
degrees were nearly half as likely (OR = 0.53, p = .046) to say that race and ethnicity 
were the same. Furthermore, as a person’s race essentialism score increased, meaning 
they were more likely to view race as having an underlying, unobservable essence, the 
odds of viewing race and ethnicity as the same increased (OR = 1.72, p = .002).  
Discussion 
 We explored the relation between adults’ stability beliefs and race essentialism as 
well as  the impact of various demographic and background variables. Some research 
suggests that stability beliefs and the biological dimensions of essentialism are separate 
and may not always be strongly linked (Heiphetz, Gelman, & Young, 2017; Haslam et 
al., 2002) while other research indicates that stability beliefs are correlated with the 
dimension of essentialism centered on heritability and biology, particularly in the context 
of race (e.g., Hirschfeld, 1996; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Smedley & Smedley, 2005; 
Yzerbyt et al., 1997). In our study, we anticipated that stability beliefs would contribute 
to adults’ use of essentialist reasoning given the tendency to use inherent properties for 
explanations (Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). Additionally, because previous research 
remains divided about individuals’ conceptions of race broadly as well as in comparison 
to ethnicity (Dubriwny et al., 2004; Glasgow, Shulman, & Covarrubias, 2009; Martin & 
Parker, 1995; Shulman & Glasgow, 2010), our final question around whether race and 
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ethnicity are synonymous was exploratory in hopes of capturing a present-day picture of 
adults’ conceptualizations of race and ethnicity.  
First, our results indicated that adults’ likelihood of explicitly offering essentialist 
explanations about the immutability of race was associated with greater stability scores 
(i.e. view race as unchanging over time). This finding aligned with our hypothesis and 
earlier research (Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007). Despite the general acceptance that 
race is a social construction (Fujimura et al., 2014; Quintana & McKown, 2008; Richeson 
& Sommers, 2016), adults still relied on biological explanations to explain why race is 
unchanging, such as endorsing statements, such as “Some racial disparities are due to 
inherent trait differences between White and Black Americans” (Williams & Eberhardt, 
2008, p. 1036; Yalcinkaya, Estrada-Villalta, & Adams, 2017). This finding is not 
surprising considering individuals’ proclivity to rely on the “inherence heuristic”, or turn 
to inherent characteristics, when explaining why a person is the way they are (Cimpian & 
Salomon, 2014). Moreover, individuals often use skin color and physical attributes to 
make race-based decisions, components with one’s appearance that are an outcome of 
one’s genetics, which may be contributing to the observed relation between stability 
beliefs and essentialist reasoning in the current study (Condit et al., 2004).  
More specifically, females were more likely to offer an essentialist explanation 
and had slightly higher race essentialism scores compared to their male counterparts. In 
other words, females are more likely to view race as a category that carries inherent 
differences and non-observable properties. One possible explanation for this is that 
females are typically in a more marginalized position than males. As such, females may 
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be more likely to internalize messages about biological differences that keep maintain 
and justify their oppressed position in contrast with males whose privilege protects them 
from having to reflect on their group membership. However, previous research suggests 
that those who identify with dominant social categories (e.g., males) usually demonstrate 
greater levels of essentialism, particularly in situations when the dominant identity is 
under attack (Kraus & Keltner, 2013; Morton, Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009). 
However, in general, research indicates that individuals are capable of intentionally 
endorsing or downplaying depending on the context and the identity at risk (Morton, 
Hornsey, & Postmes, 2009). For instance, White individuals provided less essentialist 
ideas about their racial group when they believed that their White racial group 
membership might result in them being excluded from a benefit (Morton, Hornsey et al., 
2009). Taken together, the previous research in conjunction of our findings suggest that 
the presence of essentialism may be context dependent. Given our largely White sample 
and questions that centered specifically on race, not gender, gender may have been less 
salient to female respondents and their racial identity may have played a stronger role 
causing their scores to be higher than males’ scores. Note that in this study, the actual 
difference in mean scores between males and females was extremely marginal, 
suggesting that the differences may not carry meaningful implications. Future research 
that asks about experiences of marginalization and socialization broadly would help to 
dissect this conflicting pattern. Future studies should also include a wider range of 
genders, including more transgender individuals, to better understand the intersectionality 
that gender may play with race, particularly as it relates to essentialism.  
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Another effect we observed was centered around education. Those with graduate degrees 
were less likely to use essentialist reasoning than those with high school degrees. 
Similarly, those with graduate degrees were less likely to view race and ethnicity as 
synonymous. In other words, higher levels of education may be related to more flexible 
and nuanced thinking about race. One could have imagined that greater levels of 
education resulted in stronger essentialist beliefs considering how White-centric most 
higher education institutions are (Fleming, 2018).  
This finding, although preliminary, is encouraging. One plausible explanation is 
that adults who are pursuing graduate degrees are increasing their knowledge while 
strengthening their critical thinking skills, which may foster an eagerness to learn and 
open-mindedness. In terms of unpacking the role that education plays, future work that 
considers specifically the field in which the graduate degree was obtained would be 
interesting to understand how race is embedded (or not) within a degree program. It 
would also be fruitful to consider how graduate students at predominantly White 
institutions and historically Black colleges and universities consider race to better take 
into account the context.  
It is also important to note that those with graduate degrees from low income 
backgrounds had lower scores than those with graduate degrees from middle- and high-
income backgrounds. We also observed that White individuals who identifies as the 
majority had significantly higher scores than non-White individuals who identified as the 
majority. These two findings contradict what we suggested may be taking place with 
females such that in these cases, those with greater statuses (i.e. higher income levels and 
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being White) are demonstrating higher levels of race essentialism. Recall that these 
findings are consistent with previous research that suggests that those in dominant social 
categories tend to endorse greater levels of essentialism (Yalcinkaya et al., 2017). One 
possible explanation is that due to the less salient nature of race for White people (Helms, 
1992), White adults may have spent less time thoughtfully considering race and its 
related meaning, resulting in essentialist thinking as a default. On the contrary, White 
adults who identified as the minority had lower scores than non-White adults who 
identified as the minority as well as White adults who identified as the majority. A 
plausible reason for the lower scores is that exposure to diverse populations tempers 
essentialism as well as racism (Pauker et al., 2018). For a White person to identify as a 
minority, they are inherently surrounded by people who are racially different from them 
which may foster positive intergroup relations. Furthermore, race may become more 
salient for White adults who identify as minority members, prompting them to think more 
thoughtfully and deeply about their beliefs about race.  
We also saw some age differences based on generation. Older participants who 
were part of the Baby Boomers Generation were more likely to offer an essentialist 
explanation compared with the younger participants part of Generation Z. This finding is 
not surprising when considering cohort effects that likely shaped Generation Z and the 
Baby Boomers’ upbringings. For example, Generation Z is considered the most 
progressive and most diverse, especially when it comes to race (Pew Research Trends, 
2019). Research shows that members of Generation Z (66%) are more likely than older 
generations such as the Boomers (49%) to say that Black individuals are not treated as 
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fairly as White individuals in the U.S. This finding is especially true for White 
individuals, such that White Americans in younger generations are significantly more 
likely than older White Americans to say Black individuals do not receive fair treatment.  
Given that Baby Boomers grew up during a time when the Civil Rights 
Movement was at its peak, there may be longstanding racist beliefs that were 
indoctrinated at young ages. Although change can be more difficult as a person ages, it is 
important not to overlook older individuals, as they play important roles in the lives of 
children often in the role of grandparents. Future research should explore older adults’ 
essentialist beliefs, especially in terms of their malleability, to determine if modifying 
them is possible. Moreover, for older adults who have children and/or grandchildren, 
gaining information about their racial socialization practices and how they have changed 
over the course of their lifetime would help to determine influences on the decision to 
engage in this process. On the other hand, it would also be interesting to gather 
information from members of Generation Z about their perspective on the socialization 
practices that led them to be more progressive and outspoken about racial justice, 
resulting in lower race essentialism scores.     
Participants also held multiple beliefs about race simultaneously. Within the same 
response, some participants would describe race in some way as a social construct while 
simultaneously noting that race is rooted in biology and defaulting to inherent features 
(Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). One possible explanation for 
this finding is that individuals are aware that race is a social construct but not to the 
extent that they can explain it as such. Previous research suggests that when asked to 
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choose whether race was social, biological, or psychological, approximately half of the 
sample selected biology, 21% selected social, and 23% chose biology in combination 
with the other components (Shulman & Glasgow, 2010). Our research, in conjunction 
with past work, suggests that there may not be a universal conception of race as either 
social or biological (Glasgow et al., 2009). Moreover, future research should 
systematically explore the relation between individuals’ understanding of the conception 
of race and their racial attitudes. Some research (Jayaratne et al., 2006) found that those 
who view race as more biologically based demonstrate higher levels of prejudice as 
compared with those who discount biology, whereas other research (Shulman & 
Glasgow, 2010) did not observe differences between racial attitudes for those who 
subscribed to a biological vs. social conception.  
Outstanding follow up questions center on the role that social desirability plays in 
self-report responses. In this study, self-report responses opening up the possibility that 
participants are responding in a socially desirable way, as the charge is for race to seen as 
a fluid, social construct (Omi & Winant, 1994). Social desirability may help to explain 
the fact that some participants explained race as a social construct, yet then followed up 
with biologically based explanations. Future research could assuage this concern by 
providing some participants with a speeded response task to highlight implicit biases, 
whereas other participants could be given unlimited time to respond.   
Participants who provided non-essentialist responses focused on the language 
used to describe racial groups. In other words, numerous participants suggested that their 
race could change if the labels changed. This idea is related to social construction and 
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speaks to the way names for racial groups have changed over the year (e.g., “from 
‘Colored’ to ‘Negro’ to ‘Black’ and now perhaps to ‘African American’”, Smith, 1992). 
Participants also referenced “mixed” or multiracial individuals into their responses to 
explain how race may in fact be able to change based on context (Gaither, Chen et al., 
2014). These responses may reflect our progressively more diverse nation and the need 
for increased flexibility around the conception of race (Pew Research Center, 2015a). 
 Our findings help to shed light on the nature of race essentialism among adults 
albeit the study has several limitations. First, one limitation is that the scores for 
essentialism were on a scale of four which creates a rather restricted range. As a result, 
the variance attained was generally low. These marginal influences may be a result of the 
restricted range. Another possibility is that there are other factors contributing to race 
essentialism scores beyond demographic variables that we did not investigate. For 
instance, participants may have been more impacted by their families’ socialization 
practices, the diversity of their schools, or the peers with whom they choose to surround 
themselves. Future research should investigate race essentialism using a wider range 
(e.g., Tawa’s (2017) Beliefs about Race Scale (BARS)) as well as consider measuring 
additional constructs that may be impacting race essentialism such as attitudes toward 
race or implicit bias. Further exploration of race essentialism that captures not only 
beliefs around the heritability of race but also explicitly inquires about beliefs about an 
underlying essence will be important to tease apart essentialism and biological thinking 
about race (Haslam, 1998; Mallon, 2007).   
 A second limitation is around the lack of overall diversity of our sample, which 
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was largely White. We collapsed minority racial groups into a single category to assess 
differences between White and non-White participants. We recognize the tremendous 
variability within “Non-White” and the term “Non-White” is not to suggest that White is 
a baseline. Future studies should include a more diverse sample to highlight differences 
between non-White participants based on racial status in the community. Additionally, 
there are several limitations associated with using the zip code where individuals grew 
up. First, the information about the zip code was taken from 2016. Therefore, the 
information does not necessarily reflect the demographics of the zip code at the time the 
person grew up there. More specifically, the zip code information does not take into 
account the person’s current age and when they lived there which could be as little as one 
year or more than 80 years ago. Needless to say, certain zip codes have changed 
dramatically over time due to segregation, gentrification, and general migration patterns 
to name a few reasons. Furthermore, the median household income for a certain zip code 
does not in fact tell us information about a specific person’s experience. In other words, a 
person could have been one of the poorest families in a wealthy town or vice versa. 
Nonetheless, we chose to continue to include these analyses as the zip code information 
seemed to serve as an estimated proxy for socioeconomic status.  
In summary, the findings of this study suggest that how adults think about race 
broadly as well as their levels of race essentialism vary based on age, race, gender, 
education, whether one identifies as the majority, and the neighborhood in which they 
grew up. These results highlight the complexity surrounding conceptions of race, which 
may help to explain why people resort to essentialism as a cognitive shortcut. However, 
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given the grave implications associated with essentialism, future research should further 





CHAPTER 4: STUDY 3 
Let’s Talk About Categories: Examining the Efficacy of a Continuum Framework 
for Changing Children’s Perceptions of Social Categories with Children of Color 
 
Introduction 
Social Essentialism  
Learning to group objects and individuals together is an essential cognitive skill. 
Yet, learning about discrete categories—especially binaries—is often marked by 
generalization, stereotyping, and less appreciation for the variability that can exist within 
categories (Allport, 1954; Dunham & Olson, 2016). Such within-category variability is 
important for young children to encode, as contemporary research indicates that most 
social categories, such as race and gender, should not be considered discrete (Chen & 
Hamilton, 2012). Rather, research is needed to examine how to work with children to 
bypass their natural tendency toward essentialist beliefs in order to consider variability 
within social categories.  
Social essentialism posits that specific social categories, such as racial groups, 
have a primary reality or true nature that cannot be directly observed (Hirschfeld, 1995; 
Gelman, 2003). Even before details are filled in, people are assumed to have an abstract, 
skeletal set of expectations that explains the structure and function of a category (Gelman 
& Meyer, 2011). More specifically, the underlying categorical structure includes 
classifying by attending to internal parts and hidden causes in addition to superficial 
properties (Diesendruck, 2001). Not only do children attend to these features, but they 




 As noted in Chapter 1, there are five main types of beliefs that result from 
essentialism albeit existing research typically collapses them all into the single construct 
of ‘essentialism’ (for a review, see Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017). Though related, they 
are distinct, and it is thus important to delineate the specific essentialist beliefs under 
investigation. Additionally, there is considerable variability as to whether social 
essentialism in fact develops among children, warranting further study. More 
importantly, research suggests that there is the possibility of influencing the likelihood 
that a child engages in social essentialism. Flexible thinking counters the cognitive 
implications of social essentialism, which are marked by rigidity. Therefore, we were 
interested to see if it was possible to influence 5- to 7-year-old children of color’s 
demonstration of strict boundaries beliefs, or the idea that categories have distinct 
boundaries, and homogeneity beliefs, or the idea that category members will share 
qualities with one another even if they also possess dissimilar qualities.  
Continuum Framing 
The importance of encouraging children to think more flexibly and not simply in 
terms of discrete categories is of growing importance in today’s society (Dunham & 
Olson, 2016). Researchers recognize that implicit and explicit racial bias resulting from 
rigid categorization is present at extremely early ages and therefore appreciate the 
importance of beginning this process with young children (see Raabe & Beelmann, 2013, 
for a meta-analysis). Studies generally have targeted explicit bias instead of implicit bias 
but researchers have increasingly explored whether implicit bias can be addressed among 
young children (Gonzalez, Steele, & Baron, 2017; Qian, Quinn, Heymann, Pascalis, Fu, 
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& Lee, 2017). Qian and colleagues (2017) focused on training preschool children to 
individuate faces of a race different from themselves and saw a reduction in implicit 
racial bias. The ability to see other-race faces as individuals inhibits children from 
grouping them together as a whole (Qian et al., 2017). Research suggests that by age 5, 
children become receptive to minimal groups (e.g., creation of groups using arbitrary 
criterion that does not give a child a reason to favor their in-group; Dunham, Baron, & 
Carey, 2011; Dunham & Emory, 2014). Thus, methods such as individuation, or the idea 
of focusing on unique attributes of a member of a social category, may overpower the 
default tendency to view members of the same social category as “the same” (Aboud, 
1988; Aboud & Fenwick, 1999; Banks, 1995; Graves, 1999; Rutland, 1999).  
Some research highlights the role of de-categorizing or re-categorizing to inhibit 
biases and prejudice (Jones & Foley, 2003). For example, Gaertner and colleagues (1989) 
found that among undergraduate students, encouraging two groups of three students to re-
categorize themselves and see themselves as one group of six lessened intergroup bias 
and did so more effectively than individualizing the six group members. Similarly, Jones 
and Foley (2003) found that explicit teaching about the similarities when viewing self 
and others was very successful in decreasing the salience of between-group boundaries. 
In other words, children who were taught to de-categorize were significantly less likely to 
categorize other individuals. The findings suggest that although categorization is a 
fundamental developmental process, children as young as fourth grade can be taught 
(even in a very brief, ten-minute lesson) to observe similarities rather than differences 
between themselves and others. Such results may have tremendous implications because 
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categorization has been illustrated to be a predictor of the development of racially biased 
categories whereas decategorization in this study was shown to be a predictor of the non-
prejudiced categories.   
Imposing a continuum framework emphasizes differences based on degree, rather 
than type, which allows more fastidious discrepancies to be conserved (Master et al., 
2012). Similar to individuation, a continuum framework may facilitate recognizing 
individual differences and prevent grouping people together as “the same” (Katz & Zalk, 
1978; Wilder, 1978). In other words, individuals will be marked by their differentiated 
characteristics, allowing the child to consider each person as an individual instead of 
relying on stereotypes.  
As children mature, their thinking within particular contexts becomes more 
flexible (e.g. categorizing a car based on not a single dimension but on various). In a 
study of 4- to 7-year-olds, children who had higher multiple classification skills, an 
important task within executive functioning associated with  the ability to think flexibly, 
demonstrated lower levels of in-group favoritism (Aboud, 2003). In the context of social 
essentialism, these children were able to overcome viewing boundaries as discrete. Bigler 
and Liben (1992) extended these results with 5- to 10-year-olds, finding that 
classification skills were associated with egalitarian gender attitudes pre-intervention. 
Moreover, enhancing classification skills through intervention also enhanced egalitarian 
gender attitudes.  
Ellis and Oakes (2006) found that infants too can engage in flexible cognitive 
processing. Thus, across development, infants and children demonstrate flexible thinking 
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in their approaches to some problems and inflexible thinking in their approaches to 
others. Such flexible thinking can be encouraged by the type of task and the instructions 
given (Ellis & Oakes, 2006; Gershkoff-Stowe, 2005; Ionescu, 2006). Nevertheless, an 
open question that remains is around the developmental timing of interventions that lend 
themselves to flexible/inflexible thinking.    
Current Study 
To our knowledge, only one study has explored methods to highlight variability 
within group memberships in early childhood that is not specific to a particular social 
identity (e.g., race, gender, disability). Master, Markman, and Dweck (2012) trained 
children on a continuum or a categorical framework. When children were presented with 
training highlighting discrete categories, they overestimated between-group differences 
and underestimated within-group differences. In contrast, when children were presented 
with training highlighting a continuum, they showed a greater appreciation of similarities 
between groups and variability within groups. Master and colleagues’ (2012) study was 
limited, however, as it focused on a population with narrow demographics—4-year-old 
White children from middle- to upper-middle class backgrounds. These children may 
have less experience thinking about social categories, such as race, as compared to 
children of color. For instance, previous work has found that biracial children 
demonstrate more cognitive flexibility (Gaither, Chen et al., 2014), suggesting that 
introducing continuum and categorical framing may have a different effect with children 
from varied racial backgrounds. The researchers also did not explore the relation between 
their training effectiveness and children’s essentialist beliefs, which are tied to 
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stereotyping and prejudice and are heavily influenced by cultural input (Rhodes & 
Mandalaywala, 2017). Thus, in this study, we explore how thinking about members of a 
group as a continuum might impact similarity and social judgments among children of 
color who may have more experience thinking about variability within social categories 
than their White peers. Broadly, we hope that our findings enhance our understanding of 
how essentialist beliefs develop and how to counteract the negative consequences of 
essentialist beliefs about social groups (Mandalaywala et al., 2018). 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred fifty-nine five- to seven-year-old children (M = 6.17, SD = .713) 
were recruited from two schools and one afterschool program. Parent, child, and 
school/program consent was obtained and all students provided verbal assent. One 
hundred percent of participants received free or reduced lunch. Participants included 
roughly equal numbers of males (53.5%) and females (46.5%) and reflected a range of 
racial/ethnic diversity. More specifically, 73.6% of the participants were Black, 6.9% 
Latinx, 11.3% Black/Latinx, 5.7% White/Latinx, and 2.5% White/Black. Though we 
have children from various racial and ethnic groups, we unfortunately do not have 














 5-year-olds  
(n = 29) 
6-year-olds  
(n = 74) 
7-year-olds 
(n = 56) 
Categorical 
 
Black Female 8 14 5 
 Male 3 13 7 
Latinx Female 0 0 2 
  Male 0 0 3 
 Black/Latinx Female 0 3 1 
  Male 2 1 0 
 White/Latinx Female 2 2 0 
  Male 1 0 1 
 White/Black Female 1 1 1 
  Male 0 1 0 
 Total Female 11 20 9 
  Male 6 15 9 
Continuum 
 
Black Female 2 14 10 
 Male 5 15 21 
Latinx Female 1 3 1 
  Male 1 1 1 
 Black/Latinx Female 0 0 2 
  Male 1 6 2 
 White/Latinx Female 0 0 1 
  Male 2 0 6 
 White/Black Female 0 0 0 
  Male 0 0 0 
 Total Female 3 17 14 
  Male 9 22 14 
 
Procedure 
All children viewed the same three sets of pictures, including two practice sets 
and one test set. The two practice sets contained six pictures of a puppy transforming into 
a dog, and six pictures of a white square transforming to black. Children were given 
descriptions of the items in the practice sets. Subsequently, children were given 
descriptions of the six items in the test set and answered questions about them. The test 
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set of pictures involved faces that start with a frown and progressively turn into a large 
smile. The eyebrows and mouths switch directions at the halfway point in order to 
construct a perceptual boundary (see Figure 4.1).    
 
Figure 4.1. Test set.  
  
Training. To begin the task, the experimenter presented children with the puppy-
dog pictures, and either labeled them using categorical language (‘‘puppy, puppy, puppy, 
dog, dog, dog”) or continuous language (“puppy, a little bit bigger, a little bit bigger, a 
little bit bigger, a little bit bigger, dog”). Next, she presented the pictures of the light-dark 
squares and used the same categorical (“dark, dark, dark, light, light, light”) or 
continuous language (“light, a little bit darker, a little bit darker, a little bit darker, a little 
bit darker, dark”).  
Test. Immediately following the two practice sets, the experimenter presented the 
set of test pictures with varied facial expressions pictures were shown and they heard: 
“Now I’m going to show you another set of pictures. Some people are nice and some 
people are mean.” While pointing to each picture, participants in the categorical condition 
heard: “this is one that’s nice. This is another one that’s nice. This is another one that’s 
nice. This is one that’s mean. This is another one that’s mean. This is another one that’s 
mean.” Participants in the continuous condition heard: “Now I’m going to show you 
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another set of pictures. Some people are really nice and some are really mean. [Pointing 
to each picture], this is one that’s really nice. This is one that’s a little less nice. This is 
one that’s a little less nice. This is one that’s a little less nice. This is one that’s a little 
less nice. This is one that’s really mean.” The descriptions of the smiley faces were 
counterbalanced.  
Children’s descriptions. Children viewed the endpoint pictures and the pictures 
on either side of the perceptual boundary (e.g., #1, #3, #4, and #6; refer to Figure 4.1) one 
at a time. As a manipulation check, the researcher asked the children to describe each of 
the four pictures by saying, “tell me about this one.” If the participants gave descriptions 
that matched those they were given previously, we concluded that they in fact registered 
the diverse descriptions in each condition.  
Similarity judgments. Two pictures next to the perceptual “category boundary” 
(e.g., #3 and #4) were utilized. For each of the two pictures, the researcher asked, ‘‘Can 
you show me another one like this one? And can you show me another one like this?’’ so 
that each child selected two pictures they believed to be most akin to each target picture. 
These smiley faces were also counterbalanced. Responses were coded as 0 (did not cross 
the perceptual boundary) or 1 (crossed the perceptual boundary). Participants were given 
a binary score for similarity judgments associated with both pictures indicating whether 
they never crossed the perceptual boundary (0) or crossed the boundary at least once (1).  
Inferences about social behavior. Children were shown the endpoint pictures 
and the pictures on either side of the category boundary (e.g., #1, #3, #4, #6) one at a 
time. The researcher then stated, “Some children share. Would this one share?’’ giving 
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the child the option to answer yes (1) or no (0). An identical procedure took place for 
questions about hitting. In order to run analyses using a multilevel model, we created a 
new variable examining whether each participant gave the same response when making 
judgments about two smileys that were in the same group (e.g., a score for #1 and #3, a 
score for #4 and #6) by taking the absolute value of the two responses resulting in 
responses that matched (0) or responses that did not match (1). We also examined 
whether their responses were the same when making judgments about two smileys that 
were in different groups (e.g., a score for #3 and #4) using the same process of taking the 
absolute value of the two responses resulting in responses that matched (0) or responses 
that did not match (1). This was repeated for both behaviors, resulting in six scores per 
participant (3 scores for hitting and 3 scores for sharing; 4 of these 6 scores targeted 
within boundary while 2 of these scores that targeted across boundary).  
Results 
We first explore children’s similarity judgments. Next, we explore children’s 
inferences about behavior.  
Similarity Judgments 
To explore children’s similarity judgments, we first asked whether children’s 
likelihood of crossing the perceptual boundary varied based on the Condition they were 
in. Therefore, a binary logistic regression was performed to test effects of Age (years), 
Gender (female, male), and Condition (categorical, continuum) on the likelihood of 




Table 4.2 Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Predictors of Crossing the Perceptual 
Boundary 
Predictors  (SE) Wald OR [95% CI] 
Constant -0.06(1.52) 0.001 0.95 
Condition (0 = categorical) 0.79(0.37)* 4.46 2.20 [1.06, 4.58] 
Gender (0 = female) 0.02(0.36) .004 1.02 [0.51, 2.05] 
Age (years) -0.20(0.25) 0.62 0.82[0.51, 1.34] 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Results indicate a main effect of Condition. Participants in the Continuum 
condition were more likely to cross the perceptual boundary (n = 89, M = 0.38, SD = 
0.49) than children in the Categorical condition (n = 70, M = 0.23, SD = 0.42; OR = 
2.20). No other main effects were significant (see Table 4.2). However, the overall model 
was not significant, χ2 (3, N = 159) = 4.98,  p = 0.174. Therefore, we ran a reduced model 
with only condition and the model was significant, χ2 (1, N = 159) = 4.36, p = .037, 
confirming a significant difference in the number of children who crossed the perceptual 
boundary by Condition ( = 0.74, SE = 0.36, p = .04, OR = 2.09). The odds of crossing 
the perceptual boundary were 2.09 times more likely for children in the Continuum 
condition than children in the Categorical condition. 
Inferences about Social Behaviors 
Second, we asked whether children’s inferences about social behaviors differed 
based on whether the smiley faces belonged to the same group (within boundary) or 
different groups (across boundary).  
We conducted a mixed-effects binary logistic regression on children’s likelihood 
of reporting faces as Matching on social behavior with Age, Condition (continuum, 
categorical), Face Group (within boundary, across boundary), and Behavior (sharing, 
hitting) as predictors and Participant as a random factor to account for the non-
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independence of observations. Table 4.3 displays children’s likelihood of their responses 
Matching by Age (years), Condition (0 = categorical), Face Group (0 = within boundary), 
and Behavior (0 = sharing). There were significant main effects of Condition (OR = 1.52, 
p = .001) and Face Group (OR = 10.08, p < .001), as well as a significant interaction 
between Condition and Face Group (OR = 0.34, p < .001). This interaction indicates that 
children in the Continuum condition were less likely to give Matching responses when 
the Face Group was within boundary compared to the children in the Categorical 
condition. Children in the Continuum condition were also more likely to give Matching 
responses when the Face Group was across boundary compared to children in the 
Categorical condition. 
Table 4.3 Mixed-Effects Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Fixed Effects of Age, 
Condition, and Face Group and Random Effect of Participant on Likelihood of giving 
Matching Responses.  
Predictors  (SE) Z-value OR [95% CI] 
Constant -1.24(0.43)** -2.90 0.29 [0.12,0.67] 
Age (years) -0.01(0.07) -0.17 0.99 [0.86, 1.13] 
Condition .42(0.13)** 3.20 1.52 [1.18, 1.97] 
Face Group 2.31(0.17)*** 13.94 10.08 [7.28, 13.94] 
Behavior .05(.10) 0.53 1.27[1.05, 0.87] 
Condition x Face Group -1.07(0.21)*** -5.19 0.34 [0.23, 0.51] 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
To explore the Condition x Face Group interaction further, we conducted two 
mixed-effects binary logistic regressions separately by Face Group (within boundary, 
across boundary) on the likelihood of viewing the faces as socially similar with Age and 




judgments. First, for the 
across boundary 
judgments, we conducted 
a mixed-effects binary 
logistic regression on 
children’s likelihood of 
reporting faces as 
Matching on social 
behavior with Age, 
Condition (Continuum, 
Categorical), and Behavior (Sharing, Hitting) as predictors and Participant as a random 
effect (see Table 4.4; top panel). There was a significant main effect for Condition (OR = 
0.51, p < .001). No other main effects or interactions were found.  Controlling for other 
predictors, children in the continuum condition were 2.29 times more likely to identify 
similarities between members of visually different groups (across boundary) compared to 
children in the categorical condition (see Figure 4.2; right side).  
Within boundary judgments. Second, for the two sets of within boundary 
judgments (one for the nice faces and one for the mean faces), we conducted a mixed-
effects binary logistic regression on children’s likelihood of reporting faces as Matching 
on social behavior with Age, Condition (Continuum, Categorical), Behavior (Sharing, 
Hitting), and Valence of the Faces (Nice, Mean) as predictors and Participant as a random 
Figure 4.2. Proportion of participants identifying faces as 
matching on social judgments by Face Group (within 
boundary, across boundary) and Condition (categorical, 








































effect. Valence can only play a potential role for within boundary judgments given that 
across boundary judgments automatically entail two visually different valences (one nice 
and one mean face). Thus, we included Valence in this model to determine if the faces 
were nice or mean changed the likelihood of giving matching responses when making 
within boundary judgments (see Table 4.4; bottom panel). There were main effects of 
Condition (OR = 1.60, p = .002, Behavior (OR = 3.05, p < .001) and Valence (OR = 4.40, 
p < .001), as well as a significant interaction between Behavior x Valence (OR = 0.14, p 
< .001). Children in the Continuum condition were 1.96 times more likely to identify 
differences between members of visually similar groups (within boundary) compared to 
children in the Categorical condition (refer to Figure 4.2; left panel).  
Table 4.4 Mixed-Effects Binary Logistic Regression Examining the Likelihood of 
Children Giving Matching Responses for Inferences about Social Behaviors by Face 
Group  
Predictors  (SE) Z-value OR [95% CI] 
Selecting matching responses vs. 
different responses for across 
boundary judgments 
   
Constant 1.20(0.74) 1.62 3.32 [0.78, 14.21] 
Age (years) -0.05(0.12) -0.42 0.95 [0.75, 1.20] 
Condition -0.67(0.18)*** -3.72 0.51 [0.36, 0.73] 
Behavior 0.31(0.16) 1.94 1.37 [1.00, 1.87] 
    
Selecting matching responses vs. 
different responses for within 
boundary judgments 
   
Constant -2.37(0.65)*** -3.63 0.09 [0.03, 0.34] 
Age (years) 0.01(0.10) 0.08 1.01 [0.83, 1.22] 
Condition 0.47(0.14)** 3.17 1.60 [1.20, 2.15] 
Behavior 1.11(0.26)*** 4.35 3.05 [1.85, 5.04] 
Valence 1.48(0.26)*** 5.75 4.40 [2.65, 7.29] 
Behavior x Valence -1.99(0.33)*** -6.10 0.14 [0.14, 0.26] 




To explore the Behavior x Valence interaction further, we conducted two mixed-
effects binary logistic regressions separately by Behavior (sharing, hitting) on the 
likelihood of viewing the faces as socially similar with Age, Condition (continuum, 
categorical), and Valence (nice, mean) as predictors and Participant as a random effect.  
Table 4.5 Mixed-Effects Binary Logistic Regression Examining the Likelihood of 
Children Giving Matching Responses for Inferences about Social Behaviors by Behavior  
Predictors  (SE) Z-value OR [95% CI] 
Selecting matching responses vs. 
different responses for sharing 
   
Constant -3.54(0.93)*** -3.80 0.03 [0.004, 0.18] 
Age (years) 0.16(0.14) 1.09 1.17 [0.88, 1.55] 
Gender 0.24(0.20) 1.21 1.28 [0.86, 1.89] 
Condition 0.62(0.22)** 2.87 1.86 [1.22, 2.84 
Valence 1.51(0.25)*** 6.00 4.52 [2.76, 7.40] 
    
Selecting matching responses vs. 
different responses for hitting 
   
Constant -0.42(0.79) -0.54 0.66 [0.14, 3.07] 
Age (years) -0.11(0.13) -0.87 0.89 [0.69, 1.15] 
Gender 0.05(0.19) 0.29 1.06 [0.73, 1.52] 
Condition 0.31(0.20) 1.56 1.36 [0.92, 2.00] 
Valence -0.49(0.19)** -2.65 0.61 [0.42, 0.88] 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Judgments about sharing. For the mixed-effects model for sharing, there was a 
significant main effect of Condition (OR = 1.86, p = .004) and Valence (OR = 4.52, p < 
.001; see top panel of Table 4.5). No other main effects were significant. As depicted in 
Figure 4.3 (left panel), when looking at within boundary judgments for Sharing and 
controlling for Condition, Age, and Valence, children in the Continuum condition were 
2.4 times more likely to identify differences regarding sharing behaviors between 
members of visually similar groups (within boundary) compared to children in the 
Categorical condition. Furthermore, responses varied significantly more regarding 
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whether the mean faces would share compared to whether the nice faces would share. 
Participants were 11.6 times more likely to identify differences regarding whether a 
Mean face would share compared to whether a Nice face would share.  
Judgments about hitting. For the mixed-effects model for hitting, there was a 
significant main effect of Valence (OR = 0.61, p = .008; see bottom panel of Table 4.5). 
No other main effects 
were significant. As 
depicted in Figure 4.3 
(right panel), when 
looking at within 
boundary judgments 
for Hitting and 
controlling for 
Condition, Age, and 
Valence, children’s 
responses varied 
significantly more regarding whether the Nice faces would hit compared to whether the 
Mean faces would hit. More specifically, children were 2.2 times more likely to give 
different responses about whether the Nice faces would hit compared to whether the 
Mean faces would hit.  
In short, there is more variability in responses when the valence of the behavior 







































Figure 4.3. Proportion of participants identifying faces 
as matching on social judgments when comparing 
participants by the valence of the smiley faces and the 
type of behavior. Error bars represent 1 SEM.  
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hitting).   
Comparison with Master et al.’s (2012) data 
Master and colleagues (2012) used the same procedure but with a younger age 
group (i.e. 4-year-olds) and different coding scheme in which they used mean difference 
scores. Thus, we were interested in examining their results independently using our 
coding scheme as well as in combination with our data to see if there was an age effect. 
Note that in order to adhere to the IRB used for their study, race information was limited 
to White and Non-White. Additionally, when examining Master et al.’s (2012) data 
independently, the age range was significantly more restricted (4-year-olds) and thus, we 
treated Age as a continuous predictor in months.  
Similarity judgments. Master and colleagues’ (2012) data for similarity 
judgments consisted of 40 4-year-old participants (M = 51.98 months, SD = 3.65) with an 
equal number of males and females as well as an equal number of White vs. Non-White. 
To examine similarity judgments within the Master et al. (2012) data, we ran a binary 
logistic regression on the likelihood of crossing the perceptual boundary when making 
similarity judgments with Age (months), Gender (female, male), Race (White, Non-
White), and Condition (categorical, continuum) as predictors (see Table 4.6). The model 
was significant, χ2 (4, N = 40) = 12.72, p = .013.  Inspection of Table 4.6 reveals a main 
effect of Condition (OR= 20.59, p = .016). No other main effects or interactions were 
found. Strikingly, the participants in the Continuum condition were 9 times more likely to 




Table 4.6 Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Predictors of Crossing the Perceptual 
Boundary for Master et al.’s (2012) Data 
Predictors  (SE) Wald OR [95% CI] 
Constant -6.85(7.85) 0.76 .001 
Condition 3.03(1.26)* 5.78 20.59 [1.75, 242.42] 
Gender -1.46(0.92) 2.54 0.23 [0.04, 1.40] 
Race -0.10(0.97) 0.01 0.91 [0.14, 6.09] 
Age (months) 0.08(0.14) 0.33 1.09 [0.82, 1.44] 
*p < .05 
When combined with our data, we ran a binary logistic regression on the 
likelihood of crossing the perceptual boundary when making similarity judgments with 
Gender (female, male), Race (White, Non-White), Age (years), and Condition 
(categorical, continuum) as predictors. Although all of Master et al.’s (2012) participants 
were 4 years of age, we included age in years in the model to serve as proxy for effects 
related to each data set. Similar to the results from examining the datasets independently, 
Condition was the only significant predictor (OR = 2.85, p = .002; see Table 4.7). No 
other main effects or interactions were significant. Four- to seven-year-old children in the 
Continuum condition were 2.8 times more likely to cross the perceptual boundary 
compared with their same-aged peers in the Categorical condition when making 
similarity judgments.  
Table 4.7 Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Predictors of Crossing the Perceptual 
Boundary for Master et al.’s (2012) and Current Study Data 
Predictors  (SE) Wald OR [95% CI] 
Constant -0.11(1.06) 0.01 .23 
Condition 1.05(0.34)** 9.44 2.85 [ 1.46, 5.57] 
Gender -0.23(0.32) 0.51 0.79 [0.42, 1.50] 
Race 0.54(0.68) 0.62 1.71 [0.45, 6.49] 
Age (years) -0.07(0.17) 0.15 0.94 [0.67, 1.31] 




Inferences about Social Behavior. Second, we asked whether children’s 
inferences about social behaviors differed based on whether the smiley faces belonged to 
the same group (within boundary) or different groups (across boundary). Master and 
colleagues’ (2012) data for social inferences consisted of 40 4-year-old participants (M = 
53.45 months, SD = 4.17) with an equal number of males and females. The sample was 
52.5% White.  
We first ran a mixed-effects binary logistic regression on children’s likelihood of 
reporting faces as Matching on social behavior with Age (months), Gender (Female, 
Male), Race (White, Non-White), Condition (Continuum, Categorical), Behavior 
(Sharing, Hitting) and Face Group (Within boundary, Across boundary) as predictors and 
Participant as a random effect on the Master et al. data only. Inspection of Table 4.8 (top 
panel), reveals a significant main effect of Condition (OR = 2.04, p = .005) and Face 
Group (OR = 9.97, p < .001), as well as a significant interaction between Condition and 
Face Group (OR = 0.19, p < .001).  
To explore similarities and differences in our dataset as compared to the Master et 
al. dataset, we reran the model including all participants with the likelihood of reporting 
faces as Matching on social behavior with Age (years), Condition (0 = categorical), Face 
Group (0 = within boundary), Gender (0 = female), Behavior (0 = sharing), and Race (0 = 
Non-White). Table 4.8 (bottom panel) displays the results of this model. As in the 
previous model, there was a significant main effect of Condition (OR = 1.95, p = .008) 
and Face Group (OR = 9.96, p < .001), as well as a significant interaction between 
Condition and Face Group (OR = 0.19, p < .001). Thus, the overall pattern across the two 
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studies was similar.  
Table 4.8 Mixed-Effects Binary Logistic Regression Examining the Likelihood of Giving 
Matching Responses for Inferences about Social Behaviors  
Predictors   (SE) Z-value OR [95% CI] 
Master et al. (2012) Data     
Constant  -3.45(1.32)** -2.61 0.03 [.002, 0.42] 
Condition  0.72(0.26)** 2.79 2.04 [1.24, 3.38] 
Age (months)  0.04(0.24) 1.57 1.04 [0.99, 1.09] 
Face Group  2.30(0.31)*** 7.34 9.97 [5.39, 18.42] 
Gender  0.15(.20) 0.74 1.16 [0.78, 1.72] 
Behavior  -0.01(0.19) -0.06 0.99 [0.68, 1.44] 
Race  -0.01(.21) -0.046 0.99 [0.66, 1.49] 
Condition x Face Group  -1.68(0.40)*** -4.19 0.19 [ 0.08, 0.41] 
 
Master et al. (2012) + 
Current Study Data 
    
Intercept  -1.19(1.25) -0.96 0.30 [0.03, 3.50] 
Condition  0.67(0.25)** 2.65 1.95[1.19, 3.19] 
Age (years)  -0.06(0.31) -0.20 0.94 [0.52, 1.71] 
Face Group  2.30(0.35)*** 6.59 9.96 [5.03, 19.73] 
Gender  0.13(0.20) 0.65 1.14 [0.77, 1.69] 
Behavior  -0.01(0.19) -0.06 0.99 [0.68, 1.43] 
Race  0.07(0.20) 0.33 1.07[0.72, 1.59] 
Condition x Face Group   -1.66(0.40)*** -4.12 0.19 [0.09, 0.42] 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Across boundary judgments. To explore children’s across boundary judgments in 
the Master et al. dataset, we conducted a mixed-effects binary logistic regression on 
children’s likelihood of reporting faces as Matching on social behavior with Age 
(months), Condition (categorical, continuum), Gender (female, male), Race (White, Non-
White), and Behavior (sharing, hitting) as predictors and Participant as a random effect 
(see Model 1 in Table 4.9). When including these five predictors, there were no 
significant predictors and the model failed to converge. However, upon removing 
Behavior, the model converged and Condition was a significant predictor (see Model 2 in 
Table 4.9). More specifically, 4-year-old children in the Continuum condition were 2.93 
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times more likely to identify similarities between members of visually different groups 
(OR = 0.19, p = .044) compared to children in the Categorical condition. Additionally, 
when combined with our data, when including the five predictors and Participant as a 
random effect, there were no significant predictors and the model failed to converge. 
However, upon removing Race in this case, the model converged and Condition was a 
significant predictor (OR = .45, p <.001), such that 4- to 7-year-old children in the 
Continuum condition were 2.41 times more likely to identify similarities between 
members of visually different groups compared to children in the Categorical condition 





Table 4.9 Mixed-Effects Binary Logistic Regression Examining the Likelihood of Giving 
Matching Responses for Inferences about Social Behaviors for Across Boundary 
Judgments 
Predictors  (SE) Z-value OR [95% CI] 
Master et al. (2012) Data 
Across Boundary Model 1 
   
Constant 1.20(5.10) 0.24 3.32 [0.001, 72077] 
Condition -2.30(1.70) -1.35 0.10 [ 0.004, 2.81] 
Age (months) 0.03(0.09) 0.31 1.03 [0.86, 1.23] 
Gender 0.28(0.80) 0.35 1.32 [0.27, 6.38] 
Race -0.48(0.84) -0.57 0.62 [0.12, 3.20] 
Behavior -0.99(0.57) -1.73 0.37 [1.12, 1.14] 
 
Master et al. (2012) Data 
Across Boundary Model 2 
   
Constant 0.36(3.72) 0.10 1.43 [.001, 2089] 
Condition -1.66(0.81)* -2.04 0.19 [0.04, 0.93] 
Age (months) 0.02(0.07) 0.33 .02 [0.89, 1.12] 
Gender 0.25(0.60) 0.42 1.29 [0.40, 4.19] 
Race -0.36(0.62) -0.58 0.70 [0.21, 2.34] 
 
Master et al. (2012) + Current 
Study Data 
Model 3 
   




-4.53 0.45 [0.32, 0.64] 
Age (years) 0.07(0.08) 0.84 1.07 [0.91, 1.26] 
Gender -0.06(0.16) -0.35 0.95 [0.69, 1.30] 
Behavior 0.15(0.15) 1.06 1.17 [0.88, 1.55] 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Within boundary judgments. When looking specifically at whether behaviors 
matched when faces were part of the same group (i.e. both nice or both mean), recall that 
we included the Valence of the smiley face in the model. Interestingly, when looking at 
the model specifically for within group judgments for Master et al.’s (2012) data, the 
interaction between Behavior and Valence is significant (OR= 0.25, p = .02) and the 
interaction between Condition and Age approaches significance (OR = 2.74, p = .054) 
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when controlling for Age (years), Gender, Behavior, and Valence of the faces (see Model 
1 in Table 4.10).  
Table 4.10 Mixed-Effects Binary Logistic Regression Examining the Likelihood of Giving 
Matching Responses for Inferences about Social Behaviors for Within Boundary 
Judgments 
Predictors  (SE) Z-value OR [95% CI] 
Master et al. (2012) Data 
Within Boundary Model 1 
   
Constant -0.68(1.94) -0.35 0.51 [.01, 22.83] 
Condition -4.19(2.56) -1.64 0.02 [9.92e-5, 2.29] 
Age (years) -0.35(0.43) -0.18 0.70 [0.30, 1.63] 
Gender 0.11(0.27) 0.40 1.11 [0.07, 1.89] 
Behavior 1.14(0.46)* 2.49 3.12 [1.27, 7.62] 
Valence 1.04(0.45)* 2.30 2.82 [1.17, 6.83] 
Condition x Age (years) 1.09(0.57)~ 1.91 2.97 [0.10, 9.05] 
Behavior x Valence -1.39(0.57)* -2.42 0.25 [0.08, 0.77] 
 
Master et al. (2012) Data 
Within Boundary Model 2 
   
Constant -3.67(1.35)** -2.71 0.03 [0.002, 0.36] 
Condition 0.74(0.28)** 2.68 2.10 [1.22, 3.60] 
Age (years) 0.32(0.27) 1.21 1.38 [0.82, 2.33] 
Gender 0.03(0.27) 0.12 1.03 [0.61, 1.74] 
Behavior 1.10(0.45)* 2.46 3.00 [1.25, 7.18] 
Valence 1.00(0.44)* 2.27 2.72 [1.14, 6.48] 
Behavior x Valence -1.34(0.56)* -2.38 0.26 [0.09, 0.79] 
 
Master et al. (2012) Data 
Within Boundary 
Model 3 
   
Constant -5.52(1.92)** -2.88 0.004 [9.92e-5, 0.17 
Condition 0.80(0.28)** 2.83 2.22 [1.28, 3.85] 
Age (months) 0.06(.03) 1.88 1.06 [1.00, 1.13] 
Gender 0.08(0.27) 0.29 1.08 [0.64, 1.82] 
Behavior 1.13(0.45)* 2.50 3.10 [1.28, 7.53] 
Valence 1.03(0.45)* 2.30 2.81 [1.16, 6.78] 
Behavior x Valence -1.39(0.57)* -2.44 0.25 [0.08, 0.76] 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 4.4 displays the proportion of trials participants indicated as matching by 
age group in the Master et al. data. Inspection of Figure 4.4 indicates that the participants 
in the two conditions look similarly at age 4 but at age 5, the effect of condition is 
significant such that 
those in the Continuum 
condition are more likely 
to identify differences 
between smiley faces 
within the same group. 
When the Condition x 
Age interaction is 
removed from the model, 
there is a significant 
interaction between 
Behavior and Valence (OR =0.26, p = .02) and significant main effects are observed for 
Behavior (OR = 3.00, p = .01) and Valence (OR = 2.72, p = .02) as well as Condition 
(OR = 2.10, p =.007) when predicting the likelihood that a participant will judge two 
smiley faces as socially similar when the faces are part of the same group (i.e. within 
group; see Model 2 in Table 4.10). However, it is important to note that for both of these 
models, the age of the participants in Master et al.’s (2012) data was binned to form two 
groups of 4- and 5-year-olds, such that children 4.5 and older were rounded to 5 years of 







































Figure 4.4. Proportion of participants from Master et al.’s 
(2012) data identifying faces as matching on social 
judgments when comparing participants by age and 
condition. Error bars represent 1 SEM.  
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the dataset indicates that some children were as old as 64 months. To ensure the results 
remain the same, we re-ran the model (Table 4.10; Model 3) with Age in months and Age 
still approaches significance (OR = 1.06, p = .061) and Condition, Behavior, Valence, 
and Behavior x Valence remain significant (see results for Model 3 in Table 4.10). In 
summary, children from Master et al.’s (2012) dataset in the Continuum condition were 
2.79 times more likely to give different responses for two faces within the same group 
(within boundary) compared to children in the Categorical condition.  
 
Table 4.11 Mixed-Effects Binary Logistic Regression Examining the Likelihood of Giving 
Matching Responses for Inferences about Social Behaviors for Within Boundary 
Judgments 
Predictors  (SE) Z-value OR [95% CI] 
Master et al. (2012) + Current 
Study Data for Within Boundary 
   
Constant -2.05(0.39)*** -5.28 0.13 [0.06, 0.28] 
Condition 0.52(0.13)*** 3.97 1.69 [1.30, 2.19] 
Age (years) -0.05(0.06) -0.92 0.95 [0.85, 1.06] 
Gender 0.10(0.13) 0.80 1.11 [0.87, 1.41] 
Behavior 1.10(0.22)*** 5.01 3.01 [1.95, 4.63] 
Valence 1.38(0.22)*** 6.24 3.96 [2.57, 6.11] 
Behavior x Valence -1.85(0.28)*** -6.59 0.16 [0.09, 0.27] 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Finally, we re-ran the model including data collected in this dissertation and data 
from the Master et al. study (see Table 4.11). The model with the combined data for faces 
within the same groups revealed a significant interaction between the Valence of the 
smiley faces and Behavior (OR =.16, p < .001). There were also significant main effects 
for Condition (OR = 1.69, p < .001), Behavior (OR = 3.01, p < .001), and Valence (OR = 
3.96, p < .001). In other words, across both conditions (categorical, continuum), children 
were more likely to give the same response around whether two nice faces would share 
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compared to whether two 
mean faces would share, 2 
= 46.84, p < .001 (see Figure 
4.5, left panel). They were 
also significantly more likely 
to give the same responses 
regarding whether two nice 
faces would share compared 
with giving the same 
responses regarding whether 
two nice faces would hit, 2 
= 8.09, p = .004  (see Figure 4.5; right panel).  
 
Discussion 
            An easy way to simplify the social world is to place individuals into distinct, 
social categories (Dunham & Olson, 2016; Master et al., 2012). However, recall from the 
introduction that although categories are indispensable and frequently expedient, they can 
also be problematic, preventing us from appreciating the nuances within categories 
(Allport, 1954; Dunham & Olson, 2016; Master et al., 2012). Previous research suggests 
that categorization promotes strict boundary beliefs, hindering the observation of 
similarities between groups, and homogeneity beliefs, decreasing the observation of 
differences within groups, which we observed in our research as well. Conversely, our 
Figure 4.5. Proportion of participants from Master et al.’s 
(2012) data combined with our data identifying faces as 
matching on social judgments when comparing 
participants by the valence of the smiley faces and the 









































research also illustrates that framing a group using continuous language can minimize the 
likelihood of these tendencies that are common, such as generalizations and stereotypes, 
when categories are treated as having rigid, discrete boundaries. Extending Master and 
colleagues’ (2012) work with 4-year-old predominantly White children, we investigated 
the impact of a continuum frame on the similarity judgments and social inference of 5- to 
7-year-old children of color. In line with the said research, using continuous or 
categorical language to describe the pictures influenced children’s similarity and social 
judgments. Our broad primary finding is that children across ages in the continuum 
condition are more likely to identify similarities across two different groups and 
recognize differences among individual members of the same group when compared to 
those in the categorical condition. 
            As anticipated, when group boundaries are emphasized, children are more likely 
to demonstrate strict boundary beliefs. Simply presenting the smiley faces as falling 
along a continuum or as members of two different categories appears to have shifted the 
way that children perceived similarities between the different characters. In line with 
Master et al.’s (2012) findings, presenting smiley faces as members of two different 
categories through the use of category labels (i.e., nice and mean) increased the 
likelihood that children selected faces that visually looked most similar. In other words, 
compared to children in the continuum condition, children in the categorical condition 
were more likely to select faces that were two away as most akin to the target face instead 
of crossing the perceptual boundary to choose an adjacent face. The category labels that 
children heard appear to have guided them to select faces that were deemed within the 
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same category as the target.    
On the other hand, presenting smiley faces as falling along a continuum appear to 
have enhanced the probability that children selected adjacent faces as most similar to the 
target face compared to children to whom the smiley faces were presented categorically. 
This trend took place even though the target faces resided at the perceptual boundary, 
which was marked by a change in both the mouth and eyebrows to indicate a frown 
turning into a smile. Thus, the children in the continuum condition were more likely to 
prioritize the neighboring faces, even though this might mean that the most alike the 
target face was one smiling and one frowning face, instead of two frowning or two 
smiling. These findings suggest that children cognitively internalized the verbal 
directions in different ways based upon the framing that they heard. These results are 
important because they suggest that 5- to 7-year-old children are quite impressionable to 
verbal messaging. Reminding adults and even older peers of the power of their words and 
language may be important when considering how children learn both implicitly and 
explicitly from those around them. Future research could examine how these results may 
look different when information is presented on a continuum in context. For example, it 
would be interesting to tell a story using continuous versus categorical language. This 
would help us to explore whether children are still susceptible to the framing when it is 
more embedded or if it’s more limited to situations with less context, such as the training 
task in our study.  
            Our main findings – demonstrating for the first time that the results from 5- to 7-
year-old children of color from low-income families indicate they are receptive to a 
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continuum framing – are strikingly similar to results from previous work with 4-year-old, 
predominantly White, children from middle to upper-middle class families (Master et al., 
2012). However, among the 4-year-old, predominantly White children from higher 
income families, the effect was stronger such that children in the continuum condition 
were nine times more likely to cross the perceptual boundary compared with children in 
the categorical condition. While the effect still existed within our data, children were only 
about two times as likely to cross the perceptual boundary compared to those in the 
categorical condition. One plausible explanation for the difference in the strength of the 
effect is that our sample size (n = 159) was nearly four times larger than Master et al.’s (n 
= 40), allowing for more variability. A second possibility is that the demographic 
variables are creating an effect. Due to the differing age ranges of our samples, we were 
unable to make direct comparisons. However, it is conceivable that four-year-olds may be 
more susceptible to a framing given that theory of mind as well as their emotional 
understanding is developing during this developmental time (Denham et al., 2003; see 
Flavell, 1999 for review). Additionally, there may be differences associated with 
socioeconomic status. Starting at very young ages, disparities in executive functioning 
skills exist between children based on SES because of the consequences of risk factors 
associated with poverty (Sarsour et al., 2010). Cognitive flexibility, an important 
executive functioning task that allows children to shift cognitive sets, may play a role in 
children’s ability to take in a new framing (Garon et al., 2008). Due to the tendency to 
default to discrete categories when presenting information, one could argue that being 
able to fully absorb the continuum framing requires a certain level of cognitive flexibility 
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(Dunham & Olson, 2016; Master et al., 2012). Further research with preschool-aged 
children of color as well as children of color from middle to upper middle income 
families across ages is needed to fully appreciate the findings and be able to structure 
appropriate interventions that enhance cognitive flexibility and limit strict boundaries 
beliefs. Additionally, future studies that explicitly assess the continuum framework in 
conjunction with executive functioning capacities, such as set shifting, would be useful to 
begin to further unpack and understand social essentialism. Nonetheless, it is evident 
from our study and Master et al.’s (2012) study that children across ages 4- to 7-years-old 
across racial groups and SES are amenable to the continuum framing. 
            Second, the two different frameworks impacted children’s inferences about the 
characters’ prosocial (sharing) and antisocial behaviors (hitting). Children in the 
continuum condition were more likely to give the same response for characters belonging 
to different groups (nice, mean) and different responses for characters belonging to the 
same groups compared with children who heard the categorical descriptions. On the 
contrary, children in the categorical condition were more likely to give different 
responses for characters belonging to different groups and the same responses for 
characters belonging to the same groups when compared to children who were in the 
continuum condition. Therefore, these findings suggest that children are drawing 
conclusions on their own accord in order to make an assessment as to how a character 
would behave. The pattern associated with each framing demonstrates the ease with 
which an ‘essence’ can be evoked when categories are emphasized as well as the 
tempering of discrete boundaries and homogeneity beliefs when a continuum framing is 
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employed. The rigid use of categories, social categories especially, which individuals rely 
on as a method to organize the social world, creates a false sense of simplicity, leading to 
generalizations, stereotypes, and prejudice (Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Master, Markman, & 
Dweck, 2012; Rhodes, 2013). This finding is important because it highlights the potential 
malleability of beliefs and how subtle changes in language and framing may help to both 
minimize rigid category boundaries that promote difference while also enhancing the 
recognition of similarities across categories.  
            One of the reasons we were most interested in examining our data in juxtaposition 
with Master and colleagues (2012) is to reconsider the way in which the data was 
analyzed. Master and colleagues (2012) utilized a six-point scale that captured mean 
difference scores ranging from 0-5. Under this scoring system, 0-2 were associated with 
“no” responses and a subsequent amount around how much a character would share/hit 
(e.g., 0 = no, not share a lot, 1= no, not share kind of, 2 = no, not share just no a little bit) 
while 3-5 were associated with “yes” responses (e.g., 3 = yes, share a little bit, 4 = yes, 
share kind of, 5 = yes, share a lot). The issue is that these are qualitatively different 
responses and should not be treated as an ordinal scale. Therefore, we were interested in 
determining if their findings held when examining the data using multilevel models and 
simply examining the original yes/no response. Indeed, for both similarity and social 
judgments the results did hold for our data as well as theirs. It would be beneficial to 
further explore the qualitative amounts to determine if children provided nuanced 
responses by degree based on the framing they heard. 
            Additionally, another result that was previously unobserved was related to the 
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valence of the smiley faces and the behavior being investigated. Recall that when 
children made judgments about a behavior (e.g., sharing or hitting), their response varied 
based on the condition they were in as well as the valence of the smiley face (nice or 
mean). Their responses were more likely to match when the valence of the behavior and 
the valence of the face aligned (e.g., nice and sharing). This seems intuitive given that 
there is less for a child to contemplate when the behavior and trait converge. However, 
this possibility still does not account for why the responses are less likely to match across 
both the categorical and continuum conditions when the valence of the behavior contrasts 
with that of the face (e.g., hitting and nice; sharing and mean). It is reasonable to think 
that these questions were less intuitive and the framing was not strong enough to carry 
over to a degree that impacted their judgments. Additional research is warranted to assess 
additional traits and behaviors to better understand this pattern. 
Undoubtedly, categorization is a necessary and useful skill but instead of always 
defaulting to it, it may be beneficial to also employ continuum framing to help mitigate 
some of the negative repercussions often associated with social categorization including 
stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Using a continuum framework is not meant to 
replace categories because relying exclusively on a continuum framework also has the 
potential for negative consequences including rank ordering in a competitive manner or 
in the case of race, colorism (Hunter, 2016; Nicholls, 1984). Nonetheless, even 
considering some of the risks associated with overuse of continua, a continuum 
framework still fosters one’s capacity to consider individuals as unique and nuanced and 
not generalized into groups such as “nice” and “mean.” When children as well as adults 
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consider others to be part of binary categories, it increases the likelihood of stereotyping 
(Dunham & Olson, 2016; Levy et al., 1998; Pauker et al., 2010; Pauker et al., 2016). 
Should children in classrooms be thinking on a continuum and apply it to social 
categories such as race, it is plausible that perceiving individuals on a continuum would 
encourage children to see them as more individualized instead of relying on stereotypes 
about the person’s group membership to inform their inferences (Katz & Zalk, 1978; 
Master et al., 2012). This hypothesis is supported by earlier research that suggests that 
even more tacit presentations of a continuum may inhibit the implications of 
categorization (Ensari & Miller, 2001; Gonzales et al., 2010).  
Broadly speaking, highlighting categories, instead of continua, promotes discrete 
boundary and homogeneity beliefs, components within essentialism that tend to lead to 
more rigid thinking and perceiving individuals as having fixed, inherited traits (Rhode & 
Mandalaywala, 2017). Previous research suggests that confronting these beliefs requires 
the minimization of the reification of categories through emphasizing their similarities 
and intersection with seemingly opposite categories and highlighting the variability 
within the categories, ultimately resulting in an appreciation that there’s not a causal 
distinctness to each category (Haslam et al., 2000; Master et al., 2012). A continuum also 
lends itself to more flexible thinking because more change can take place within the 
continuum. A person is not simply “nice” or “mean”, there’s room for movement in 
either direction. As maintained by Master and colleagues (2012), an outstanding question 
for future research is if continuum framing does allow for more flexibility cognitively, 
then a continuum frame may be an effective intervention to mitigate stereotyping.  
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Taken together with Master et al.’s (2012) findings, the results from our study 
help to highlight a developmental window that’s wider in nature (i.e. ages 4 to 7) when 
children are receptive to subtle cues that impact their judgments. Considering how brief 
the training was, it is exciting to think about the possibilities for future research that could 
expand upon these results. For example, it would be interesting to create a storybook, one 
that uses a continuum frame and another that uses a categorical frame, and see if it 
impacts the way in which children judge the characters. Classroom interventions also 
could be useful to determine the longevity of the continuum effect. Additionally, to 
explore how a continuum frame may be related to other cognitive skills, it would also be 
advantageous to see if tasks that increase cognitive flexibility also impact similarity 
judgments and social inferences.  
In summary, this study illustrates the inductive power of framing on children’s 
inferences, which may be impacted by subtle language used by adults. Future research 
utilizing pictures of real people is of interest to ensure that these results extend beyond 
line drawings. Finally, the framing used in this study was extremely brief and slight yet 
still demonstrated an impact on children’s judgments. It would be advantageous for 
future studies to intensify the training by experimenting with more extensive 
interventions to explore whether the results hold over an extended period of time and can 
mediate other fundamental capacities such as intergroup cognition (e.g., stereotypes), 




CHAPTER 5: SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS 
Social essentialism is present early and observed across the lifespan. Yet, the 
presence and strength of social essentialism varies based on both demographic as well as 
contextual factors. For instance, children and adults’ essentialist beliefs are greatly 
impacted by cultural input and in many ways are pliable. There are many different factors 
that play a role in children and adults’ essentialist beliefs, serving to both strengthen and 
diminish the power of these biases. In Chapter 1, I highlighted the predictors and 
consequences of children and adults’ race essentialism. In Study 1, I proposed two factors 
in particular that might influence this pattern among children: racial group and age. In 
Study 2, I proposed numerous demographic variables as well as characteristics related to 
individuals’ backgrounds that might influence race essentialism among adults. Finally, in 
Study 3, I examined whether essentialist beliefs can shift when information is not 
presented in categories. The goal of this dissertation was to explore the potential 
predictors of social essentialism so that future research can consider mechanisms to 
minimize these biases, which may alter how individuals engage with others and think 
about the social world.   
Educational Implications 
 Children and adults’ social essentialism influences their perceptions and 
judgments of social groups. In the current dissertation, I used experimental and survey 
methods to investigate three specific types of essentialism: stability, discrete boundaries, 
and homogeneity beliefs. The findings from the three studies presented here have 
important implications for children’s learning, teaching, social interactions, and education 
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broadly. The findings from Study 1 (Chapter 2) highlight the acquisition of race 
essentialism among monoracial and biracial Black children. First, it is important for 
teachers and caregivers to recognize that children across racial groups are already 
thinking to some degree about race in early elementary school. Yet, the curricula 
generally embed a colorblind approach and race is not discussed (Husband, 2012, 2018; 
Modica, 2015; Vittrup, 2016). Additionally, racial socialization continues to be centered 
on Black children even with the increasing number of multiracial children (see Priest, 
Walton, White, Kowal, Baker, & Paradies, 2014 for a review). Despite noting that race 
was an important topic to discuss with their children, White mothers denied having 
discussions with their White 4- to 7-year-old children about race (Vittrup, 2018). 
Caregivers of biracial youth also offer minimal messaging about race and when they do, 
race is downplayed and the conversation usually arises as a reaction to a racist incident as 
opposed to from a prevention standpoint (Kerwin, Ponterotto, Jackson, & Harris, 2009; 
Rollins & Hunter, 2013; Samuels, 2009). When parents of biracial children do 
proactively discuss race, biracial children are able to navigate the often inconsistent and 
cloudy messages about race and these conversations help to nurture racial awareness, 
minimize confusion, and protect youth from effects of ambiguous messages and 
stereotype threat (Crawford & Alaggia, 2008; Nakazawa, 2003; Shih, Bonam, Sanchez, 
& Peck, 2007).  
When looking at children’s level of race essentialism when making judgments 
about others, monoracial Black children’s scores remained stable across ages 5 to 7 while 
biracial Black children’s scores steadily increased as they got older. Similar to the 
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biracial children’s scores, White children’s levels of race essentialism also increased as 
children got older (Pauker et al., 2016). To create a more just society, children need to be 
able to develop skills that foster positive attitudes about racial diversity (Katz, 2003; 
Kelly et al., 2007; Ramsey, 2008). In turn, this also means that the adults in children’s 
lives (i.e. caregivers, educators, etc.) need to be able to effectively make sense of and 
appreciate the increasing levels of diversity to create positive learning experiences for 
children from all racial groups (Priest et al., 2014). Therefore, it is important that 
educators and caregivers consider ways in which to maintain and increase the cognitive 
flexibility that biracial and monoracial children, respectively are demonstrating prior to 
age 7.  
Moreover, Study 1 indicated that children’s race essentialism scores when making 
judgments about themselves were lower than when they made judgments about others. In 
some ways, this could be seen as positive and indicate that both monoracial and biracial 
children are thinking about themselves more flexibly than the way they think about 
others. Cognitive flexibility is an essential skill not only for making sense of the social 
world but also within education as it helps children transition from task to task, consider 
different viewpoints, and plays a key role in all types of learning. On the contrary, 
cognitive rigidity is associated with learning disabilities as well as mental illnesses such 
as OCD, anxiety, and ADHD. Thus, prioritizing the enhancement of cognitive flexibility 
is of great importance given its widespread effects and one way to do this may be through 
increasing the use of continua.   
Additionally, adults need to be prepared and engage in preemptive conversations 
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with children from all racial backgrounds about race. In Study 2, adults were probed 
about their race essentialist beliefs, and I explored age-related differences, as well as 
differences based on whether an individual felt that their racial group was a majority or 
minority in their community. Some recent research suggests that distinguishing racial 
identity and ethnic identity as many U.S. researchers have traditionally done may be 
obsolete (Cross & Cross, 2008; Umaña-Taylor et al., 2014). Yet, the sample in Study 2 
largely distinguished between the two constructs (at least in terms of their definitions). 
Furthermore, previous research links essentialist reasoning with stereotyping and 
prejudice and so it is important to examine adults’ use of essentialist reasoning to 
ultimately help inform interventions and prevention methods. The findings help to shed 
light on how adults understand race on its own as well as in relation to ethnicity. 
Moreover, the findings highlight the extent to which racial status within a community 
impacts essentialist beliefs. 
As demonstrated in Study 3 (Chapter 4), children’s discrete boundaries and 
homogeneity beliefs are pliable and can be shifted even through a brief verbal training. 
Through emphasizing gradations on a continuum, children are able to better appreciate 
the heterogeneity within a group and view category boundaries as more fluid. Enhancing 
children’s grasp of within group heterogeneity is critical for certain curricular lessons. 
For instance, in biology, understanding the variation with populations is a critical 
component of evolutionary theory and a necessary prerequisite for understanding natural 
selection and adaptation (Emmons, Smith & Kelemen, 2016). However, essentialist 
tendencies make it irreconcilable for students to grasp evolution due to its emphasis on 
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homogeneity and strict boundaries (Emmons et al., 2016; Pobiner, 2016). Additionally, in 
social studies curricula, teachers often introduce “cultural universals” which are designed 
to help children identify shared human characteristics across cultures that might 
otherwise be very different (Alleman, Knighton, & Brophy, 2007).  
In general, adults should be mindful that presenting information in dichotomous 
categories tends to be the default (Dunham & Olson, 2016). However, it is critical that 
information, particularly about social groups, is presented to children in a flexible, non-
essentialist way. Our findings suggest that a subtle shift in the framing of information can 
impact children’s similarity judgments and inferences about behaviors. When engaging in 
basic categorization activities, it may be useful for teachers to encourage children to sort 
items by categories but then seek to identify differences within categories and similarities 
across categories. For example, when teaching children about shapes that are all different 
colors and sizes, it would be beneficial to have children first categorize the items by 
shape and then think about alternative ways to sort them (e.g., color, size). Additionally, 
within the classroom, students are often being put into different groups. Helping to 
explicitly highlight how these groups change from day to day may be useful. For 
instance, perhaps one day the groups are determined by the color shirt they are wearing 
while the next they are determined by the month of their birthday. Therefore, on any 
given day, a student will have shared qualities with other students even in different 
groups. This may help to illuminate the importance but also flexibility of categories.  
Additionally, although generic language is not the sole cause of essentialist 
thinking, Rhodes and Bushara (2015) investigated whether using generic language about 
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science activates essentialist beliefs and disturbs children’s achievement behaviors. In 
their study, half of the four- to five-year-old children heard, “Today we are going to be 
scientists and play a science game” and the continued use of generic language. The other 
half heard “Today we are going to do science and play a science game” with language 
that emphasized “doing science.” The researchers found that among both boys and girls, 
generic language augmented essentialist beliefs about scientists. For instance, a child in 
the essentialist condition was less likely to say that someone who struggled with science 
could improve their abilities. In contrast, they were more likely to say that someone who 
was good at science had always been good at the subject. Additionally, essentialist beliefs 
were shown to weaken only girls’ performance. Indeed, girls in the “be a scientist” 
condition opted to do fewer rounds of the game (e.g., less persistence) than girls in the 
“do science” condition. They also judged their own performance less positively and 
reported more negative attitudes toward science. In summary, the small differences 
between saying “doing” versus “being” can inhibit achievement.  
Although the aforementioned study was unrelated to race, the findings likely 
translate to essentialist beliefs about race. Merely being a member of a stereotyped group 
can impact performance on a task that is related to that stereotype (Armenta, 2010). 
Thinking of success as something that depends upon unchanging, natural talent leads to 
increased withdrawal after any stumbling blocks and avoidance of taking on challenging 
problems (Cain & Dweck, 1995). To reiterate Tai et al.’s findings (2006), these beliefs 
frequently determine children’s success more accurately than preparation or ability level 
(Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). Furthermore, essentialist beliefs are not 
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conducive to the receipt of negative feedback. Any type of setback can be considered 
evidence as to why a person does not belong in the group after all (Cimpian & Markman, 
2011). Where this becomes particularly serious is that essentialism weds itself to the idea 
that category membership is fixed. Therefore, an individual perceives effort as futile and 
unable to lead to improvement and change (Rhodes & Bushara, 2015). When placed in 
the context of race, merely being a member of a stereotyped group can impact 
performance on a task related to the stereotype (Armenta, 2010). Therefore, making 
group membership more fluid by means of continuum and non-generic language, it seems 
as though it would benefit all students in terms of their self-efficacy and beliefs in their 
abilities.  
 Broadly speaking, subtle language cues have immense power to buoy 
essentialism. For instance, even simply using “you” versus “we” to introduce a task can 
elicit strict boundary beliefs (Sahin, 2018). Furthermore, labels of any kind highlight 
category boundaries and impact young children’s categorizations and likelihood of 
making group-based judgments (Baron et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2013; Roberts, Ho, & 
Gelman, 2017; Sloutsky, 2003). Category-based inferences among 4-year-olds are most 
likely when generic language is used to introduce a novel category compared to using 
specific labels or no labels (Gelman et al., 2010; Roberts et al., 2017; Roberts & Gelman, 
2017b). Similarly, Study 3 highlighted the effect of presenting specific labels on a 
continuum which minimized category-based inferences and thus, decreased the likelihood 
that the category signifies fundamental differences related to the essence of the category 
member (Gelman & Heyman, 1999). In summary, when categorizing an individual, traits 
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are seen as fixed and thus categories are seen as having fixed individuals, which then fails 
to capture the richness of an individual’s many identities, instead often marginalizing one 
identity (Weeks, 2015). It behooves teachers to thoughtfully consider their use of 
category labels and look for ways to promote more fluid category boundaries both for the 
interpersonal dynamics within their classrooms as well as for the enhancement of 
students’ cognitive flexibility. Teachers are typically using language in a group-based 
setting (i.e. the classroom) and must consider the example they set for all of the students 
in the way that they group and individualize children in the context of teaching. Future 
research that systematically explores the presentation of curricula that emphasize 
continuum and similarities across groups and differences within groups compared to 
curricula as it stands would be important to assess the short- and long-term implications 
for students’ learning, achievement, and social interactions.  
Clinical Implications 
Relatedly, clinicians should be extremely sensitive to the power of labels and categories 
when diagnosing patients. While teachers are predominantly working in group-based 
contexts, there is more variability in a psychologist’s work such that they usually are 
engaged in one on one dyads as well as group-based work. Given that there is often more 
opportunity for dyad work in clinical settings, it may be fruitful to have an open 
discussion that explores how the patient chooses to self-identify across various categories 
and what labels they prefer, if any.  Additionally, previous research highlights the 
importance of using state-based language (e.g., “She is experiencing symptoms of bipolar 
disorder.”) instead of trait-based language (e.g., “She is bipolar.”) As observed in Study 
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3, trait based-language is positively associated with essentialism (Bastian & Haslam, 
2003; Gelman, 2003; Prentice & Miller, 2007). When working with children clinically, 
an inherent part of the work is engaging in conversation with the adults in the child’s life 
about their treatment. Therefore, when talking to a child’s parents, especially in front of 
them, or offering recommendations to a school, it is critical to highlight their personhood 
first so they are not essentialized as mentally ill. Considering strategies that help children 
and adults normalize their symptoms and see similarities between those without 
diagnoses and themselves may also be helpful for treatment and developing their self-
concept.  
Second, the teacher workforce (82%) as well as active psychologists (83.6%) are 
largely White (King, McIntosh, & Bell-Ellwanger, 2016; Lin, Nigrinis, Christidis, & 
Stamm, 2015; Segall & Garrett, 2013). Yet, race is not commonly discussed in the 
learning environment nor in therapy and if it is, often a colorblind approach is endorsed, 
which denies racial differences and invalidates experiences of discrimination (Brown, 
Blackmon, Schumacher, & Urbanski, 2012; Ellis, 2018; Derman-Sparks & Ramsey, 
2006; Husband, 2010). Some argue that due to developmental level it is inappropriate to 
discuss race (Hughes & Chen, 1997). However, it is evident from our findings that 
children are clearly aware of race and concepts are being more strongly reinforced as they 
go through elementary school. Additionally, due to this failure to appreciate the salience 
of race for young children, the literature on young children’s early discrimination 
experiences is lacking. One new research study suggests that young children’s perceived 
experiences of ethnic-racial discrimination predicted heightened internalizing and 
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externalizing behaviors one year later but only for children who had less advanced 
ethnic-racial identities (Marcelo & Yates, 2019). Taken together, these findings highlight 
the need for adults both in and outside of the family to recognize the importance and feel 
prepared to confront race and racism explicitly to promote healthy socialization and racial 
identity development as well as positive mental health outcomes.  
Moreover, for children and adults, there is research indicating that denial of 
identity is associated with various negative mental health outcomes (Albuja, Sanchez, & 
Gaither, 2018; Shih & Sanchez, 2005). This is especially relevant for biracial individuals 
who are often denied their White identity due to the pervasiveness of essentialism and the 
need for an individual to be the member of a single racial category with strict boundaries 
(Kang, Plaks, & Remedios, 2015). When denied their identities, biracial individuals have 
been shown to have elevated levels of stress and depressive symptoms (Albuja et al., 
2018). With such clear relations to mental health, it is important that the therapeutic 
relationship does not serve to mimic society’s essentialist norms and allows for the space 
to integrate identities and promote intersectionality broadly (Albuja et al., 2018; Cheng & 
Lee, 2009).  
Despite these important implications, I continue to be cautious about the 
implications of these findings for future interventions seeking to decrease social 
essentialism. As highlighted in Chapter 1, despite recognizing the problematic 
consequences often associated with social categories and in many cases the obsoleteness 
of categories altogether, we continued to perpetuate these boundaries by examining our 
three study results through the lens of categories. Though there is recognition that 
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categories are increasingly failing to capture the diversity of our nation (e.g., Dunham & 
Olson, 2015), presently social categories continue to be meaningful and can greatly 
impact a person’s life outcomes depending on the categories in which they are placed. 
Therefore, the vision is for future research to limit the weight categories hold but in the 
meantime, we felt it was important to attend to categories at risk of being seen as 
misleading. Additionally, while the use of smiley faces is interesting in Study 3, it is 
unclear whether or not children will extend their judgments to real people and in turn 
whether their actions and engagement in social interactions will be impacted. More 
research is needed to determine if the findings generalize to other domains and impact 
people’s attitudes.  
General Conclusions 
Taken together, the results of this research have both theoretical and practical 
consequences. These studies help us to better understand the ways in which both children 
and adults are thinking about race. Children of color have been overlooked in this 
research area and this work intends to shed light on their unique developmental 
trajectory. Although children at extraordinarily young ages demonstrate preferences, 
attitudes, and the ability to categorize based on race, the literature remains ambiguous 
regarding children’s development of race essentialism. Often elementary educators 
assume that children are not developmentally ready to discuss race and in turn, use a 
“color blind” approach, which only serves to perpetuate racism (Banks, 1995; Husband, 
2010, 2012; Kalin, 2002). These studies allow us to not only gain greater insight as to 
how children and adults think about race but also help to guide our application of this 
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knowledge to create necessary and important change within schools and broader society. 
Increasing our understanding of how children are making sense of their own racial 
identity, and that of others, will help us to provide scaffolding and support that 
strengthens their racial and ethnic identity development. Fostering this identity 
development at young ages will likely impact the way in which these children are able to 
manage issues unique to people of color as they grow older into adolescence and 
adulthood. Promoting strong racial identity development practices as well as positive 
intergroup relations has never been more important than in today’s society since tensions 
between racial groups remain high (Parker, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2015a). The 
findings from this work will help us to begin to identify the factors through which adults 
can help to generate positive change and allow for greater inclusivity. Furthermore, the 
potential of implementing a continuum framework as a possible intervention and 
everyday practice to encourage more flexible thinking among children may help to 
prevent the development of stereotypes. Such flexibility is increasingly important as the 
number of multiracial children rises (U.S. Census, 2012). In conclusion, social 
essentialism among children and adults varies greatly between different social groups and 
is considerably malleable. Thus, we believe that the results from this dissertation provide 






Table A1 Byrd’s (2012) model 
Stage Age (years) Markers 
Awareness 
3-4 




Awareness based on physical 
differences; consistent classification 
Identification 6-8 
Identification develops; 
preconceptual classification  
Constancy 
8-10 
Awareness based on physical and 
biological characteristics; some 
awareness of social characteristics; 
conceptual classification 
10-12 Awareness based on physical, 
biological, and social characteristics; 






Table A2 Socio-cognitive developmental model (Alejandro-Wright, 1985) 
Stage Age (years) Markers 
Stage 0: Idiosyncratic 3-4 
 
Lacking knowledge and a systematic 
approach to racial categorization  
Stage I: Subliminal 
Awareness 
4-6 
Able to accurately group races but do 
not appreciate racial categories as 
mutually exclusive or based on 
multiple factors  
Stage II: Preconceptual 6-8 
Categories become more 
differentiated and emerging 
awareness that features beyond skin 
color play a role 
Stage III: Conceptual 8-10 
Understand racial groups as separate 
and informed by physical attributes, 
origins, and social dimensions 
 
Table A3 Ethnic identity development in children (Bernal et al., 1990) 
 
Stage Age Markers 
Preschool 3-5 
 
Understand labels based on concrete 
and physical features but lack in 
more abstract concepts like meaning, 
constancy, and preference   
Early School 6-8 
Labels as well as group identification 
are perceived as more salient and 
fixed  
Later School 8-10 
Enhanced understanding of ethnic 









Race Essentialism Adult Survey 
1. How old are you? 




3. What is your race? 
4. What is the color of your skin? 
5. What is the zip code of where you grew up? 
6. What is your highest level of education? 





8. Do you consider yourself to be part of the majority or minority racial group 




Here are some questions about you and about the world. They might seem silly or 
impossible, or really obvious. We ask little kids, older kids, and adults the same questions 
to see how what you know changes as you grow up. Just answer the best you can.  
 












12. Can you become another race? 
Yes, No, or Unsure 
  Why/Why not?  
13. Could you become another race if you: 
Put on a wig and makeup? 
  Yes or No 
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Laid in the sun and got a tan? 
  Yes or No 
Took medication and/or had a medical procedure? 
  Yes or No 
Married someone of a different race? 
  Yes or No 
        Moved to a foreign country? 
  Yes or No 
        Adopted a different cultural background as your own? 
  Yes or No 
        Is there anything else that you could make you a different race?   
  Yes or No 
14. Do you think race and ethnicity have the same meaning? 
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